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ABSTRACT
This thesis provided a detailed examination o f severe performance loss in competitive 
sport. Baumeister’s (1984) model of choking under pressure and Masters, Polman and 
Hammond’s (1993) model of skill failure under pressure have largely predicted the 
direction o f the current research associated with this phenomenon. Both models control for 
dispositional and situational factors. The research underpinning these theories has 
produced equivocal findings. Furthermore, mechanisms associated with these models have 
been derived from limited research, lacking empirical or qualitative grounding in sport. 
The primary aims o f this thesis were to identify psychological mechanisms that underpin 
severe performance loss, examine how the dominant mechanisms within the problem 
interact and establish coping strategies to counteract this phenomenon. Three research 
designs were used across this thesis. The first study adopted an inductive qualitative 
design. Studies two, three and four adopted a group-based design. The final study adopted 
a single-subject reversal design. The final two studies also used qualitative interview 
techniques. Study one investigated from the athlete’s perspective, psychological 
mechanisms that underpin severe performance loss in sport. Inductive techniques produced 
five main themes that described athletes’ experiences: stress, anxiety, self-consciousness, 
conscious processing and automaticity disruption. Athletes followed a similar sequence o f  
events outlined by Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis and reported 
dispositional characteristics consistent with Masters et al.’s (1993) model o f skill failure 
under pressure. The contentions of Baumeister (1984) were not supported. Masters et al. 
(1993) constructed the Reinvestment Scale which they claimed to be a predictor of  
performance loss under stress. Study two investigated the predictive power o f the 
Reinvestment Scale in skilled soccer players executing a gross dynamic motor task under 
stress. Results indicated that high reinvesters were more susceptible to performance loss 
under stress than low reinvesters, which provided support for the predictive power o f the 
Reinvestment Scale. Study three investigated the effect of holistic and process learning 
methods and reinvestment on the performance of an adapted basketball free-throw task 
under stress. Results indicated that minimising the acquisition o f explicit task knowledge 
in high reinvesters using holistic style learning performance loss, precipitated by conscious 
processing could be prevented when under stress. These findings have practical 
implications for rule-based orthodox coaching strategies used in sport. Study four 
investigated whether or .not the use of different attentional foci could prevent performance 
loss in skilled golfers, high in reinvestment when they performed a putting task under 
stress. Results indicated that loading heavily on working memory (e.g. random letter 
generation focus) desensitised high reinvesters to stress. Thus, conscious processing o f  
explicit task knowledge was prevented and automaticity promoted, which enabled 
consistent performance under stress. The final study investigated the influence of a two- 
phase putting intervention strategy on skilled golfers high in reinvestment. The 
intervention strategy successfully counteracted conscious processing by loading on 
working memory to prevent access to explicit knowledge during putting execution, whilst 
still enabling critical environmental information to be processed prior to putting execution 
via the use o f  external imagery. Interview data indicated that all participants would feel 
confident in using the putting intervention during competition. It is the author’s belief that, 
although unanswered questions remain, this research programme has enriched the 
conceptual and practical understanding o f severe performance loss in competitive sport for 
researchers, practitioners and coaches. Future research should investigate the relationship 
between personality and environmental factors on learning styles and skilled performance 
to establish a richer understanding of this phenomenon. Research also needs to examine the 
efficacy o f psychological intervention strategies used to counteract severe performance 
loss in a variety o f sports and ecologically valid competitive environments.
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GLOSSARY
Severe Performance Loss in 
Competitive Sport
Conscious Processing
Automaticity
Choking Under Pressure
Reinvestment
Self-consciousness
Anxiety
Pressure
Stress
Explicit (Process) Learning 
Implicit learning 
Holistic Learning
A sudden and substantial deterioration of a well-learnt 
motor skill under stress.
Consciously rehearsing explicit task knowledge 
associated with early stages of learning under stress.
An implicitly regulated processing system 
unconstrained by conscious control.
The occurrence of inferior performance despite an 
individual striving and situational demands for superior 
performance.
A dispositional tendency to experience conscious 
processing and automaticity disruption under stress.
A dispositional tendency to experience self-awareness 
in social situations.
The emotional impact or cognitive dimension of 
arousal.
Any factor or combination of factors that increases the 
importance of performing well.
A substantial imbalance between environmental 
demands and response capacity, under conditions where 
failure to meet the demands has important consequences.
Acquiring a skill through a specific set of rules that are 
one is aware of and therefore can articulate.
Acquiring a skill through a specific set o f rules that one is 
not aware of and therefore can not articulate.
Acquiring a skill as a whole with little or no awareness 
of rules associated with that skill.
CHAPTER I
1
1.0. INTRODUCTION
The world o f sport hosts m any famous examples where athletes occasionally have 
experienced a sudden and severe loss in performance during competition. One has only to 
reflect on the semi-final o f the 1990 football W orld Cup finals when both Chris Waddle and 
Stuart Pearce missed important penalty kicks against Germany or Jana N ovotna’s 
extraordinary loss to Steffi G raf in the 1993 W imbledon tennis final. A more recent 
example o f this phenomenon is Jean Vandervalde’s missed opportunity to win The Open 
G olf Championship in 1999 at Carnoustie after experiencing an unprecedented triple bogy 
on the final hole. Paradoxically, on these occasions it would appear that motivation and the 
importance to perform well were at a premium, yet performance suddenly dropped well 
below what would normally be anticipated. A clear understanding o f  this phenomenon 
eludes applied sport psychologists and researchers alike owing perhaps to the complex and 
individual nature of such a phenomenon.
Severe performance loss in competitive sport can be characterised by  a sudden and 
substantial deterioration o f  performance under stress. As a result o f  the com plexity o f such 
an experience several theories probably have a part to play in explaining this performance 
deterioration (e.g. choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984); catastrophe theory (Hardy, 
1990); conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992); skill failure under pressure 
(Masters, Polman & Hammond, 1993)). These theories provide different perspectives in 
attempting to explain performance loss phenomenon. For these reasons, throughout the 
programme o f research this phenomenon will be referred to as severe perform ance loss in 
competitive sport as opposed to other terminology used in the literature such as choking or 
skill failure. It was the author’s belief that this would avoid any confusion about the thrust 
o f  the thesis. In addition, it was believed that by initially adopting a broad approach to this 
phenomenon the value o f different theoretical perspectives could be adequately explored.
Current research has highlighted pressure and stress as fundamental antecedents associated 
with decrements in motor performance (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, M ullen & Jones, 1996; 
M asters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). Pressure increases the 
demands o f performing well; stress is the process involving one’s appraisal o f  whether or 
not those demands can be successfully met (Lazarus, 1966, 1982, 2000; Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). In the context o f sport it has been suggested that stress might or might not 
place strain on the individual, it is one’s appraisal or perceived ability to cope with the 
situation (i.e. stressor) that is central to the process (Jones, 1990). The purported 
mechanisms through which such stress affects motor performance are wide ranging and 
depend on the theoretical position adopted. Some researchers have suggested that large 
deteriorations in performance can occur due to the effects o f anxiety (Fazey & Hardy,
1988; Masters et al., 1993) and arousal (Easterbrook, 1959) that emerge from stress. These 
researchers argued that the combination o f high cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal 
w ould have catastrophic effects on skill execution. Some purported effects o f  experiencing 
arousal and anxiety are that they can cause either a distraction or a self-focused attention. 
Distraction occurs when an individual is preoccupied by task-irrelevant information (e.g. 
worry) and fails to attend to task-relevant cues (Eysenck, 1979). Alternatively, 
performance decrements occur when self-focused attention interferes with the automatic 
execution o f a motor skill (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992).
Substantial support has been provided for the stress-self-focus relationship. For example, 
M asters (1992) proposed the conscious processing hypothesis, which stated that heightened 
state anxiety precipitated by stress can direct attention to the process by w hich a well- 
leam ed skill is executed. Deikman (1969) refers to this as deautomatization; performance 
decreases because conscious attention interferes w ith the automatic regulation o f  the skill 
sequence. These arguments have led to suggestions that such attentional shifts are 
influenced by the method through which the skill was learnt (Masters, 1992). M otor skills 
have been proposed, initially, to be learned explicitly through conscious processing 
(Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967). Over time, w ith practise, motor skills are then 
thought to become implicit through automatic processing. It is therefore hypothesised by 
some authors that stress results in a regression to early learning phase strategies (Fuchs, 
1962) and results in a movement characterised by inefficient co-ordination patterns and a 
freezing of the degrees o f  freedom within the movement sequence (Bernstein, 1967). Hence 
the movements lose effectiveness, which leads to large deteriorations o f performance.
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The phenomenon under investigation in this study has sometimes been labelled as choking 
and describes an athlete when he/she experiences a severe loss in performance during a 
critical mom ent in competition (Baumeister & Showers, 1986). This suggests that the 
timing o f  the deterioration in performance is linked to specific characteristics o f the 
situation such as the competition environment and the moment by moment status o f  that 
performance and targets set. Baumeister (1984) proposed a model o f choking, which 
hypothesised that arousal, created by pressure, heightens self-consciousness, which directs 
attention to the movement characteristics o f a skill sequence. An anxious attem pt is then 
made to consciously control the movement to ensure the correct execution o f  the skill. This 
disrupts automaticity and impairs performance because explicit knowledge is no longer 
available to the conscious attention to successfully guide the execution o f  a well-learned 
skill.
To test the choking model Baumeister (1984) conducted a series o f experiments. The 
outcome was that it is easier for highly self-conscious individuals to cope w ith pressure 
because they are used to performing whilst feeling self-conscious, in contrast to low self- 
conscious individuals who are not so accustomed to this process (Baumeister, 1984). This 
suggests that the role of dispositional characteristics in a perform er’s personality might 
have an explanatory role in large performance decrements. Further to this M asters et al. 
(1993) regard the primary mechanism by which skill regression occurs as reinvestm ent of 
controlled processing. They described this occurrence as having a greater or lesser 
disposition to rehearse explicit task knowledge, particularly when under stress.
Clearly, a definitive explanation in terms o f mechanisms that underpin the experiences of 
such athletes as Chris Waddle, Jana Novotna and Jean Vandervalde has yet to be 
established. There a four central criticisms emanating from the literature that require 
investigation: first, psychological mechanisms associated with models claim ing to explain 
severe performance loss (e.g. Baumeister, 1984; M asters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993) have 
been derived from limited research, possessing no empirical or qualitative grounding in 
sport. Current research has not identified the athlete’s perspective on psychological 
mechanisms that might underpin severe performance loss in competitive perform ers.
Second, there are conflicting elements between such models both from theoretical and 
research perspectives. Third, dispositional factors and learning methods have
independently emerged as key mechanisms that underpin severe performance loss. 
Nevertheless, the combined effects o f such mechanisms have not been investigated. 
Finally, intervention strategies have yet to be developed to help promote automaticity and 
prevent severe performance loss in competitive sport. These limitations in the literature 
will form the basis for this programme o f research.
Purpose o f the Thesis
The central purpose o f this thesis was to investigate psychological mechanisms that 
underpin severe performance loss in competitive sport. M oreover, one intention was to 
make the transition from theory into practice and provide psychological intervention 
strategies that practitioners could use to help performers counteract this phenomenon. 
Subsidiary aims o f this thesis were to establish psychological mechanisms that underpin 
severe performance loss (Studies 1 & 2), examine how dominant mechanisms o f the 
problem interact (Studies 3 & 4) and establish coping strategies to counteract the severe 
performance loss phenomenon (Study 5). A time line o f this thesis is presented in 
Appendix 1.
Structure and Main Findings o f the Thesis
The thesis comprises seven further chapters that address the central research aims. The 
structure o f  this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a critical overview o f a broad range o f theories and research that could 
explain severe performance loss in competitive sport.
Chapter 3 examines psychological characteristics derived from the perceptions and 
interpretations o f competitive athletes that have experienced first-hand, performance loss in 
a variety o f  sports. To date, previous research has exclusively used quantitative, outcome- 
based measures to examine performance loss in competitive sport without a qualitatively 
derived understanding. The main purpose o f the study was to explore the value o f  available 
theories used in the literature to explain severe performance loss in relation to the 
perceptions o f athletes who have experienced such a phenomenon. The study also
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provides a basis for testing specific psychological mechanisms in the subsequent 
investigations.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of dispositional reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993) and 
stress on experienced soccer players using a gross, dynamic m otor task. The main purpose 
o f the study was to assess whether or not those players who scored high on the 
Reinvestment Scale would be more susceptible to severe perform ance loss o f a gross 
dynamic motor skill, precipitated by conscious processing and automaticity disruption 
under high stress.
Chapter 5 examines the effects of learning methods and reinvestment under stress. The 
main purpose o f  the study was to assess if  limiting explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition could prevent conscious processing and so promote implicit regulation o f 
performance in individuals predisposed to conscious processing (high reinvesters) under 
high stress.
Chapter 6 investigates the effects of attentional foci (internal, external and articulatory 
suppression) on experienced golfers high in reinvestment under stress. The main purpose 
o f the study was to assess whether the manipulation of attentional focus or loading on 
working m em ory could prevent conscious processing and prom ote automaticity in 
experienced golfers high in reinvestment. Another aim o f this study was to provide 
information to develop psychological intervention strategies that golfers could use to 
prevent severe performance loss during competition in the future.
Chapter 7 examines the effects of a two-phase psychological putting intervention on 
experienced golfers, high in reinvestment, in an ecologically-valid environment under 
stress. The purpose o f the study was to assess whether the putting intervention could help 
experienced golfers, high in reinvestment, to maintain performance by preventing 
conscious processing and promoting automaticity under high stress.
Chapter 8 summarises the overall findings o f the research program m e and discusses 
theoretical implications. The chapter also provides an outline o f  practical im plications as
6
well as strengths and limitations that emanate from the findings. The chapter concludes by  
identifying areas o f  future research and clarifying the overall conclusions o f  the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
2.0. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Sport comprises many athletes that have experienced, under pressure, a marked loss in 
their performance. However, definitive understandings of the mechanisms that underpin 
these experiences continue to elude sports psychologists and researchers. Deleterious 
performance effects are scattered across a wide range of topics in the academic 
literature. Hence, explanations for these phenomena have been made through the most 
readily available theory (Baumeister, 1986). An area that has received much attention in 
sport psychology literature is the influence of stress and pressure upon performance 
(Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Current sports performers are required to compete 
under intense pressure, which often elicits high psychological stress. It is therefore no 
surprise that researchers have tried to identify the antecedents of stress, whilst 
attempting to develop strategies to help performers cope with this phenomenon 
(Scanlan, Stein & Ravizza, 1991). Explanations o f the stress - athletic performance 
relationship have been provided through a string o f theoretical models. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between stress and the disruption to automatic skills (or deautomatization; 
Deikman, 1969) has received comparatively little attention in the academic literature 
and, hence, is not that well understood. This is perhaps owing to the individual nature 
and complexity of such a phenomenon.
The initial section of this review of literature will clarify issues surrounding the use of 
terminology and concepts associated with performance pressure, psychological stress, 
arousal, activation and anxiety in sport. This is followed by an overview and critique of 
both unidimensional and multidimensional arousal and competitive anxiety theories 
associated with severe performance loss. The next section of the review provides an 
overview and critique of theory and research on the influence of attention mechanisms 
on severe performance loss. Also incorporated into this section is an overview and 
critique of the theory and research relating to the influence of skill acquisition upon 
severe performance loss. The final section provides an overview and critique o f theory 
and research relating to the influence of dispositional factors upon severe performance 
loss. The main focus of the review forms a synopsis of the nature of the aforementioned 
cognitive mechanisms and compares how they interact with each other in relation to 
severe performance loss. The review concludes by summarising areas of future study
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within the domain of severe performance loss in competitive sport. This provided the 
rationale for the programme o f research undertaken within this thesis.
2.1. PERFORMANCE PRESSURE, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS, AROUSAL, 
ACTIVATION AND ANXIETY -  CLARIFICATION OF TERMS
An integral part of competing in sport, particularly at elite level, is the capability to cope 
with high levels of pressure, stress, arousal and anxiety (Jones & Hardy, 1990). A 
problem within the literature has been the imprecise use of terminology. This has led to 
such constructs being used interchangeably in previous research. Therefore, the aim of 
this review section is to remedy this problem by presenting a series of clear definitions 
that outline and distinguish these constructs.
Current research has highlighted pressure and stress as being fundamental antecedents 
o f decrements in motor performance (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996, 
Masters, 1992; Masters et ah, 1993; Mullen & Hardy, 2000).
These constructs, often used interchangeable in the literature, are not synonymous and 
possess distinct differences. Pressure has been defined as
“any factor or combination of factors that increases the importance 
o f performing well on a particular occasion” (Baumeister, 1984,
p.610).
Baumeister and Showers (1986) highlight five main antecedents of pressure in sport. 
These are contingency of reward or punishments on level of performance, an evaluative 
audience, comparative coactors (e.g. competition), the relevance of performance in 
relation to the ‘ego’, and finally, having only one chance to be successful. Baumeister 
and Showers (1986) argued that an individual must be aware of the incentive(s) of 
pressure for performance to be influenced. They also argued that more than one factor 
might elicit pressure in certain circumstances and thus, speculated the effects on 
performance would be additive.
1 0
General psychology has suggested that stress should be characterised as a process 
(Lazarus, 1966; 1982; 2000; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Stress has been defined as
“a relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the person as relevant to his or her well-being and in 
which the person’s resources are taxed or exceeded” (Folkman &
Lazarus, 1985, p .152).
In short, pressure increases the demands of performing well, whilst stress is one’s 
appraisal as to whether those demands can be successfully met or not. Current 
researchers within sport have acknowledged the main principles of Lazarus and 
colleague’s definition (e.g. Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996; Jones, 1990). For examples, 
Jones (1990) proposed that stress in sport was a state in which some demand is placed 
on the individual, who then is required to react in some way to overcome the situation. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that stress might or might not place strain on the 
individual, it is one’s appraisal or perceived ability to cope with the situation (i.e. the 
stressor) that is central to the process. Apprehension and doubt relating to an athlete’s 
perceived ability to cope with a stressful situation is likely to be reflected in heightened 
levels of anxiety (Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996).
Anxiety can be defined as
“a negative emotional state with feelings of nervousness, worry and 
apprehension associated with the activation or arousal of the body”
(Levitt, 1980, p. 182).
Anxiety has become commonly accepted as a negative emotional response that can be 
experienced as cognitive reactions, such as worry and distraction or as bodily arousal 
(cf. Raffety, Smith & Ptacek, 1997).
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Arousal1 has been defined as
“the extent of release of potential energy, stored in the tissue of the 
organism, as this is shown in activity or response”. (Duffy, 1962, 
p.179).
Arousal was hypothesised to indicate an Inverted-U type performance relationship with 
moderate levels being associated to optimal performance (Broadhurst, 1975). More 
recently researchers have questioned the simplistic explanation of unidimensional 
theorisation o f arousal (e.g. Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; 
Lacey, 1967; Neiss, 1988; Pribram & McGuinness, 1975). Lacey (1967) proposed that 
arousal comprises three separate components; cognitive (electocortical activity 
measured via EEG), physiological (activity measured via skin conductance and heart 
rate) and behavioural (overt activity) components. Arousal and activation are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. Therefore, Pribram and McGuiness (1975; cf. Hardy 
Jones, & Gould, 1996) called for researchers to make a distinction between the two 
constructs. Arousal refers to an unprepared response to some new or unexpected form 
of stimulus presented to the system, involving cognitive and physiological activity. In 
comparison, activation refers to a prepared response to an anticipated input into the 
system involving cognitive and physiological activity (Pribram & McGuinness, 1975).
In summary, research within stress and anxiety has been limited by the incongruent 
terminology used to define pressure, stress, arousal, activation and anxiety (Hardy, Jones 
& Gould, 1996; Woodman & Hardy, 2001). Clearly these constructs are inter-related. 
Nevertheless, differentiation between these constructs remains essential for 
understanding. Thus, for the remainder of this thesis reference will be made to each 
construct in accordance with the previously denoted definitions.
1 An in-depth review o f  undimensional and multidimensional arousal and anxiety theories are provided in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
2.2. AROUSAL AND SEVERE PERFORMANCE LOSS IN COMPETITIVE SPORT
For almost a century researchers have sought to explain the arousal-performance 
relationship. Until recently, research has attempted to resolve the anxiety-performance 
relationship through arousal based theories. The following section provides a brief 
outline and critique of two main arousal-performance explanations; Inverted-U theory 
and Drive theory. This is followed by an outline of multidimensional theory, a more 
contemporary explanation of the arousal-performance relationship. Throughout this 
section a series of theoretical issues will be discussed relating to the role o f arousal upon 
severe performance loss in competitive sport.
From a theoretical perspective, Inverted-U theory was the first documented model 
proposed to explain the arousal-performance relationship. Inverted-U theory was 
initially proposed by Yerkes and Dodson (1908) to explain the habit strength 
formulation of mice at different levels o f punishment stimulus frequency. More 
recently, this theory has been used to explain the relationship between arousal and sports 
performance. Inverted-U theory proposed that arousal has a curvilinear relationship 
with performance. It was hypothesised that increases in arousal up to a certain ‘optimal’ 
level would result in performance gains. In comparison, it was proposed that increases 
or decreases in arousal above or below the optimal point would result in performance 
decrements, proportionate to the changes in arousal levels (see Figure 2.1). Hence, the 
Inverted-U theory has received much criticism from several perspectives (Hardy, 1990; 
Lacey, 1967; Landers & Boutcher, 1986). Initially, criticism was directed towards the 
lack of theory to underpin the Invert-U hypothesis. The hypothesis provides no 
explanation as to how arousal affects performance or why performance is impaired 
when levels are less than optimal (Eysenck, 1985). Further criticism came from 
catastrophe models2 which suggest slight arousal reduction is unlikely to reinstate 
optimal performance levels (Hardy, 1990). Finally, Lacey (1967) found evidence to 
suggest that arousal was not undimensional, but rather a multidimensional construct 
comprising three elements. Individuals that experience severe performance 
deterioration in sport report a large and dramatic loss to performance, rather than a 
gradual decrease in performance. Hence, the Inverted-U theory is unlikely to be able to 
explain the occurrence o f severe performance loss in competitive sport.
2 A review of catastrophe theory is provided in section 2.3.
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Figure 2.1. The Inverted-U Hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908)
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Drive theory, initially proposed by Hull (1943) and later modified by Spence and Spence 
(1966) hypothesised that drive and habit strength were predictors of performance. Drive 
is considered synonymous with arousal. Habit strength is associated with the 
dominance of the correct or incorrect response. In contrast to Inverted-U theory, Drive 
theory proposed that the arousal-performance relationship was linear - Performance (P)
= Habit (H) x Drive (D). Habit represented the standard of skill that the individual had 
obtained and drive was the level of arousal that they were experiencing. Thus, in the 
early stages of learning where a skill had not reached automaticity, the habit (dominant 
response) would not be the correct response. Hence, as arousal increases so the quality 
of the performance would deteriorate because the skill was not well learned. Later in 
the learning process, where the skill has been well learned the dominant response will be 
the correct one. For individuals at this stage of skill development increases in arousal 
should produce a higher quality performance.
Drive theory also takes into account ‘incentive value’. This aspect of the theory 
suggests that performance will only increase if the performer desires to perform the task. 
Hence, if an individual’s ‘incentive value’ is low then performance improvements will 
not occur. Drive theory has been criticised on two main counts; first the theory is too 
simplistic to explain behaviour in a sporting context. Second, it is very difficult to 
determine the habit hierarchy of correct and incorrect responses (Fisher, 1976). Such 
limitations have made it problematic to test the theory in motor behaviour contexts. 
Hence, Drive theory has been rejected as an accurate predictor of the effects o f arousal 
on motor performance (Martens, 1971; Neiss, 1988). Individuals who experience severe 
performance loss in competitive sport are generally considered to possess well learned, 
automatic skills (Masters, 1992). According to Drive theory high levels o f arousal 
should help to produce the dominant response and facilitate performance. Baumeister 
(1984) identified high levels of arousal to be detrimental to executing a well learned 
skill, which is inconsistent with the predictions of Drive theory. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that Drive theory is able to explain the occurrence o f severe performance loss in 
competitive sport.
More recently, researchers have taken a multidimensional approach to arousal (Hockey 
& Hamilton, 1983; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Lacey, 1967). Pribram and McGuiness (1975) 
proposed three interactive neural systems that influenced the arousal-performance
15
relationship; these were arousal, activation, and cognitive effort. Arousal refers to an 
unprepared response to some new form of stimulus presented to the system, involving 
cognitive and physiological activity. Activation refers to a prepared response to an 
anticipated situation involving cognitive and physiological activity. Cognitive effort is 
responsible for co-ordination between the arousal and activation systems and is deemed 
to be an attentional measure associated with maintaining or increasing efficiency.
Deuchamps (1988) proposed three inter-related dimensions of arousal; energetical, 
emotional, and computational (cognitive). Deuchamps (1988) asserted that specific 
stressors would predict which dimension is most aroused, which is then given priority 
(via the central nervous system) at the expense of the other dimensions. For example, if 
the stressor is physical the energetical dimension will be given priority in terms of 
arousal; if the stressor is anxiety then the emotional dimension will be most aroused at 
the expense of the other dimensions. Presumably, although Deuchamps (1988) does not 
comment on this, resources are taken up by negative emotions, which might leave 
insufficient arousal for the other two dimensions to operate efficiently. Hence, the 
execution of a motor skill might be impeded. Thus, Deuchamps’ (1988) theory could 
offer an explanation as to why individuals experience severe performance loss in sport. 
However, this theory has not been rigorously tested in relation to motor performance 
due to the complexities of measuring such a construct.
Neiss (1988) conceptualised arousal as a patterning of different physiological 
parameters rather than a unidimensional quantitative state. Hockey and Hamilton
(1983) argued that the appropriateness of this pattern (Neiss, 1988) in relation to the 
task being undertaken can affect performance efficiency. If the present physiological 
arousal pattern is inappropriate a decrement in performance will ensue (Neiss, 1988). In 
a specific task being undertaken activation states of some subsystems will be inevitably 
higher than in others. Hardy, Jones and Gould (1996) explained the potential 
differences in activation subsystems using the example of golf putting. They suggested 
that when this task is executed brain wave activity may be high, but local muscle 
activity in the forearms may be low. These activation states are task specific as different 
tasks utilise different subsystems. A degree of preparation is also required to create the 
appropriate activation state prior to performance (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996).
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Hockey and Hamilton (1983) suggested that by using different strategies to induce stress 
(e.g. auditory noise, monetary reward, and sleep deprivation) different activation states 
could be elicited. However, processes of some operations would be facilitated whereas 
others would be impaired. Hockey and Hamilton (1983) highlighted the importance of 
identifying specific subsystems relating to arousal that support performance. In 
addition, they called for research to investigate different constructs that induce stress 
and their impact on different cognitive variables (e.g. vigilance, selective attention, 
working memory capacity, short and long-term recall, and speed of information 
transfer).
Clearly, Hockey and Hamilton (1983) consider arousal to be a multidimensional state 
and thus reject unidimensional theories relating to this construct. However, a criticism 
of multidimensional arousal theorists is they do not quantify the required dimensions of 
arousal needed to activate the different subsystems in order to elicit optimal 
performance. Finally, a multidimensional approach to arousal suggests generic 
interventions used to suppress physiological arousal (e.g. applied relaxation techniques) 
in athletes are inappropriate, as they collectively reduce both the positive and negative 
aspects of arousal in relation to performance (Burton, 1990). Arousal, if treated as a 
multidimensional construct could offer an explanation as to why severe performance 
loss occurs. However, a greater understanding of the required dimensions of arousal 
that activate performance is needed before a fuller explanation of the relationship 
between multi-dimensional arousal and severe performance loss can be established.
2.3. ANXIETY AND SEVERE PERFORMANCE LOSS IN COMPETITIVE SPORT
Anxiety and its effects on athletic performance have received a considerable amount of 
attention in the sport psychology literature. The majority of the literature relating to 
severe performance loss in competitive sport has been associated with some form o f 
anxiety (e.g. Baumeister, 1984, Bright & Freedman, 1998; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones,
1996, Masters, 1992; Masters et al. 1993; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). The following 
section provides a brief outline and critique of anxiety theory and research. This 
includes a description of the components and measures of anxiety, followed by a series 
of explanations relating to the anxiety-performance relationship. Throughout this
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section a series o f theoretical issues will be discussed relating to the role o f anxiety and 
severe performance loss in competitive sport.
Early research by Spielberger (1966) proposed two types of anxiety that are situational 
specific, defined as state anxiety and that which is a personality disposition, defined as 
trait anxiety. State anxiety was defined as
“subjective, consciously perceived feelings of tension and 
apprehension associated with the arousal of the autonomic nervous 
system.” (p. 17)
In comparison, trait anxiety was defined as
“a motive or acquired behavioural disposition that predisposes an 
individual to perceive a wide range of objectively non-dangerous 
circumstances as threatening and respond to these with state anxiety 
reactions disproportionate in intensity to the magnitude of the 
objective danger.” (p. 17)
In short, individuals high in trait anxiety interpret more situations as threatening and 
thus, respond with greater levels of state anxiety. In general psychology Davidson and 
Schwartz (1976) began to recognise anxiety as a multidimensional response including a 
cognitive and somatic component. When defining the components, cognitive anxiety 
was suggested to reflect “...the cognitive elements of anxiety, such as negative 
expectations and cognitive concerns about oneself, the situation at hand, and potential 
consequences.” (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981; p.541). Whereas somatic anxiety 
was defined as “...ones perception o f the physiological-affective elements o f the anxiety 
experience, that is, indications of autonomic arousal and unpleasant feelings states such 
as nervousness and tension.” (Morris et al., 1981). From a sports perspective, Hardy, 
Jones and Gould (1996) defined cognitive anxiety as ‘concerns about performing well, 
and the consequence of failing to do so’. In comparison, somatic anxiety was defined as 
‘the physiological response to psychological stress’ (p. 69).
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Liebert and Morris (1967) proposed that the two sub-components o f anxiety have 
different effects on performance. Similarly, from a sporting perspective, Burton (1988) 
contended that somatic and cognitive anxiety influence performance in different ways. 
Cognitive anxiety was hypothesised to exhibit a negative linear relationship with 
performance. Hence, the greater the levels of cognitive anxiety, the greater the 
performance decrement. In comparison, somatic anxiety was suggested to display a 
quadratic or Inverted-U relationship with performance. Hence, moderate levels of 
somatic anxiety would produce optimal performance. However, changes in somatic 
anxiety levels (e.g. increase or decrease) would elicit a proportionate performance 
decrement (Burton 1988; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990). In the case 
o f cognitive anxiety, the proposed performance relationship was based on Wine’s 
(1971) theory of attentional disruption where worried athletes were suggested to become 
preoccupied with their own self-evaluation rather than direct attention to the task in 
hand (i.e. performance; Martens et al., 1990). The rationale for the hypothesised 
relationship between somatic anxiety and performance is less clear, although it appears 
to be an extension o f the proposed Inverted-U relationship between arousal and 
performance (cf. Woodman & Hardy, 2001). Additionally, Martens et al. (1990) cited 
Weinberg’s (1978) research surrounding the effects of increase muscular tension on 
performance deterioration as a possible mechanism accounting for the relationship.
Much of the early research used either the state version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Luschane, 1970) or the Competitive State 
Anxiety Inventory (CSAI; Martens, Burton, Rivkin, & Simon, 1980) to calculate 
competitive anxiety intensity. The STAI was developed as a non-sport specific measure 
o f anxiety and was criticised because of the need for instruments to be situation specific 
and sensitive to the characteristics of the measurement environment (Mandler &
Sarason, 1952). In response, Martens et al. (1980) developed the sport specific CSAI, 
suggested to be a more sensitive scale for use within sporting environments.
Although the developments outlined above aided understanding, the conceptualisation 
o f anxiety was still somewhat limited owing to the inventories used to calculate 
competitive anxiety intensity being unidimensional. The stimulus for the use of 
multidimensional anxiety in sport psychology was initiated through the development of 
the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens et al., 1990) as a
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development of Martens et al.’s (1980) original (unidimensional) CSAI scale. Martens 
et al. (1990) integrated the definitions of Morris et al. (1981) with state cognitive 
anxiety suggested to be “ ...most commonly manifested in negative expectations about 
performance and thus negative self-evaluation, both of which precipitate worry, 
distributing visual images or both.” (p. 120). In comparison, state somatic anxiety was 
referred to as “ ...the physiological and affective elements of the anxiety experience that 
develop directly from autonomic arousal. Somatic A-state is reflected in such responses 
as rapid heart rate, shortness of breath, clammy hands, butterflies in the stomach, and 
tense muscles.” (p. 121).
During the original validation of the CSAI-2 self-confidence also emerged as a separate 
construct of competitive anxiety (Martens et al., 1990). During the exploratory factor 
analysis procedures adopted by Martens et al., (1990) cognitive anxiety effectively split 
into two factors; a positively labelled factor subsequently termed self-confidence, and a 
negatively worded set described by the term cognitive anxiety. Martens et al. (1990) 
suggested that the two constructs represented opposite ends of a continuum, with state 
self-confidence indicative of an absence of cognitive anxiety, and conversely state 
anxiety representing a lack of state self-confidence. For this reason, self-confidence 
became a component of multidimensional arousal theory.
More recently Jones (1991, 1995) criticised the ‘intensity’ (i.e., levels) alone approach 
to the measurement and conceptualisation of competitive anxiety suggesting the need to 
consider the direction dimension of the response (i.e., the interpretation o f symptom 
intensity as either facilitative or debilitative towards performance). Jones (1995) 
contended that areas such as educational psychology have long regarded the positive 
consequences of anxiety and identified the need to distinguish between positive and 
negative components o f the stress relationship. To examine the efficacy o f directional 
perceptions within competitive anxiety, Jones and Swain (1992) modified the CSAI-2 
adding a debilitative-facilitative continuum to each item. Specifically, performers were 
asked to rate whether they interpreted the intensity of pre-competitive anxiety symptoms 
as facilitative (i.e., positive) or debilitative (i.e., negative) towards future performance. 
Empirically research using the modified CSAI-2 has been successful in identifying 
several individual differences variables over and above approaches simply viewing 
anxiety as an intensity-based construct. Studies have revealed a consistent pattern of
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findings in their comparisons between elite versus non-elite performers (Jones, Hanton, 
& Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1995), good versus bad performance (Jones, Swain, & 
Hardy, 1994), high versus low competitive individuals (Jones & Swain, 1992), and 
positive versus negative goal expectancy groups (Jones & Hanton, 1996). However, no 
research has examined the directional interpretation of anxiety in relation to severe 
performance loss in competitive sport. Consequently, it is not clear what impact 
directional interpretation of anxiety might have on such a phenomenon.
Multidimensional anxiety theory has undoubtedly developed an improved understanding 
of the anxiety-performance relationship (Martens et al., 1990). However, research 
assessing the relationship between the components of anxiety and performance has 
tended to produce equivocal findings (Burton, 1998). A limitation of multidimensional 
anxiety theory is that it only describes the independent effects of somatic and cognitive 
anxiety, it does not account for the interactive nature of the two constructs upon 
performance (Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996). In an attempt to clarify the interactive 
effects of the two anxiety sub-components the cusp catastrophe model (see Figure 2.2) 
was proposed (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; cf. Hardy, 1990; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). 
This model hypothesises that the cognitive sub-component of anxiety determined the 
effects of physiological arousal on performance, which was termed a splitting function. 
The catastrophe model indicated that if cognitive anxiety is low, physiological arousal 
has a relatively small and systematic effect on performance, similar to Inverted-U 
theory. However, if cognitive anxiety is high then the effects of physiological arousal 
on performance will be large and catastrophic. A substantial reduction in cognitive 
anxiety is required if performance is to be reinstated. Fazey and Hardy (1988) argue that 
under such circumstances even reinstating intermediate levels of performance are 
unlikely.
More recently, Hardy (1990) proposed the catastrophe butterfly model; a higher order 
theme paradigm. This was to remedy criticisms of catastrophe theory, which did not 
account for self-confidence or the directional interpretation (facilitative or debilitative) 
o f anxiety. This five-dimensional model proposed that self-confidence increases the 
probability that individuals will be able to sustain performance even when experiencing 
high levels of cognitive and physiological arousal. This model could offer a more
21
p Yv^  s\o \o^ caX
OViS^
PerformanceI
c °gnitive
Anxiety
Figure 2.2. Catastrophe M odel o f Anxiety, Physiological A rousal and Perform ance (Hardy, 1990)
22
complete explanation of the anxiety-performance relationship. Nevertheless, research to 
support this paradigm has not been forthcoming.
Only limited support has been provided for catastrophe theory largely because of the 
difficulties in testing such a complex model. Athletes that have experienced severe 
performance loss have associated high levels o f anxiety with a sudden and dramatic 
decrease in performance (LeUnes & Nation, 1996). Therefore, catastrophe theory might 
explain why performers, on occasions, experience this phenomenon. However, this 
model does not provide an explanation as to how skills breakdown or how anxiety 
influences the mechanics o f automatic skill execution. Further, this model does not take 
into account dispositional factors (Baumeister, 1984; Masters et al., 1993), or the 
influence o f using different processing systems (e.g. automatic versus conscious) to 
execute automatic skills (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992), which have 
been proposed to influence this phenomenon. Hence, catastrophe theory is unlikely to 
explain fully the complex nature o f severe performance loss in competitive sport.
2.4. ATTENTIONAL MECHANISMS INFLUENTIAL IN SEVERE PERFORMANCE
LOSS IN COMPETITIVE SPORT
As established in the preceding two sections o f this review it is clear that both arousal 
and anxiety can influence decrements in sports performance. However, the models used 
to explain both the arousal- and anxiety-performance relationships are limited. Hence, it 
would appear that such models alone are unable to provide a complete explanation as to 
how and why automatic skills breakdown. Much of the literature that has examined the 
disruption to automatic skills, associated with arousal and anxiety, has also identified 
changes in attentional focus to be pivotal in this occurrence (e.g. Baumeister, 1984,
Bright & Freedman, 1998; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992; Masters et al. 
1993; Mullen & Hardy, 2000).
A dichotomy has emerged in the literature. This has produced two alternative 
mechanisms to explain the processes underpinning decrements in motor performance 
through an interference or change in attentional processes, often associated with arousal 
(Easterbrook, 1959) and anxiety (Masters et al., 1993). The first o f these mechanisms 
occurs when an individual is distracted by task irrelevant information (e.g. worry) and
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fails to attend to task relevant cues (Eysenck, 1979; Kahneman 1973; Morris & Liebert, 
1969; Sarason, 1972; Spencer & Spencer, 1966; Wine, 1971). The second mechanism 
occurs when self-attention interferes with the automatic execution o f a motor skill 
(Baumeister, 1984; Liebling & Shaver, 1973; Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993). 
Throughout this section a series of theoretical issues will be discussed pertaining to the 
relationship between attention-arousal and attention-anxiety, and how these constructs 
might influence severe performance loss in competitive sport. This section begins with 
an overview and critique of distraction theories. This is followed by an overview and 
critique of self-awareness, self-consciousness and self-attention theories.
2.41. Distraction theories
Duval and Wickland (1972) proposed that distraction might be evoked in one of two 
ways. Firstly, an attempt to process a large amount of information will leave 
insufficient capacity to attend to task relevant cues. Secondly, if  a normal amount of 
information is processed, but attention shifts to focus on task irrelevant cues insufficient 
resources will be available to process relevant information. Either way a decrement in 
performance will ensue.
Easterbrook’s (1959) cue utilisation theory proposed that attention and arousal have a 
curvilinear relationship with performance, similar to Inverted-U theory (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908). This theory hypothesised that as arousal increases to a moderate level, 
attention narrows, which only allows task relevant cues to be processed. However, if 
arousal continues to increase attention continues to narrow causing task relevant 
information to be missed, which in turn leads to performance impairment. Easterbrook 
(1959) argued that low arousal levels can lead to processing large amounts of 
information. This can cause information overload, which might explain the occurrence 
of severe performance loss in competitive sport. However, pressure is not usually 
associated with low levels of arousal. Rather, pressure is usually associated with high 
arousal levels (Baumeister, 1984). Hence, this phenomenon is more likely to be 
explained through the omission of task relevant information, owing to high arousal 
levels (Baumeister, 1984).
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Kahneman (1973) described arousal as a functional resource (neurotransmitters) in the 
brain available for processing information. As arousal increases so to does the amount 
of functional resources available for processing information. The amount of resources 
required to execute a task depends on the complexity of that task. If there are 
insufficient resources available to execute a skill then a decrement in performance will 
ensue. Furthermore, if sufficient resources are available to execute a skill, but some 
resources are allocated to task irrelevant information then a decrease in performance will 
also ensue. Kahneman (1973) also highlighted cognitive effort to be an influential 
factor. Kahneman (1973) proposed that when only limited resources are available (low 
arousal levels) or not all resources are allocated to the task, cognitive effort can prevent 
decrements in performance provided the task is simple and does not involve extensive 
information processing. However, the unidimensional arousal theories used to explain 
attentional distraction are unlikely to fully explain the occurrence of severe performance 
loss owing to the limitations highlighted in Section 2.2.
One type of distraction that has been suggested to affect the processing o f task relevant 
information is worry. Wine (1971) investigated the distraction of worry precipitated by 
the effects of test anxiety. Wine (1971) found that highly anxious individuals directed 
attention to task irrelevant negative thoughts (e.g. worry). Consequently, such 
individuals were unable to engage in the cognitive processing required for successful 
completion of the test (Wine, 1971; cf. Eysenck, 1979; Morris & Liebert, 1969; Sarason, 
1972; Spencer & Spencer, 1966).
An influential factor in Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory is 
worry (e.g. self-preoccupation / evaluation apprehension), which is thought to deplete 
processing and storage resources in working memory. Specifically, this theory attempts 
to explain the interactive function of state anxiety, trait anxiety and situational threat or 
stress on performance. Processing efficiency theory is based on Baddeley’s (1986) 
multi-dimensional working memory model. This model of working memory comprises 
at least three primary components (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Logie, 1995, 1999). The 
core of the system is the central executive, which has limited capacity to process 
information. This component regulates, retrieves, processes and stores information 
(Baddeley, 1992). The phonological loop and visuo-spacial sketch-pad are the two 
subsidiary systems, also limited in capacity, and work on behalf of the central executive.
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The phonological loop co-ordinates the retention and manipulation of verbal 
information. The visuo-spacial sketch-pad co-ordinates the visual and spatial material 
required for processing and short term retention (Baddeley, 1992).
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed that the control system, which mediates the effects 
of anxiety on performance, initiates the response to poor performance in two ways. 
Firstly, by dealing directly with worry to reduce it, available capacity in working 
memory can be increased. Secondly, deleterious effects of worry on performance can be 
eradicated by recruiting additional resources, through increased effort on the task. 
According to processing efficiency theory highly anxious individuals tend to allocate 
additional resources to the task in hand more frequently than low anxious individuals for 
several different reasons. Firstly, worry can increase motivation and thus, improve 
performance which reduces worry. Secondly, highly anxious individuals are more likely 
to acknowledge a mismatch between expected and actual performance, as they tend to 
allocate more resources to worry and task irrelevant cues, which leads to performance 
impairment. Thirdly, highly anxious individuals are more sensitive to failure feedback. 
This makes salient any discrepancy between expectation and outcome, which increases 
motivation to task performance. Finally, highly anxious individuals tend to set 
unrealistically high standards, which elicit a greater chance of a discrepancy occurring 
between expectances and outcome.
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) made a distinction between performance effectiveness and 
processing efficiency. Performance effectiveness is associated with the quality of 
performance. Processing efficiency is the relationship between performance 
effectiveness and the investment of processing resources (e.g. effort). According to 
Masters et al. (1993) athletes who experience skill failure under pressure3 consciously 
reinvest processing resources in the movement characteristics of the task, which disrupts 
automaticity and impairs performance. Therefore, conscious processing reduces 
processing efficiency (by allocating resources to task irrelevant self-focused cues), 
which reduces performance effectiveness. The extent to which performance 
effectiveness is reduced is presumably exacerbated by those irrelevant cues being 
associated with the explicit rules of the task, which are thought to disrupt automaticity 
and lead to skill failure under pressure (Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993). Woodman
3 A review o f skill failure under pressure is provided in 2.6
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and Hardy (2001) have made links between the conscious processing hypothesis4 
(Masters, 1992) and processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Woodman 
and Hardy (2001) suggest that dramatic decrements in performance under stress can be 
produced in one of two ways; effort withdrawal or effort-induced lapses into conscious 
processing. Hence, processing efficiency provides a theoretical framework by which 
conscious processing can take place.
Carver and Scheier (1988) also attempted to explain the effects of anxiety on human 
behaviour (see also Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979; Carver, Peterson, Follansbee, & 
Scheier, 1983; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1984). Their model proposed that individuals 
develop reference points which are mediated by short and long term goals, standards and 
intentions. From these reference points individuals attempt to monitor their actions.
Any discrepancies between the actually and desired task outcome are monitored by a 
regulatory feedback control system (Carver & Scheier, 1988).
From a control-process perspective human behaviour can be distracted by anxiety, 
which disrupts performance. Carver and Scheier (1988) described anxiety as a 
conflicting variable in the regulatory mechanism. Conflict could arise when behaving in 
the direction of one reference point, which offsets the balance of another reference point 
(e.g. physical safety, acceptance from other people, personal comfort; Rogers, 1980). In 
addition, the nervous system uses anxiety by means of information, which takes up 
space in working memory (Hamilton, 1983) and can interrupt specific actions (Simon, 
1967).
Carver and Scheier (1988) argued that anxiety could have an energising and focusing or 
conversely a disrupting and negative effect on behaviour. The diverse effects of anxiety 
are contingent upon favourable versus unfavourable expectancies of achieving the 
intended outcome goal(s). For example, for an individual who perceives a high 
likelihood of success to complete a task (favourable expectancy) anxiety will increase 
effort and thus self-focused attention will facilitate perseverance. Conversely, for an 
individual who perceives a low likelihood of success to complete a task (unfavourable 
expectancy) anxiety will decrease effort and thus self-focused attention will lead to 
disengagement (discontinue) from the task. More subtly, an individual may disengage
4 A review o f  the conscious processing hypothesis is provided in 2.52.
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from the effort required to execute the task rather than disengaging from the task itself. 
Masters (1992) stated that skill breakdown under pressure is common in those highly 
motivated to succeed. Baumeister and Showers (1986) argued that choking can not 
occur without pressure. Consequently, if an athlete effectively disengages from a 
situation involving pressure by withdrawing effort from the task, any performance 
decrement that ensues is clearly not a result of stress induced skill disruption. In 
addition, individuals who perceive a high likelihood of success will focus on the task, 
which from a control-process perspective suggests that
“one cannot be task focused without being simultaneously focused on an 
aspect of the self.” (Carver & Scheier, 1988, p. 132)
Conversely, self-focused attention in individuals who perceive a low likelihood o f 
success will be directed towards negative cognitions such as self-doubt and worry in 
addition to their failure to proceed towards their intended outcome goal (Carver & 
Scheier, 1988).
2.42. Self-awareness. Self-consciousness and Self-Attention
An alternative mechanism derived from the attentional literature that claims to explain 
the occurrence of severe performance loss in competitive sport are theories of self- 
awareness. Self-awareness theories propose that attention is directed to oneself, and 
essentially, towards the movement characteristics of a task, which can disrupt and 
impair performance (Baumeister, 1984). However, before discussing these theories it is 
important to draw attention to the link that exists between theories of distraction and 
self-awareness. Task irrelevant worries associated with distraction theories can also 
manifest themselves in the form of self-evaluation. Consequently, self-awareness can 
be a form o f distraction, which can monopolise attentional resources, detract from 
processing task relevant information and lead to performance impairment (Leibling & 
Shaver, 1973).
This section begins by clarifying terminology and concepts associated with self- 
awareness, self-consciousness and self-focus. A series of theoretical issues are then
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discussed relating to the role of these constructs upon severe performance loss in 
competitive sport.
Philosophers and psychologists alike have investigated the nature o f the self, the role of 
self-consciousness and self-awareness in an attempt to understand such constructs and 
their influence on human behaviour (Carver & Scheier, 1978). These constructs are 
often used interchangeably in the literature. However, they are not synonymous and 
thus, require clarification. Self-consciousness has been defined as
“a dispositional tendency to experience self-awareness in social 
situations.” (Christensen, 1982, p. 177)
In comparison, self-awareness has been defined as
“a state in which the subject’s attention is directed towards the self, 
and there will be a comparison of the self with standards of 
correctness.” (Innes & Young, 1975, p. 36)
Self-awareness has been advocated by psychoanalysts and Rogerian therapists 
suggesting that getting in touch with oneself by attending to and understanding one’s 
inner thoughts and feelings is both a tool and a goal. Individuals possessing greater self- 
awareness will conform in accordance with normal behavioural standards (e.g. society) 
more so than those who are less self-aware (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Scheier, 
Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974). A theory o f self-awareness, proposed by Duval and 
Wickland (1972), suggested that attention can be directed inwardly (e.g. to the self) or 
outwardly (e.g. to the environment). A person high in self-awareness can become more 
conscious of their feelings, presence and attributes when performing. The standards and 
correctness by which behaviour is evaluated is heightened when an individual is self- 
aware. Hence, if  there is a mismatch between behaviour and standard then a negative 
affect will ensue (Duval & Wickland, 1972). Greater attempts will be made by a self- 
aware individual to remedy this mismatch than when they are not self-aware. Thus, the 
theory proposes that performance should improve in self-aware individuals. This does 
not support the contention of Carver and Scheier (1881) who suggested that self- 
awareness can detract away from processing task relevant information, otherwise
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required for successful performance. Nevertheless, low self-consciousness has been 
found to be detrimental to performance of a well learned motor skill under pressure 
owing to conscious attempts to control ones movements (Baumeister, 1984). There 
have been numerous connections made between self-awareness and a person’s self- 
consciousness. Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) proposed that self-attention was a 
element of dispositional self-consciousness.
Fenigstein et al., (1975) proposed that certain individuals are predisposed to self- 
consciousness. Hence, they constructed the Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale to 
assess individual differences within this construct. The validation o f the scale revealed 
that self-consciousness comprises three subscales; private, public and social anxiety. 
The private self-consciousness subscale measure an individual’s self-focus, that is the 
mulling over of specific aspects of oneself. High scores on this scale were indicative of 
feelings, thought and mood awareness. The public self-consciousness subscale 
measures an individual’s awareness and concerns of being a social entity. The final 
subscale was social anxiety. This refers to individual reactions when being evaluated 
by others. Research by Carver and Scheier (1978) used the Self-Consciousness Scale to 
assess aspects of self-awareness. Carver and Scheier (1978) attempted to increase self- 
awareness by manipulating the environment whilst conducting a sentence completion 
task. They found that having to perform in front of an audience or mirror, heightened 
self-attention. They also reported the private subscale of the Dispositional Self- 
Consciousness Scale did measure self-attention. More recently, research conducted 
using the Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) found it to be 
a successful predictor of choking under pressure5 (Baumeister, 1984).
The terms nervousness and self-consciousness, although not synonymous, are believed 
to be associated with the same stimulus conditions (e.g. audience evaluation; Wegner & 
Giuliano, 1980). Research has been directed towards self-consciousness as a construct 
that heightens arousal levels. However the findings are equivocal (Gibbons, Carver, 
Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979; Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Paulus, Annis & Riser, 1978). In 
antithesis, Wegner and Giuliano (1980) hypothesised that it is arousal that heightens 
self-consciousness. Wegner and Giuliano (1980) examined the two constructs and 
found that heightened arousal does increase attention to the self. Their findings support
5 A review o f choking under pressure is provided in section 2.6.
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Baumeister (1984) who also found that heightened arousal was responsible for directing 
attention to oneself, which led to conscious control o f movement and subsequent 
performance impairment.
Simon (1967) proposed fear as a construct that can interrupt and impede a specific 
behaviour. Pressure inducing situations such as competition demand optimal 
performance (Baumeister & Showers, 1986). However, an athlete in such a situation 
might not perceive they are capable of meeting those demands. Hence, stress through a 
sense of apprehension and fear of failure might ensue. Fear of failure can impair 
performance and in extreme cases can preclude success to such an extent that it renders 
an athlete dysfunctional (LeUnes & Nation, 1996). Pam Shriver, when talking about her 
performance anxieties stated
“I’m scared when I play tennis. I fear failure at every comer, and 
until I rid myself of that attitude, I know I will never attain my goal, 
of winning a Wimbledon or U.S. Open.” (Cited in LeUnes & Nation,
1996. p. 112)
Carver and Scheier (1981) contended that rising fear commands attention, which can 
make people stop what they are doing and consider for a moment whether they are 
capable of meeting the demands of the task. Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (1979) 
examined the effects of dispositional private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) 
and manipulated fear. Scheier et al. (1979) found that heightened fear directs attention 
to the self, which in turn disrupts behaviour. Carver and Scheier (1981) proposed that 
as fear is heightened an individual’s subjective awareness of that fear would become 
greater. However, interruption of certain behaviour is dependent upon the amount of 
anxiety that the person is experiencing at this time. If anxiety is relatively low then 
behaviour is unlikely to be effected. Conversely, if anxiety is relatively high then 
frequent interruption to behaviour is inevitable. This supports the contention of the skill 
failure under pressure (precipitated by conscious processing) literature as this 
phenomenon has been associated with both automaticity disruption and high levels of 
state anxiety (Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992; Masters et al. 1993; Mullen 
& Hardy, 2000).
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In an attempt to remedy the dichotomy in the literature Lewis and Linder (1997) 
conducted an investigation to explore distraction and self-focus theories used to explain 
breakdown in performance under pressure. Participants were required to complete the 
Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) prior to the study. A 
golf putting task was learned in either a ‘self-awareness non-adapted’ (no manipulation), 
or a ‘self-awareness adapted’ (using a video camera, and evaluation techniques during 
practice) treatment group. Performance was then assessed in conditions o f low (no 
distraction) or high (increased cognitive load -  counting backwards from 100 in twos) 
distraction under different conditions of stress (e.g. reward contingency). Lewis and 
Linder (1997) found that participants who were acclimatised to self-awareness during 
skill acquisition experienced less of a breakdown under pressure than those not 
acclimatised. In addition, they found that adding a distraction task (e.g. number 
generation) during the pressure phase did not have an additive effect on skill 
breakdown. Lewis and Linder (1997) concluded that skill breakdown under pressure is 
mediated by self-focus rather than distraction, which support the findings o f Baumeister
(1984). Findings from the Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale were equivocal. 
Hence, support for Baumeister’s (1984) contention that dispositional self-consciousness 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) is a predictor of performance under pressure was not 
forthcoming.
2.5. THE INFLUENCE OF SKILL ACQUISITION, FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND 
DEAUTOMATIZATION UPON SEVERE PERFORMANCE LOSS IN 
COMPETITIVE SPORT
In the academic literature increasing attention has been directed towards specific 
learning processes in the belief that skill breakdown under stress is anchored in the 
stages of motor leaning (Masters, 1992). Specifically, attention has been directed 
towards the phenomena o f ‘implicit’ versus ‘explicit’ (Hardy et a l, 1996; Masters,
1992; Maxwell, Masters & Eves, 2000) and ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ (Wulf, HoB & 
Prinz, 1998; Wulf, Lauterbach & Toole, 1999; Wulf, McNevin, Fuchs, Ritter & Toole, 
2000) modes of skill acquisition and their effectiveness on learning and performance. 
Both implicit and external modes of learning have been found to promote automaticity, 
particularly under stress. In comparison, both explicit and internal modes o f learning 
have been found to disrupt automaticity, particularly under stress. Throughout this
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section a series o f theoretical issues will be discussed relating to the acquisition and 
control o f motor skills and how these factors might influence severe performance loss in 
competitive sport. This section begins with an overview and critique of information 
processing systems in relation to skill progression. This is followed by an overview and 
critique o f leaning methods used to minimise the accumulation and prevent the 
processing of explicit task knowledge during learning and skilled performance, tested 
under different conditions of stress. This section ends with an overview and critique o f  
the relationship between learning and focus of attention upon skill effectiveness.
2.51. Conscious Versus Automatic Processing Systems
Well learned motor skills are believed to comprise automatic procedures and are 
considered an integral part o f performance (Chase & Simon, 1973). Motor skills have 
been proposed, initially, to develop explicitly through conscious processing (Anderson, 
1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967). Hence, early stages o f learning are characterised by 
verbalisable, inconsistent, effortful and slow performance (Anderson, 1982; Fitts & 
Posner, 1967). Over time, with practice, motor skills are thought to become implicit 
through automatic processing (automaticity). This stage is characterised by non- 
verbalisable (unavailable to conscious awareness) (Carr, McCauley, Sperber, &
Parmalee, 1982; Marcel, 1983), stereotypic (McLeod, McLaughlin, & Nimmo-Smith, 
1985; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1984), effortless (Logan, 1978; 1979; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977), and fast (Neely, 1977; Posner, & Snyder, 1975) performance.
Conscious processing has been defined as
“a temporary sequence o f nodes activated under control of, and 
through attention by the subject. Because active attention by the 
subject is required, only one such sequence at a time may be 
controlled without interference, unless two sequences each require 
such a slow sequence o f activations that they can be serially 
interwoven” (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977. p. 2).
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In comparison, automatic processing has been defined as
“the activation of a sequence of nodes with the following properties:
(a) The sequence of nodes (nearly) always becomes active in 
response to a particular input configuration, where the inputs may be 
externally or internally generated and include the general situational 
context, (b) The sequence is activated automatically without the 
necessity of active control or attention by the subject” (Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2).
Automatic processing has been differentiated from conscious processing by three main 
characteristics: Firstly, automatic processing must occur without intention; secondly, it 
should not involve any conscious awareness; and thirdly, it should not interfere with any 
other cognitive activity that is currently being undertaken (Fitts & Posner, 1967). 
Automatic processing is not subject to attentional limitations, which would explain why 
this mechanism is fast, effortless and effective in executing motor skills. Hence, 
automaticity is uncontrollable as it does not require attentional capacity. Thus, any 
process that does not require conscious attention can not be controlled by the use of 
allocating resources to that process (Posner & Synder, 1975). This adds further support 
to the contention that trying consciously to control normally automatic, implicit 
processing by explicit utilisation, disrupts automaticity and impairs performance (Hardy, 
Mullen & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992; Maxwell, Masters & Eves, 2000).
Anderson (1982) proposed two systems that govern the progression of skilled 
performance; declarative and procedural. According to Anderson (1982), skill 
progresses from declarative to procedural. In the declarative stage performance is slow 
and not fluent as explicit, verbal knowledge dominates the control of movement. In the 
procedural stage performance is fluent as it is no longer governed by verbal knowledge; 
the skill is regulated implicitly and run automatically with little conscious control. 
Salmoni (1989) contented that motor skills are governed by the procedural system.
Thus, knowledge of a skill should be developed through performing rather than by 
explicit instruction. Such an instructional based strategy of learning places high 
demands on the declarative system, owing to the copious amounts of rule based 
information to be processed (Salmoni, 1989). However, this contention is not consistent
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with general coaching principles today. The use of rule-based instructions is still widely 
used by coaches, particularly during early stages of learning, which can interfere with 
implicit regulation even after a skill has become well learned.
2.52. Explicit Knowledge Suppression during Learning and Skilled Performance
Developing one’s skill to an automatic level of functioning is what sports performers 
generally aspire to achieve because of its fluidity and efficiency. Without the 
development of automatic processing many fast ball sports could not be performed at 
such a high level due to temporal demands, which leave little time for information 
processing. Recent research has reported that performers could inadvertently switch 
from using automatic to conscious processing systems, particularly under stress. To 
explain this phenomenon Masters (1992) proposed the conscious processing hypothesis 
(see Figure 2.3). This hypothesis stated that heightened state anxiety, precipitated by 
stress can direct attention to the process in which a skill is executed. Owing to the 
importance of the correct execution of the task, performance is consciously guided by 
use of explicit task knowledge associated with early stages of learning (reinvestment). 
This ironically, disrupts automaticity, and impairs the performance of a well learned 
skill. Recent research has reported that, under stress, performers could inadvertently 
switch from using automatic to conscious processing systems to ensue correct skill 
execution (Crews, 2001). Such an attempt to focus conscious attention on explicit task 
rules, associated with the early stages o f learning, is thought to disrupt the automatic 
flow of a well learned skill and impair performance (Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996; 
Masters et al., 1992).
Masters (1992) proposed that conscious processing in automatic skills might also 
explain ‘dartitis’ or the feared ‘yips’”. The ‘yips’ has been defined as a long-term motor 
disorder that affects finely controlled motor skills by causing involuntary movement 
during execution (McDaniel, Cummings & Shain, 1989). Some researchers believe the 
‘yips’ to be a physiological-based problem (Foster, 1977; McDaniel et al., 1989), 
whereas other researchers consider the disorder to be caused by psychological factors 
(Bawden & Maynard, 2001). However, limited research has been unable to 
conclusively ascertain how and why the ‘yips’ occur (Moody, 1993; Sachdev, 1992;
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Figure 2.3. A Schematic o f the Conscious Processing Hypothesis (Masters, 1992)
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Smith et al., 2000; White, 1993). Nevertheless, the purpose of this programme of 
research was to investigate temporary forms of severe performance loss not long-term 
motor disorders. For this reason, the ‘yips’ was considered outside the scope of this 
programme of research and therefore was not investigated in this thesis.
Deikman (1969) refers to conscious control on a typically automatic skill sequence as 
deautomatization. This conceptualisation suggests that by reinvesting in actions 
governed by conscious attention automaticity will be undone. Wertz (1986) argued that 
automaticity breaks down because the mind is not aware of the movement on more than 
a surface level when the body performs the action. Research by Keele (1973) on 
experienced pianists, and Langer and Imber (1979) on experienced typists reported that 
conscious control of their finger movements produced a decrement in performance. 
Hefferline, Keenan, and Harford (1959) demonstrated that by increasing the 
consciousness of the behavioural process (e.g. a muscle response) operant conditioning 
could be undermined. Psychotherapists use similar techniques to help individuals with 
psychological disorders by making unconscious material conscious. This helps to 
eradicate neurotic effects which have become instinctive. Thus suggesting increased 
consciousness makes things less lawful and less predictable (Baumeister, 1984).
Langer and Imber (1979) suggested that over-learning (e.g. automaticity) a skill could be 
detrimental to performance. They hypothesised that when an individual is led to 
question his / her ability to perform a skill (e.g. stress), explicit task components are 
required to help guide performance. However, once a skill has been over-learned it 
becomes mindless. Consequently, such skills become inaccessible to consciousness and 
thus, re-correction of how to perform is no longer possible. Langer and Imber (1979) 
and Masters (1992) concur in the theorisation that attempting to consciously control a 
movement can result in the breakdown of automatic skills. However, their explanations 
as to why this is detrimental to performance are conflicting. Langer and Imber (1979) 
proposed that conscious skill control is harmful to performance owing to an absence of 
explicit knowledge. In antithesis, Masters (1992) proposed that it is the availability and 
processing of explicit knowledge that impairs the execution of an over-learned skill6.
6 It is important to note that Langer and Imber (1979) used a cognitive task, which was neither sport 
specific nor required any motor co-ordination.
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This contention is supported by the amount of rules reported by participants relating to 
the task in Masters' (1992) study.
Theoretical explanations for skill deautomatization include the Progression-Regression 
hypothesis (Fitts, Bahrick, Noble & Briggs, 1961). This hypothesis proposed that as a 
skill becomes well learned (automaticity), the high order strategies used to control that 
skill become more complex. More recently, the regression aspect of this theory has 
been used to explain the breakdown of automatic motor skills (Lee & Swinnen, 1993). 
Under stress, the higher order control strategies that guide automatic performance can 
become disrupted. This is a consequence of an individual adopting the use of control 
strategies, associated with early stages of learning, to execute the skill. Thus, causing a 
regression back to a more basic level of skill processing (e.g. conscious processing) 
which offers support to Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis.
Baddeley and Woodhead (1982) postulated that a decrement in performance would 
ensue if specific components of an automatic skill were focused upon. Similarly, 
Klatzky (1984) reported that performance awareness impairs the execution of a skilled 
act. The martial artist Bruce Lee suggested that consciousness of self is the greatest 
hindrance to the proper execution of all skills. Moreover, he asserted that knowledge 
and skill are meant to be forgotten so that an individual may be poised, enabling them to 
strike at the right moment (cited in Thomas, 1997). Prinz (1997) suggested that when 
speaking we do not focus on the spatiotemporal patterns of movement required to 
produce the desired sounds. Instead, our action plans are related to the audible effects, 
which appear to effectively guide the motor system to produce the desired outcome. 
Kerr’s (1973) simplified analogy of this conceptualisation suggested that consciously 
thinking about an automatic skill could have unpredictable consequences, for example,
“if you think too deeply about the leg movement involved in walking 
down a flight o f stairs, you may well finish up in a heap at the 
bottom of those stairs”, (p. 62)
Roger and Nesshoever (1987) suggested that reducing explicit task knowledge means 
less potential information to rehearse and thus less distraction when performing.
Further, research has highlighted that a skill can be effectively learned without the need
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for explicit ‘declarative encoding’ of knowledge (Brooks, 1978; Hayes & Broadbent, 
1988; Reber, 1967). Hayes and Broadbent (1988) argued that knowledge of a particular
task can be developed through implicit or explicit processes (see also Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987; Reber, 1989; Reber & Allen, 1978). Explicit knowledge comprises
“factors and rules of which we are specifically aware and therefore 
able to articulate” (Masters, 1992, p. 343).
In comparison, implicit knowledge comprises
“that which we ‘know’ yet are not aware o f and thus cannot 
articulate” (Masters, 1992, p. 343).
Over the last decade increasing attention in the literature has been devoted to the 
phenomenon of implicit and explicit learning. Research on implicit learning has 
typically used cognitive tasks such as artificial grammers (Reber, 1967; Reber & Allen, 
1978), complex computer systems (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Broadbent & Aston,
1978) or serial reaction time tasks (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Several factors have 
been identified which distinguish implicit and explicit processes. The primary indictor 
of implicit held knowledge is a lack of explicit knowledge despite improved 
performance (Berry & Broadbent, 1984). Another indicator is that implicit processes 
are more resistant to psychological stress, disorders and dysfunctions than explicit 
processes (Abrams & Reber, 1988; Reber, 1993; Schacter, 1987). A further indicator is 
that implicit processes are more durable and less likely to erode over time (Allen & 
Reber, 1980) and are relatively independent of IQ and age (Light & Singh, 1987; Reber, 
1993). In antithesis, explicit processes and memory tend to erode with age and are 
correlated with IQ (Light & Singh, 1987; Reber, 1993).
Despite the increasing interest in implicit learning, the research on implicit motor 
learning is sparse (Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000). One study that has examined the 
learning and performance effects o f this phenomenon is Masters (1992). He proposed 
that by learning a motor skill implicitly (without the knowledge of rules) explicit task 
knowledge is kept to a minimum (see also Masters, 2000 for review). Consequently, an
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individual is less able to rehearse consciously the rules of the skill, particularly under 
conditions o f heightened state anxiety, than if they had learned the skill explicitly (with 
the knowledge of rules). Thus, implicit learners are less likely to experience a 
disruption to automaticity or a decrement in performance because the explicit 
knowledge o f the skill is relatively inaccessible to conscious attention.
Masters (1992) conducted a study in which participants were required to leam a golf 
putting task either explicitly or implicitly in a low stress environment. The explicit 
learning group received specific instructions on how to putt. The implicit learning 
group was given no instructions on how to putt, but was required to carry out 
Baddeley’s (1966) randomised letter generation task to occupy working memory. This 
was to prevent participants from generating their own explicit rules relating to the task. 
Participants were then required to perform the putting task under manipulated 
conditions of stress (evaluation apprehension and financial incentive). The implicit 
learning group was not required to perform the secondary task when executing the 
putting task under stress.
Masters (1992) found that the implicit learners performed significantly better under 
stress than explicit learners did. Results also indicated that implicit learners continued 
to improve regardless of stress. Masters (1992) argued that skills learned implicitly are 
more robust under stress and are less susceptible to skill breakdown, than skills learned 
explicitly. Masters concluded that this was owing to implicit learners having limited 
rule-based knowledge available to the conscious to rehearse under stress. Be that as it 
may, according to Hodge and Franks (2002), focusing on a single explicit aspect of 
movement dynamics can still disrupt automated control systems (see also Wulf, 
McNevin & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001).
Hardy, Mullen and Jones (1996) criticised Masters’ work (1992) by suggesting that the 
implicit learning group only used the secondary task during the learning phase and not 
during the stress phase of the experiment. Therefore, Hardy, Mullen and Jones (1996) 
argued that the implicit learning group continued to improve under stress because the 
skill was made easier by omitting the secondary task load in the putting only group.
This indicated that the release from the secondary task load was responsible for the 
increased performance of Masters' (1992) putting-only group.
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Hardy, Mullen and Jones (1996) replicated and extended the work of Masters (1992). In 
addition to a putting-only group they included an implicit learning group that was 
required to perform a putting task under secondary task load during both the learning 
phase and stress phase of the experiment. The results indicated that both implicit 
learning groups continued to improve regardless of stress; whereas the explicit learning 
group did not. The results supported Masters’ (1992) research. Hardy, Mullen, and 
Jones (1996) concluded that skills learned implicitly are more robust under stress, than 
skills learned explicitly. Hardy et al. (1996) also suggested that individuals who learn 
implicitly are less likely to experience skill failure under pressure, than individuals who 
leam explicitly.
However, using a dual task paradigm has affected the way in which Masters’ (1992) and 
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones’s (1996) results have been interpreted. The explicit learning 
group demonstrated no significant decrease in performance under stress; data indicated 
that the learning curve of this group reached a plateau whereas, the implicit group 
carried on improving. For this reason, it could be that the implicit learning groups 
progressed at a slower rate because the dual task made the overall skill more complex. 
Perhaps the participants in the implicit learning groups had not yet reached their plateau, 
therefore, continued to improve regardless of stress. Implicit learning using a secondary 
task has been found to suppress the progression of learning even after the completion o f 
3000 putting trials, owing to greater demands being placed on working memory 
(Maxwell et al., 2000).
Baddeley and Wilson (1994) contended that implicit learners are unable to leam from or 
correct errors. Consequently, this learning style is unable to prevent individuals from 
repeating the same errors in future performances. Berry and Broadbent (1987) argued 
that implicit learning is slow compared to explicit learning. They proposed that implicit 
learning involves the encoding of all action-outcome possibilities and that improved 
performance is a result of a gradual accumulation of positive outcomes. In contrast, 
explicit learning involves the conscious selection of positive action-outcome 
possibilities and avoidance of negative ones. Thus, Maxwell et al. (2000; see also 
Bennett, 2000) contended that 3000 trials were insufficient to produce a convergence 
between implicit and explicit learning styles and thus proposed that further practice was 
required to achieve similar standards of learning.
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Bright and Freedman (1998) questioned the validity o f Masters (1992) and Hardy, 
Mullen and Jones’s (1996) interpretation of their research. For this reason, Bright and 
Freedman (1998) partially replicated Hardy et al's (1996) study. Their findings 
indicated that the performance o f the implicit learning group that continued to perform 
the secondary task did not improve under stress. In comparison, the performance of the 
implicit learning group released from the secondary task load improved under stress. 
Bright and Freedman (1998) concluded that implicit learners improve under stress 
simply because they are released from secondary task loading and thus refuted the 
implicit motor learning hypothesis (Masters, 1992). Mullen and Hardy (2000) recently 
criticised Bright and Freedmans’s (1998) protocol. Stress was manipulated by Bright 
and Freedman (1998) after a learning phase o f only 160 putts. In comparison, Masters’ 
(1992) and Hardy, Mullen, and Jones’s (1996) stress manipulation occurred after 400 
putts. Hence, Mullen and Hardy (2000) argued that Bright and Freedman’s (1998) 
participants were at an earlier stage in the learning process when stressed, in comparison 
to previous research.
A second experiment conducted by Bright and Freedman (1998) required participants to 
execute a putting task in either a hard dual-task group (e.g. generate random letters 
every second) or an easy dual-task group (e.g. generate random letters every 3 seconds). 
Bright and Freedman (1998) hypothesised that the hard dual-task group would 
demonstrate a greater increase in performance under stress, in comparison to the easy 
dual-task group, owing to the differing cognitive resources available when released from 
the secondary task load. The hard dual-task group demonstrated a significantly greater 
increase in performance under stress than the easy dual-task group following the release 
from the secondary task load. The results indicted support for Bright and Freedman's 
(1998) hypothesis and their initial conclusions drawn from their first experiment.
Another criticism of Bright and Freedman's (1998) protocol is the claim that the 
participants used in their experiments were novice golfers. However, some participants 
who reported having golfing experience were allowed to partake. Maxwell et al. (2000) 
argues that an individual with experience in golf is likely to have formed a pool of 
explicit knowledge and thus would confound the number of reported task-rules.
Maxwell et al. (2000) contented that implicit-based learning research using novice
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performers can not be compared to experiments using non-novice performers due to the 
protocols used to distinguish between implicit and explicit learning being violated.
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) offered another explanation for their findings. They 
suggested that the implicit learning groups could have become partially immune to the 
effects o f stress and anxiety owing to participants being required to perform the 
secondary task when putting. The secondary task was used to eliminate opportunities 
for participants to generate explicit task knowledge. Consequently, implicit learners 
could have become desensitised to self-regulated verbal distractions and thus, anxiety.
Neither Masters’ (1992) nor Hardy, Mullen, and Jones’s (1996) research was 
conclusive. Consequently, additional criticisms of their work need to be addressed. 
Firstly, both experiments only used performance outcome based measures to predict 
conscious processing (and its effects on the performance o f explicit learners). 
Consequently, conscious processing under stress was assumed in such studies.
Secondly, implicit learning might well be more robust under stress. However, the 
current techniques used to promote this style o f learning (e.g. random letter generation 
task) might not be practical in an applied sport setting. For example, shouting out 
random letters to the sound o f a metronome would not be considered acceptable when 
putting in golf. Thus, in its current format this technique could not be used in an 
ecologically valid environment. Thirdly, state anxiety induced by stress was only 
partially controlled for in these experiments. Both Masters (1992) and Hardy, Mullen, 
and Jones (1996) only measured the changes in physiological arousal (somatic anxiety) 
by monitoring heart rate. Consequently, it is not known whether stress was successfully 
manipulated or if  state anxiety had any impact on performance. State anxiety is now 
considered a multidimensional response comprising somatic and cognitive sub­
components, and self-confidence. Both intensity and directional components o f such 
factors should be controlled for in future research. Further, Hardy (1998) argued that 
somatic anxiety and physiological arousal are not synonymous, which questions whether 
the preceding studies controlled for any aspect of state anxiety or indeed, psychological 
stress as claimed.
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) called for more practical learning methods that 
prevented the accumulation o f verbal knowledge, but not at the expense o f  skill
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development. In response to this call research by MacMahon and Masters (2002) 
compared learning a golf putting task using a variety o f secondary tasks, which loaded 
on different components of working memory7. The secondary tasks primarily either 
loaded on the central executive (random letter generation and counting backwards in 
sevens) or the phonological loop (repeated word and unattended speech). In study one 
results indicated that only the central executive loading tasks were successful in 
preventing the accumulation o f explicit rules. Skill development was only inhibited in 
the counting backwards condition. MacMahon and Masters (2002) speculated that the 
random letter generation did not inhibit skill acquisition, as expected, owing to the 
relatively simple nature of the task (flat surface) in comparison to Masters’ (1992) 
research (e.g. 1 in 4 incline putting surface).
Kleiman (1975) suggested that loading the phonological loop is only effective in 
disrupting the generation of rule acquisition on complex tasks that require additional 
storage facilities during processing. In other words, a task that fully loads on the central 
executive then relies on the phonological loop for rule acquisition. Loading the 
phonological loop minimizes rule acquisition, leaving the central executive free to 
execute the primary task. However, fully loading the central executive still minimises 
rule acquisition, at the expense o f reduced capacity with which to execute a more 
complex task. Thus, MacMahon and Masters (2002) second study examined the effects 
using the repeated word and random letter generation conditions on a more complex 
putting task. They found that only the random letter generation task was successful in 
limiting the accumulation of explicit task knowledge, which still hampered skill 
development. Hence, MacMahon and Masters (2002) were unsuccessful in identifying a 
secondary task that minimised explicit knowledge and maximised skill acquisition of a 
golf putting task.
In an attempt to overcome the restrictions imposed on skill development under 
secondary task load Liao and Masters (2001) proposed an alternative learning strategy. 
This paradoxical technique has been termed Analogy learning and was proposed to 
enhance implicit skill acquisition, via explicit instruction, in novice performers (Liao & 
Masters, 2001). This learning strategy is designed to reduce the amount of information 
being consciously processed by abridging a number o f task relevant rules into one, all
7 A review o f  working memory is provided in section 2.41)
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encompassing biomechanical metaphor (Masters, 2001). In the belief that analogy 
learning could elicit similar characteristics to that of implicit learning styles Liao and 
Masters (2001) conducted two experiments.
In Experiment 1, novice performers learned a table tennis forehand topspin under 
implicitly (using a random letter generation task), explicitly (using 12 explicit 
instructions), or analogy (using the analogy o f a right-angled triangle) conditions. All 
participants executed 300 trials, followed by a 50 trial secondary task transfer and a 50 
trial delayed retention test. Liao and Masters (2001) found that the implicit and analogy 
learners reported similar levels of explicit task knowledge, which was significantly less 
than the explicit learners. In addition, when the secondary task was introduced the 
explicit learners experienced a significantly greater decrement in performance than the 
implicit and analogy learners who demonstrated similar performances.
In Experiment 2, Liao and Masters (2001) examined the robustness of analogy and 
explicit learning styles in a stress retention test. Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White
(1987) thought suppression technique was used in an attempt to manipulate thought 
processes relating to the task. Wegner et al. (1987) found that when participants were 
asked to suppress thoughts of a white bear, such thoughts were, ironically, magnified. 
Liao and Masters (2001) asked participants not to think about how to strike the ball, in 
the belief that such thoughts would be magnified; particularly in those with greater 
explicit knowledge. Results indicated that explicit learners experienced a decrement in 
performance as a consequence of stress and thought suppression. In comparison, the 
analogy learners were relatively unaffected by either stress or thought suppression. It 
was suggested that the results indicated that Analogy learning imposes a lighter load on 
attentional resources than explicit learning (Liao & Masters, 2001). Maxwell and 
Masters (2002), however, proposed an alternative explanation to the Analogy learning 
strategy. They suggest that Analogy instruction directed focus of attention, externally, 
to the movement of the bat, in comparisons to the explicit group whose instmctions 
were likely to direct conscious attention, internally, to the process of movement.
Maxwell and Masters (2002) found some support for the contention that an external 
focus might place minimal demands on working memory, in comparison to an internal 
focus that imposes large demands on this system.
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Liao and Masters (2001) concluded that analogy learning has similar characteristics to 
those of implicit learning, and claimed it would be practical to use in an applied sport 
setting. However, a criticism of this claim is that this strategy might impose restrictions 
on the development of a skill, similar to implicit learning strategies. In this case of 
using the analogy of an imaginary triangle to help shape a table tennis forehand topspin 
is likely to be detrimental when performing this stroke in an applied setting. At the top 
level table tennis is a fast sport involving extremely restrictive time constraints that 
demand rapid stroke recovery. Therefore, analogy learning might well reduce explicit 
task rules, but would almost certainly compromise the development o f effective and 
efficient stroke production, otherwise required to compete at the top level.
Recently, Mullen and Hardy (2000) examined the effects o f using a secondary task load, 
normally associated with implicit learning strategies, on the performance of skilled 
golfers. An aim o f Mullen and Hardy’s (2000) study was to investigate the 
desensitization hypothesis (Hardy et al. 1996). The desensitization hypothesis predicts 
that individuals who have learned a task implicitly become desensitized to self­
generated verbalizations and thus immune to the effects of competitive anxiety (e.g. 
conscious processing). Another aim o f the study was to examine Eysenck’s (1992) 
processing efficiency theory. This theory suggested that performance decrements would 
occur if the attentional capacity threshold was exceeded. The final aim of the study was 
to examine the effects of increased state anxiety on the kinematic processes 
underpinning deautomatization.
In this study skilled golfers (handicap: 12-18) were required to perform a putting task in 
three experimental conditions under low and high stress environments. To control for 
anomalies in putting ability participants were classified as either ‘better’ or ‘poorer’ 
(predicted by mean absolute error scores from the low stress control condition). In the 
task-relevant condition golfers were required to use three performance-related coaching 
points to encourage lapses into conscious processing, which were verbalised throughout 
each trial. In the task irrelevant condition golfers were required to carry out a random 
letter generation task (Baddeley, 1966). Finally, in the control condition golfers were 
required to just putt as normal. A retrospective self-report measure was used to monitor 
effort after each condition, and the CSAI-2 (Martens et al., 1990) inventory was used to 
measure state anxiety prior to the low and high stress conditions.
46
Mullen and Hardy’s (2000) findings indicated performance decrements were prevented 
in ‘better’ putters when using the random letter generation task under high stress. This 
alleviation of performance impairment suggested that sufficient attentional resources 
were available for successful task execution. This offers some support for the conscious 
processing hypothesis over and above the attentional threshold explanation (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992). In contrast, under low stress the random letter generation task impaired 
performance. Mullen and Hardy (2000) suggested that without incentive when a dual­
task is introduced (random letter generation or task-relevant) a shift in attention occurs 
(Lewis & Linder, 1997). Thus, golfers might have recruited insufficient resources to 
produce successful performance as both task manipulations require active, controlled 
processing. Mullen and Hardy (2000) concluded that such tasks, under high stress only 
impair performance if they interfere with task automaticity. In contrast, no performance 
decrements were found for ‘poorer’ putters. Mullen and Hardy (2000) explained this 
finding through the conceptualization of automaticity. In that, poor putters might have 
attained partial automaticity, which might mean that putting execution relied upon both 
controlled and automatic processing systems (Kahneman & Treiman, 1984). Mullen 
and Hardy (2000) concluded that the flexible use of both controlled and automatic 
processing can facilitate the performance in those possessing partial automaticity.
Hence, this could explain the differences between the ‘better’ and ‘poorer’ putters.
The increased effort reported by participants when anxious offers support for processing 
efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), which predicted that performance might be 
maintained, in anxious individuals, by allocating additional resources to the task in 
hand. The ‘better’ performers reported an increase in effort when anxious, which 
maintained task performance in the control conditions and improved performance in the 
task irrelevant condition, but not in the task relevant condition. Mullen and Hardy 
(2000) argued that increases in effort in anxious performers could maintain or even 
improve performance provided that it is channeled towards appropriate procedures.
A criticism of Mullen and Hardy's (2000) study and indeed, all the performance 
breakdown under stress research is that the directional aspect of anxiety was not 
monitored. Clearly, future research needs to monitor directional anxiety as this might 
provide a more complete explanation of the relationship between state anxiety and 
automaticity disruption. A fundamental limitation of much of the research relating to
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the conscious processing hypothesis is that it is assumed from outcome based measures 
(e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Hardy et al. 1996; Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993). Beuter, 
Duda, and Widule (1967) proposed that performers that try and regain conscious control 
of a skill refreeze the degrees of freedom in the distal joints. Mullen and Hardy (2000) 
attempted to monitor movement characteristics o f a putting task under stress but found 
equivocal results. However, they report trends in changes of acceleration during the 
putting action that may offer some explanation as to how increased effort as a function 
of anxiety is manifested in movement dynamics. Further research involving movement 
characteristics and outcome-based measures could offer a greater understanding of the 
relationship between conscious processing and motor performance.
2.53. Focus of Attention during Learning and Performance
Contrary to the stages o f learning hypothesis (Anderson, 1982) research has consistently 
established that conscious processing o f movement behaviour is not just detrimental to 
well-learned skills, but can also disrupt the acquisition o f new skills (Baumeister, 1984; 
Maxwell et al., 2000; Maxwell, Masters, Kerr & Weedon, 2001; Wulf, McNevin, & 
Shea, 2001). Recently awareness learning strategies have been challenged (Singer, 
Lidor, & Cauraugh, 1993). Highly skilled individuals are generally considered to 
perform automatically, defined by the very nature o f their fast and effortless 
performance, requiring no conscious attention (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Gallwey (1976), 
and Loehr (1982) contended that elite sport performers generally know what to do in a 
range o f situations without the requirement for any conscious processing; in other words 
it is implicit in nature. Further, Gallwey (1976, 1981) suggested that reducing attention 
to conscious task processing and situational cues will enable greater sensory feedback 
awareness during the execution of a motor skill.
Singer et al. (1993) also questioned the effectiveness o f process oriented strategies o f  
learning. They hypothesised that beginners could be able to approach skills similar to 
the way experts do in sport. In addition, Singer et al. (1993) suggested that novices 
could benefit from taking a more holistic approach to learning by using a nonawareness 
performance strategy. This means learning with little or no conscious awareness o f the 
explicit rules of the task and thus adopting the ‘just do it’ philosophy. However, Singer
(1988) felt that for beginners to perform skills as if  they were automatic was untenable.
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Therefore he proposed the Five-step approach as a global strategy for self-paced skills 
that combined components of both awareness and nonawareness strategies. The five 
steps include: a) Readying -  attaining a optimal emotional state, thinking positively; b) 
Imaging -  mentally picturing oneself accurately and quickly executing the sequential 
movements; c) Focusing -  on one relevant task cue; d) Executing - without thinking 
about the act itself; and e) Evaluating -  the performance and the effectiveness o f the 
four previous steps if time permits.
Singer, Lidor and Cauraugh (1993; see also Singer, 1988; Singer, Lidor & Cauraugh 
1994) compared the effectiveness of the five-step approach to that of an “awareness” 
strategy (e.g. focusing on the specific explicit cues, movement, action and noise of the 
task) and a “nonawareness” strategy (e.g. focusing on the centre of the target only, 
ignoring movement and other contextual cues of the task) using a overhand throwing 
task, executed with the non-dominant hand. Results indicated that the non-awareness 
condition and five-step approach produced less error in performance and faster response 
times in a dual-task transfer for a sequential key-pressing task than did the awareness 
condition. Singer et al. (1993) concluded that novices can successfully adopt the mental 
style of experts when learning skills, which might have implications for the way coaches 
develop the skills of athletes in the future.
Singer and his colleagues’ research has been influential in challenging traditional 
awareness approaches by proposing a potentially more effective attentional focus for 
performers whilst learning. Be that as it may, there are several criticisms of this 
research that need to be addressed. Firstly, the acquisition of a motor skill is highly 
task-specific (Beek, 2000). Hence, the five-step approach may not be generally 
applicable to all motor tasks. Although this approach was found to be effective for a 
variety of simple laboratory tasks Wulf and Weigelt’s (1997; Shea & Wulf, 1999) 
results indicated that this was not transferable to more complex motor skills. Finally, 
Singer and his colleagues provide no theoretical explanation as to why the five-step 
approach and the non-awareness strategies were effective. In summary, both the five- 
step approach and the non-awareness strategies emphasised the same mode of 
attentional focus during execution, which produced a similar level of performance. 
Further, it appears that by focusing, externally, on one specific attentional cue leads to 
superior task performance on self-paced tasks. Hence, such findings indicate that there
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might be an optimal focus of attention, which facilitates performance above that of 
awareness strategies. However, Singer and his colleagues’ approach was limited to 
simple motor skills and lacks theoretical underpinning.
Recent research has provided converging evidence that focus of attention induced by 
instructions or feedback is influential in motor learning and performance (McNevin, 
Shea, & Wulf, 2000; Shea & Wulf, 1999; Wulf, Hob & Prinz, 1998; Wulf, Lauterbach 
& Toole, 1999; Wulf, McConnel, Gartner & Schwarz., 2002; Wulf, McNevin, Fuchs, 
Ritter, & Toole, 2000; for review see Wulf & Prinz, 2001). These studies assessed the 
effectiveness of directing the learners’ attention to their body movements (e.g. internal 
focus o f attention) in comparison to directing the learners’ attention on the effects of 
their movement (e.g. external focus of attention) in relation to the environment (e.g. 
apparatus). Wulf et al. (1998, Experiment 1) used a ski-simulator task and found that 
instructing performers when to exert force on the wheels of a platform (external focus) 
was more beneficial than instructing them to focus on when to exert force with their feet 
(internal focus). Similarly, learning was enhanced for participants undertaking a 
stabilometer balancing task when focusing on markers in front of their feet (external 
focus) in comparison to focusing on the feet themselves (internal focus) (Wulf et al, 
1998, Experiment 2; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001).
Despite the relatively small differences between the loci to which attention was directed 
an external focus consistently resulted in greater learning benefits (as measured by 
performance in retention) than did an internal focus.
The benefits of learning through an external focus have also been reported for sport 
skills. W ulf et al. (1999) found that performance and learning of a pitching shot in golf 
were facilitated by directing learners’ attention to the motion of the club rather than the 
swing motion of the arms. Enhancement of learning and performance has also been 
observed in other sport skills including tennis (Maddox, Wulf, & Wright, 2000) soccer 
and volleyball (Wulf, McConnel, Gartner & Schwarz. 2002) thus adding support to the 
generalisability of the effects.
Wulf and her colleagues’ findings are consistent with the work of Singer et al. (1993, 
1994) in demonstrating the detrimental effects of self-focused attention in comparison to 
an extemal-focus of attention. Singer (1984, 1988) advocated that focusing on a single,
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general external cue (e.g., target) would prevent performers from attending to their own 
movements. Wulf et al. (2000) challenged this contention. They hypothesised that by 
encouraging a specific external focus that related to the movement effects of a task 
would not only prevent a movement related focus, but would produce superior learning 
over and above a general external cue (as advocated by Singer and his colleagues). To 
test this hypothesis Wulf et al. (2000) used a tennis forehand stroke. Novice participants 
were required to practise hitting tennis balls at a target on the opposing side of the court. 
Participants were either instructed to focus on the ball approaching them (antecedent 
group) or to focus on the ball leaving the racket (effect group). W ulf et al.’s (2000) 
findings indicated that the movement effects related focus produced superior learning 
and performance of a tennis forehand drive in comparison to the antecedent group.
Wulf et al. (2000) speculated that the movement effects related focus was not only 
successful in preventing performers from adopting an explicit, movement dynamic 
focus, but was also influential in promoting self-organisational motor systems to 
implicitly regulate task performance.
Trying to exert control over low-level co-ordination processes is thought to be 
disruptive to both learning and skilled performance (Hodge & Franks, 2002). Further, 
this could explain skill breakdown, which has consistently been associated with an 
internal focus of attention in the literature (Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993). This 
supported the contention that the motor system comprises different autonomous levels 
that are integrated to allow functional movement (Berstein, 1967). Hence, focusing on 
the movement effects of a skill appears to allow the motor system to use those 
autonomous processes, unconstrained by conscious control (W ulf et al., 2000; for 
review see W ulf & Prinz, 2001). Wulf, McNevin, and Shea (2001; see also Wulf, Shea, 
& Park, 2001) refer to this as the constrained-action hypothesis. This hypothesis 
proposed that an internal focus o f attention (movement focus) constrains or interferes 
with normal automatic control processes that regulate movement (e.g. by freezing of the 
degrees o f freedom), whereas an external focus (movement effects focus) enables the 
motor system to self-organize more naturally, unconstrained by conscious control.
To test the constrained-action hypothesis Wulf, McNevin, and Shea (2001) examined 
participants’ movement kinematics in relation to balancing performance on a 
stabilometer platform using either an internal or external focus o f attention. Results
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indicated that the external focus group (e.g. focused on markers attached to the 
platform) produced significantly smaller balance errors and responded at a significantly 
higher frequency than did the internal focus group (e.g. focused on their feet). The 
higher response frequency indicated greater confluence between voluntary and reflexive 
mechanism. These findings support the contention o f Newell and Slifkin (1996) who 
interpreted increases in response frequency as an indication of an increased number of 
active degrees o f freedom. In contrast, conscious attempts to intervene in motor control 
processes seem to result in a ‘freezing’ o f the degrees of freedom (Vereijken, van 
Emmerik, Whiting, & Newell, 1992) in a less automatic movement execution thus 
inhibiting learning and performance.
In an attempt to measure the attentional demands required under the two attentional 
focus conditions Wulf, McNevin, and Shea. (2001) measured probe reaction times 
(RTs). Results indicated that the external focus group produced significantly lower 
probe reaction times in comparison to the internal focus group. This indicated that 
participants in the external focus group produced a greater amount o f spare attentional 
capacity, which promoted a higher degree o f automaticity in comparison to participants 
in the internal focus group. Wulf, McNevin, and Shea’s. (2001) study provided three 
sources of evidence consistent with the constrained-action hypothesis. First, an external 
focus of attention resulted in increased balance performance, second, increased 
frequency of response, and third, reduced attentional demands relative to an internal 
focus o f attention. These findings indicate that the constrained-action hypothesis 
provides a viable explanation for the attentional focus phenomenon. Recently, Al- 
Abood, Bennett, Hernandez, Ashford and Davids (2002; cf. McNevin & Wulf, 2002) 
assessed movement dynamic (movement form) versus movement effects (e.g. ball 
trajectory to basket) verbal instructions on a basketball free-throw task. Al-Abood et 
al's. (2002) findings also provide support for the constrained-action hypothesis.
A comparison across previous research (Shea & Wulf, 1999; Wulf et al., 1998; Wulf et 
al., 1999) indicated that the advantages o f an external focus was enhanced (and found to 
occur earlier in the learning process) as the proximity of the external focus from the 
body increased (McNevin, Shea, & Wulf, 2003). For this reason, McNevin et al. (2003) 
hypothesised that increasing the proximity between the body and focus o f attention 
would enhance the learning advantages associated with an external, movement effects
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related focus of attention. In testing this hypothesis McNevin et al. (2003) used 
participants that were required to leam to balance on a stabilometer by focusing on 
markers, which were attached to the platform and placed at three different distances 
away from their feet. Group one were instructed to focus on distance markers outside 
(“far-outside”) of the platform. Group two were instructed to focus on distance markers 
inside (“far-inside”) o f the platform. Group three were instructed to focus on markers 
close to their feet (“near”). The results o f a retention test indicated that all three 
extemal-focus groups indicated significantly more effective balance learning than the 
intemal-focus control group. The far-outside and far-inside group produced similar 
performances; both groups indicated significantly more effective balance learning than 
the near group. Moreover, the two far-groups indicated higher-frequency movement 
adjustments than the near group. The findings o f this study support the hypothesis that 
focusing on more distant effects facilitates learning by promoting the use o f more 
naturally controlled processes. The findings are also in line with the constrained action 
hypothesis (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001) that account for restricted learning 
associated with attentional focus directed towards effects in close proximity to the body, 
or towards the body itself.
Recently, Wulf et al. (2002) investigated how the effectiveness of feedback for the 
learning of complex motor skills is affected by the focus o f attention it induces. The 
feedback referred specifically either to body movements (internal focus) or to movement 
effects (external focus). In Experiment one advanced and novice volleyball players 
practiced a service task under either internal or external feedback conditions. Results of 
both practice and retention indicated that feedback style did not differentially affect 
movement quality. However, extemal-focus feedback did indicate significantly greater 
service accuracy than intemal-focus feedback, independent o f expertise level. In 
Experiment two the effects of relative feedback frequency as a function o f attentional 
focus were assessed. Experienced soccer players were required to execute a lofted pass 
at a target using either internal or external feedback conditions. Results indicated that 
extemal-focus feedback produced significantly greater accuracy than intemal-focus 
feedback. Moreover, reduced feedback frequency was found to be beneficial under 
intemal-feedback conditions. In contrast, feedback frequencies provided for 100% or 
33% o f trials were equally effective under external focus conditions. W ulf et al. (2002) 
proposed that increased benefits were observed when feedback frequency was reduced
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in the intemal-feedback condition due to relief of an incessant internal focus induced by 
every-trial feedback. The main findings of this Wulf et al.s’ (2002) study indicate 
extemal-focus feedback induces superior learning and performance of a complex motor 
skill than intemal-focus feedback. Wulf et al. (2002) concluded that like extemal-focus 
instructions, extemal-focus feedback promotes the use of automatic motor systems more 
so than feedback that directs attention to internal, movement-based mechanisms. 
Moreover, Wulf et al.’s (2002) findings offer support for the constrained-action 
hypothesis.
The research findings relating to the efficacy o f adopting an external, movement effects 
related focus appear to be relatively stable with regards to both learning and 
performance. A criticism o f Wulf and her colleagues’ work is that they have primarily 
examined the effects of different attentional foci on novice performers during the 
acquisition of motor skills. Little attempt has been made to examine the specific effects 
of such foci of attention in skilled performers. Another criticism of the research is that 
the effects of different attentional foci have not been assessed under psychological 
stress.
One study that did attempt to examine the effects of different attentional foci under 
stress was carried out by Jackson and Wilson (1997). They tested whether the use of a 
‘swing thought’ in the moment immediately prior to putting (Boutcher & Crews, 1987) 
could help prevent performance impairment under stress. Participants were required to 
focus attention to their body movement (using a single aspect of putting technique) or 
attend to a visual stimulus (e.g. dimple pattern o f the ball or the texture o f  the putting 
surface). The results indicated that regardless o f adopting an internal or external focus 
immediately prior to putting under stress performance was still maintained.
Jackson and Wilson (1997) argued that the verbal cue (internal focus) might have 
discouraged performers from concentrating on too many aspects of skill execution and 
thus prevented a performance decrement. This would appear unlikely as focusing on 
just one explicit aspect o f movement dynamics can still disrupt automated control 
systems (Hodge & Franks, 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). In contrast, visual 
cues (external focus) have previously been found to be effective during skill acquisition 
(Singer et al., 1993, 1994). Thus, a performance decrement might have been prevented
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in Jackson and Wilson’s study by discouraging an explicit, movement dynamic focus.
Be that as it may, one criticism of Jackson and Wilson’s (1997) work is that they did not 
monitor participants’ foci. Consequently it is unclear as to what exactly they focused on 
during performance. Based on Wulf and her colleagues’ findings the most effective 
focus to adopt prior to the initiation of a motor skill is one that elicits an external, 
movement effects related focus (Al-Abood et al., 2002; Wulf et al., 2000), or more 
specifically an external, movement effects related focus that is set at a greater distance 
from the body (McNevin et al. 2003).
Maxwell, Masters and Eves (2000) provided some evidence that indicated attending to 
the internal mechanisms of performance results in greater accumulation of explicit task 
knowledge. They found that individuals who were more susceptible to conscious 
processing reported using more explicit information to ensue goal success than those 
less susceptible to such an internal focus. Increased processing o f explicit rules would 
have imposed greater demand on working memory. This supports the contention o f the 
constrained-action hypothesis in that an internal focus demands greater attention 
capacity (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea., 2001). Further, participants in Wulf and her 
Colleague’s research who adopted an internal learning focus might, effectively, have 
encouraged participants to accumulate a pool o f explicit information relating to the 
movement dynamics of the task, which could be consciously processed. Whereas, 
participants who adopted an external learning focus might not have developed this 
information.
Maxwell, Masters, Kerr and Weedon (2001) examined the effects of errorless learning 
in comparison to errorful learning using a golf putting task. Maxwell et al. (2001) 
proposed that when errors are prevented or considerably reduced, a passive mode of 
skill acquisition will occur. In contrast, when errors are present and require correction, 
an explicit, hypothesis testing mode of skill acquisition will occur. That is, errorful 
learners were predicted to formulate and test hypotheses in order to correct errors, 
which, in turn, would load on working memory (Baddeley, 1986) and impair 
performance. Maxwell et al.’s (2001) findings indicated that the hypotheses testing 
strategy (errorful learning) produced a pool of explicit task knowledge and a reduction 
in performance under secondary task loading. In contrast, errorless-passive learning, 
which did not require any hypothesis testing, accumulated little explicit knowledge and
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thus performance was maintained under secondary task loading. Maxwell et al. (2001) 
concluded that minimising explicit hypothesis testing reduces the load on working 
memory, which is exemplified by the maintenance of motor performance under 
secondary task loading.
In the belief that an external focus minimises the load placed on working memory in 
comparison to an internal focus, which imposes greater demands on working memory, 
elicited by conscious processing, Maxwell and Masters (2002) conducted two 
experiments. A balancing task (measured in a single plane o f motion -  ‘roll’) was used, 
similar to that used by Wulf et al. (1998), in both experiments. Experiment one 
consisted of a learning phase and test phase. In the learning phase participants were 
required to complete the task using either an internal (focus on feet) or external (focus 
on balancing board) focus. In the test phase participants were required to complete a 
retention test, followed by a transfer test. The transfer test required participants to 
complete a secondary task during their performance. Maxwell and Masters (2002) 
hypothesised that the secondary task would have a detrimental effect on the performance 
of the internal focus group (owing to the need to process explicit knowledge), as 
apposed to the external focus group. The results indicated no difference in accuracy 
during learning or performance between the two groups. Post experimental reports 
suggested that participants instructed to use an internal focus might have switched to 
using an external focus. Further, Maxwell and Masters (2002) suggested that a ceiling 
effect might have occurred as some participants were able to attain perfect performance 
on some trials.
Experiment two was designed to overcome the limitations o f Experiment one. A 3D 
movement analysis system was used to provide more accurate measures in two planes of 
motion (‘pitch’ and ‘roll’). In addition, participants received no feedback during the 
experiment to encourage conformity with their instructed focus. All other aspects o f the 
experiment were conducted in accordance with Experiment one. Similar to that of 
Experiment one, participants still appeared to adopt an external focus, regardless o f the 
instruction given. However, the results still support the contention that an external 
focus might place minimal demands on working memory. Maxwell and Masters (2002) 
concluded an implicitly regulated, external focus is the default option, particularly when 
an explicitly regulated, internal focus is inadequate during learning and performance o f a
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motor skill. This supports the contention of Wulf, Shea, and Park (2001) who found 
that when given the choice most participants chose an external (which was more 
effective) rather than an internal focus o f attention.
In summary, there has been considerable evidence indicating the advantages of adopting 
an external focus of attention during skill acquisition, which in turn, promotes 
automaticity and minimises the load on working memory (Maxwell et al., 2002; Wulf, 
McNevin, & Shea, 2001). This evidence is based largely on the learning o f novel motor 
tasks in novice performers. More recently Wulf et al. (2002) have found that the 
advantages o f extemal-focus feedback are transferable to skilled performers (e.g. 
volleyball and soccer). Conversely, it would appear that consciously processing 
internal, movement-related information is detrimental to both learning and performance 
of a motor skill, which in turn, interferes with automatic regulation and loads heavily on 
working memory (Maxwell & Masters, 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001).
A criticism o f Wulf and her colleagues’ research is that they failed to monitor whether 
participants conformed to the attentional focus instructions. Therefore caution must be 
taken when interpreting the underlying antecedents associated with benefits o f using an 
external focus. Another criticism of Wulf and her colleagues’ research is that their 
findings have not been tested under stress. Jackson and Wilson (1997) examined 
internal and external foci under stress. They found that regardless o f the adopted 
attention focus performance under stress was maintained. However, their results were 
inconclusive. Further, there were confounding elements between their findings and both 
the constrained-action hypothesis (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 
2001) and the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992). Be that as it may, the 
visual cue used by Jackson and Wilson (1997) was comparable to that used in Singer et 
al.’s studies (1988, 1993, 1994). Thus, suggesting that an external, movement effects 
related focus (Al-Abood et al., 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, &
Park, 2001) could be more effective in skilled performers under stress. However, 
additional research is required to ascertain a richer understanding o f the relationship 
between different attentional foci and skilled performance under stress. Further, no 
research to date has examined the relationship between skilled performers predisposed 
to conscious processing under stress (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; 
Masters et al., 1993) and attentional strategies that are thought to promote automatic,
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implicit regulation of performance (Al-Abood et al., 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 
2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001).
2.6. DISPOSITIONAL FACTORS AND SEVERE PERFORMANCE LOSS IN
COMPETITIVE SPORT
The limited research that has attempted to examine performance deterioration under 
stress in sport is largely based on two models, both o f which comprise dispositional 
factors. These models are choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984) and skill failure 
under pressure (Masters et al., 1993). Both models propose anxiety, attentional focus 
and automaticity disruption, in addition to dispositional factors, as antecedents 
associated with performance breakdown under stress. Nevertheless, these models 
possess conflicting elements that need to be addressed. Throughout this section a series 
of theoretical issues will be discussed relating to how dimensions o f personality might 
influence performance breakdown under stress. This section begins with an overview 
and critique o f choking (Baumeister, 1984). This is followed by an overview and 
critique of skill failure under pressure (Masters et al, 1993). Included in this section are 
the limitations and conflicting elements between the two models, followed by research 
that could remedy such limitations.
Choking under pressure has been defined as
“a metaphorical expression used to describe the occurrence o f inferior 
performance despite an individual striving and situational demands for 
superior performance.” (Baumeister, 1984, p. 610)
Baumeister (1984) proposed a model (see Figure 2.4) that, he believed, explains choking 
under pressure. Baumeister (1984) hypothesised that arousal, created by pressure, 
heightens self-consciousness and thus, directs attention to the movement characteristics 
of the skill sequence. An attempt is then made to control the movement consciously to 
ensure the correct execution o f the skill. This, ironically, disrupts automaticity and 
impairs performance owing to explicit knowledge being no longer consciously available 
to successfully guide skill execution. In an attempt to test the model o f choking under 
pressure Baumeister (1984) carried out a series of experiments. A commercially
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available game called “roll-up” (e.g. a ball and rod task), which required a certain 
amount of motor and visual co-ordination (Martens & Landers, 1972) was used as the 
experimental task. Participants were required to focus attention on either their hand 
movements or the ball when executing the task. Results of Experiment 1 (pilot) and 2 
were consistent with the model. Baumeister (1984) concluded that increased awareness 
to one’s movements and efforts reduces the consistency of performance, which supports 
the contention of Wulf and her colleagues. Experiment 3 incorporated the public and 
private sub-scales o f the dispositional self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, et al., 1975). 
Baumeister (1984) hypothesised that dispositionally low self-conscious individuals 
would be more susceptible to the negative effects of an internal state during 
performance because they are habitually unaware of such processes. Results o f  
Experiment 3 found that participants dispositionally low in public self-consciousness 
indicated the greatest susceptibility to decrements in performance when instructed to 
consciously control their movements.
In Experiment 4 implicit pressure through self-presentation concerns was created. A 
confederate’s performance was manipulated to do either moderately better (high 
pressure condition) or moderately worse (low pressure condition) than the participants.
It was assumed that pressure would be heightened when the performance o f the 
confederate was moderately better and thus, hypothesised that choking would be more 
common. Baumeister’s model o f choking proposes that pressure directs greater 
attention to the process of performance. Low self-conscious individuals are not 
accustomed to performing whilst feeling self-conscious. Therefore, it was also 
hypothesised that dispositionally low self-conscious participants would show greater 
vulnerability to the act of choking under pressure. This hypothesis was supported as 
participants dispositionally low in private self-consciousness performed significantly 
worse under pressure than participants dispositionally high in private self- 
consciousness. However, interestingly during the non-pressure practice trials this was 
not the case, it was participants dispositionally high in self-consciousness that 
performed worse, than those low in self-consciousness. Baumeister (1984) concluded 
that dispositional private self-consciousness was a moderating factor in the choking 
under pressure process.
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Figure 2.4. A Schematic o f the Choking Under Pressure Model (Baumeister, 1984).
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Experiment 5 manipulated explicit pressure using monetary reward. In the pressure 
condition participants were given a target score to reach individually determined by 
initial pre-test trials, which demanded a high degree o f performance. Results indicated 
that participants dispositionally low in self-consciousness demonstrated a greater 
tendency to choke under pressure than participants dispositionally high in self- 
consciousness. However, it is worth clarifying that both the dispositionally high and 
low self-conscious participants produced a decrement in performance under pressure; 
only the low self-conscious result was significant.
In Experiment 6 a popular arcade game was used in an attempt to examine choking 
under pressure in a field setting. Performance evaluation of participants was used to 
induce explicit pressure (self-presentation concerns). Participants were required to score 
as high as possible on the task. Dispositional self-consciousness was not measured in 
this experiment. Results indicated an average decrease in performance of twenty-five 
per cent under pressure. Baumeister (1984) concluded that situational pressure does 
induce choking effects in a field setting.
The series of experiments undertaken by Baumeister (1984) led him to the overall 
conclusion that dispositionally low self-conscious individuals are more susceptible to 
choking under pressure, in comparison to dispositionally high self-conscious 
individuals. Baumeister (1984) argued that individuals high in dispositional self- 
consciousness simply find it easier to cope with pressure because they are used to 
performing whilst feeling self-conscious. In contrast, individuals low in dispositional 
self-consciousness are not accustomed to this process.
However, there are confounding elements to the research conducted by Baumeister 
(1984) that need to be addressed. Firstly, Baumeister (1984) stated that pressure must 
be present for choking to occur. Baumeister (1984) also stated arousal to be an 
important component of the choking process, which can heighten levels of self- 
consciousness. Nonetheless, he made no attempt to measure either construct during the 
series of experiments. Therefore, it would appear that such constructs were assumed on 
the basis that experimental groups demonstrated a reduction in performance under 
pressure. Further, it is not clear what levels of arousal are required to heighten self-
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consciousness and whether this differs between low and high self-consciousness 
individuals.
Secondly, the ambiguity of Baumeister’s (1984) results means that they can be 
interpreted another way. The conclusion that dispositionally low self-conscious 
individuals were more susceptible to choking under pressure than dispositionally high 
self-conscious individuals is questionable. Masters (1992; Maxwell et al., 2000) argued 
that cognitive failure was common in individuals who are highly motivated to succeed. 
Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed that worry operates as a function of motivation by 
recruiting additional resources (e.g. mental effort), which are directed towards strategies 
created to prevent negative performance effects. Therefore, perhaps dispositionally high 
self-conscious individuals were worried about being negatively evaluated by relevant 
others by nature of their disposition and thus possessed a greater motivation to perform 
well under pressure. However, it is not known if additional resources were recruited or 
indeed, where they were allocate as Baumeister (1984) neither monitored motivation nor 
mental effort. Clearly, research needs to control for these limitations in the future.
Thirdly, the ball and rod task (used in experiments 1-5) might have had little relevance 
to participants’ ego. Without any ego involvement the effects o f pressure would be 
minimised thus, self-focused attention is unlikely to have occurred, particularly in 
individuals low in self-consciousness. This also suggests that motivation could have 
been an influential factor in the outcome of these results. In addition, Baumeister 
(1984) speculated that increased attention to oneself was responsible for disrupting 
automaticity and impairing performance in dispositionally low self-conscious 
participants. However, the task used by Baumeister was novel to participants (used in 
experiments 1-5) thus it is unlikely that the acquired skill was taken to an automatic 
level of functioning. Using participants that possess automatic skills might be a more 
suitable control for motivation (e.g. high ego involvement) and automaticity in future 
research. Finally, in the series o f experiments conducted by Baumeister (1984) the two 
tasks used (ball and rod task and a video game) were not sport specific. Thus, the 
results are not generalisable to athletic performance.
Baumeister (1984) went on to argue that an individual does not need to have reached an 
automatic level of functioning in order to experience choking under pressure; it can
6 2
occur at any phase in the learning process. For example, an introductory level athlete 
with minimal experience will not be proficient enough to execute a skill at an 
autonomous level. However, the athlete will still be aware of the fundamental 
difference between high (e.g. competition) and low (e.g. practice) pressure 
environments. Consequently, that athlete will still be susceptible to choking under 
pressure. According to Baumeister (1984) individuals that perform a skill automatically 
choke under pressure owing to the explicit knowledge of that skill being inaccessible to 
the conscious to guide performance. This implies that if the explicit knowledge of that 
skill were consciously available decrements in performance could be avoided. If this 
were the case, clearly knowledge o f specific skills would still be consciously available 
to introductory level athletes as automaticity would not yet have been reached. This 
should enable such athletes to guide performance under pressure and essentially, prevent 
the choking process. Although it is recognised that low level performers can experience 
a decrement in performance under pressure, it is unlikely to be due to the lack of 
consciously available knowledge relating to the process of the skill. This suggests that 
Baumeister’s (1984) model of choking under pressure possesses other confounding 
elements that require further investigation.
Masters et al. (1993) argued that skill failure under pressure, outlined by the conscious 
processing hypothesis8 (Masters, 1992) (see Figure 2.5.) could have links with 
dimensions o f personality. Masters et al. (1993) proposed certain skilled performers to 
have a disposition to reinvest in controlled processing, which can disrupt automatic skill 
functioning under stress. Reinvestment o f controlled processing has been defined as
“having a greater or lesser disposition than others to reinvest actions
and percepts with attention -  particularly when under pressure”
(Masters et al., 1993, p.655)
It is important to clarify at this point where the discrepancy lies between Baumeister’s 
(1984) model o f choking under pressure and Masters et al.’s (1993) model of skill 
failure under pressure. Baumeister (1984) proposed that when a skill becomes 
automatic the explicit knowledge of that skill is inaccessible to the conscious attention 
to guide performance in times of stress thus, performance is impaired. In antithesis,
8 For a review o f  the conscious processing hypothesis see section 2.52.
Masters et al. (1993) (cf. Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992) argued that 
explicit knowledge of an automatic skill is readily available to the conscious attention to 
reinvest in under stress, which disrupts automaticity and impairs performance.
In an attempt to assess the relationship between dispositional factors and skill failure 
under pressure Masters et al. (1993) constructed the Reinvestment Scale. The twenty 
item Scale comprises items from the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (Broadbent, 
Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & 
Nesshoever, 1987) and the public (6 items) and private (6 items) subscales of the 
Dispositional Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). In an attempt to assess 
the predictive power of the reinvestment scale, Masters et al. (1993) conducted three 
experiments. Masters et al. (1993) hypothesised that individuals who scored high on the 
Reinvestment Scale would be more prone to skill failure under pressure, than those who 
scored low on the Scale.
In Experiment 1 participants scoring low (n = 7) or high (n = 9) on the Reinvestment 
Scale formed the two experimental groups. Participants using a pool o f explicit 
instructions were required to leam a two-dimensional rod-tracing task (Seashore,
Dudek, & Holtzman, 1949). Participants were then required to perform the task under 
stress, induced by audience evaluation and monetary reward (this was reduced each time 
participants made an error). Results found no significant differences between high and 
low reinvestment groups at a rod-tracing task.
In Experiment 2 specific data from Masters’ (1992) study were used in which 
participants had learned a golf putting task and then their performance tested under 
stress (induced by monetary reward). Participants completed the Reinvestment Scale 
with those scoring low (n = 7) or high (n = 7) forming the two experimental groups. 
Results found a significant correlation (r = 0.59, P < 0.05) between participants scoring 
high on the Reinvestment Scale and a decrease in golf putting performance under stress.
In accordance with Experiments 1 and 2, Masters et al. (1993) suggested that the 
relatively simple rod-tracing task was not complex enough to elicit the reinvestment
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Figure 2.5. A Schematic of Skill Failure Under Pressure (Masters et al., 
1993).
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process. In contrast, the golf putting task was considered a more complex skill 
comprising many explicit components to elicit reinvestment. Thus, Masters et al. 
(1993) concluded the Reinvestment Scale to be a successful predictor of skill failure 
under pressure, precipitated by conscious processing.
A criticism of Experiment 2 is that Masters et al. (1993) proposed state anxiety to be a 
fundamental antecedent associated with skill breakdown under pressure. However, 
Masters et al. (1993) only measured the physiological (somatic) aspects of anxiety by 
recording heart rate; no provision was made for intensity or directional components of 
cognitive anxiety or self-confidence. State anxiety is considered a multidimensional 
construct comprising both somatic, cognitive, and self-confidence factors (Martens et 
al., 1990). Clearly, research needs to control for these constructs in the future.
Secondly, the data used for Experiment 2 required participants to execute four hundred 
golf putts during the acquisition phase (Masters et al., 1993). During this phase 
participants would have acquired some degree o f proficiency. However, it is unlikely 
that they developed their putting skills to an automatic level of functioning. Future 
research should test the Reinvestment Scale using athletes who already possess 
automatic skills. Further, this might also control for motivational factors (e.g. ego 
involvement) that could have influenced Masters et al.’s (1992) findings. That is, all 
participants were required to participate in the study as an obligatory part of their degree 
course, which might have affected motivation similar to that suggested for Baumeister’s 
(1984) research.
In Experiment 3, Masters et al. (1993) used the top twelve ranked performers o f the 
collegiate squash and tennis clubs, in an attempt to validate the Reinvestment Scale in a 
field based setting. All participants completed the Reinvestment Scale. Independently, 
the president and captain o f each club were required to rate each team mates’ tendency 
to choke or fail under pressure. Performers were ranked on a 0 (never chokes under 
pressure) to 4 (always chokes under pressure) likert scale. Data from the two sporting 
groups were collaborated. Results indicated a significant correlation (r = 0.64, p < 0.01) 
between the skill failure ratings (as predicted by presidents and team captains) and the 
scores o f the Reinvestment Scale. Masters et al. (1993) concluded that the correlation 
between the propensity to reinvest and experience skill failure under pressure offered 
greater validity to the Reinvestment Scale.
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A criticism of Experiment 3 (Masters et al., 1993) was that squash and tennis 
performers’ susceptibility to failure under pressure was based on the subjective opinions 
of the team presidents and captains, respectively. Hence, this experiment does not 
examine whether athletes suggested to be susceptible to this phenomenon do actually 
consciously process explicit task knowledge in a field based setting. Thus, future 
research needs to examine the relationship between the Reinvestment Scale and 
performance outcomes in a field based setting.
Masters et al.’s (1993) research suggested that high reinvesters are more susceptible to 
skill failure under pressure, precipitated by conscious processing, than low reinvesters. 
Twelve out of the twenty items that comprise the Reinvestment Scale are common to the 
public and private subscales of the Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975). Thus, suggesting that those high in dispositional reinvestment were also 
high in dispositional self-consciousness. For this reason, Masters et al.’s (1993) 
findings (Experiment 2) are in contrast to Baumeister’s (1984) who found that 
dispositionally low self-consciousness performers to be more susceptible to decrements 
in performance under pressure. Hence, high reinvesters might simply be highly self- 
conscious and more likely to become stressed and thus anxious particularly in 
conditions open to appraisal. This contention is supported by Maxwell et al’s. (2000) 
data (unpublished), which indicated that the Reinvestment Scale and the trait section of 
the State-Trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970) were significantly correlated 
(r = 0.55, n =193, p < 0.001). Thus, suggesting that high reinvesters are likely to be 
more anxious than low reinvesters, which might account for differing performances 
under stress in Masters et al.’s (1993) research. Further, Maxwell et al. (2000) found a 
negative correlation between performance during explicit learning and Reinvestment 
Scale scores. It would appear that low reinvesters learn more effectively than high 
reinvesters. Hence, perhaps self-consciousness can also influence the progression of 
learning. Clearly, future research needs to investigate the conflicting elements that exist 
between Baumeister’s (1984) and Masters et al.’s (1993) work if an improved 
understanding of the stress-rehearsal-performance breakdown is to be established.
Finally, a further criticism of Masters et al.’s (1993) research is that they propose the 
Reinvestment Scale to be a strong predictor of reinvestment of controlled processing.
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However, this inventory appears only to offer a measure o f an individual’s cognitive 
inhibitions, rather than the direct assessment o f the processing system used to execute 
skills. Hence, conscious processing was assumed in participants dispositionally high in 
reinvestment from performance outcome based measures alone.
One such study that attempted to bridge the gap between conscious processing and 
outcome based measures is Crews (2001). Crews (2001) examined both situation and 
dispositional factors of skill failure under pressure. This study comprises three 
conditions, which all required golfers to execute a series o f five-foot putts on a flat 
green. In phase one the golfers were required to execute twenty putts. In phase two 
golfers were required to complete the same task with the addition o f being told that they 
would be filmed live, by a television company. In the final phase golfers were told they 
would receive a large monetaiy reward if they exceeded their previous score; failing to 
do so would decrease their prize money in proportion to their score. An 
electroencephalographic (EEG) instrument recorded brain activity throughout the 
experiment. The brain is divided into two hemispheres. The left hemisphere is thought 
to be involved with conscious, analytical activity, whereas the right hemisphere is 
thought to be involved with automatic, creative activity (Crews, 2001).
Results from Crew’s (2001) study indicted that golfers who possessed a propensity to 
choke indicated an increase in activity, but predominantly used the brain’s left 
hemisphere. In comparison, golfers who were consistent under pressure experienced 
equal amounts of increased activity. However, this was distributed evenly between the 
brain’s left and right hemispheres. The findings of Crews (2001) indicate that golfers 
adopting the brain’s conscious analytical side to process information are susceptible to 
experiencing a decrement in performance under pressure. This provides theoretical 
support for the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) and the constrained- 
action hypothesis (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). Both models propose that directing 
conscious attention internally to explicit movements can disrupt the implicit regulation 
of task performance otherwise suggested to facilitate learning (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 
2001) and performance (Masters; 1992).
Crews (2001) concluded that if players are to be successful under pressure they need to 
learn to access the right side of the brain throughout performance, which promotes
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automatic processing systems. For this reason future research needs to examine 
psychological intervention strategies that help to promote right brain activity during 
learning and performance particularly, in individuals predisposed to conscious 
processing under stress.
2.7. SUMMARY AND AIMS OF RESEARCH
The preceding review of literature has shown that severe performance loss in 
competitive sport has been explained through a variety of psychological constructs. 
Further, this review has identified specific issues and conflicting elements relating to 
aspects of this phenomenon that require further investigation. First, both Masters et al.’s 
(1993) model o f skill failure underpressure and Baumeister’s (1984) model of choking 
under pressure have intuitive appeal in explaining severe performance loss in sport.
Both models take into account dimensions of personality, and situational factors. 
Nevertheless the mechanisms that underpin such models have been derived from limited 
research, possessing no empirical or qualitative grounding in sport. Further, the 
research underpinning these theories has produced equivocal findings. Clearly, future 
research needs to explore psychological characteristics derived from the perceptions and 
interpretations o f athletes that have experienced, first hand, severe performance loss in 
competitive sport. Through such an examination the value of the available theories used 
in the literature to explain severe performance loss, and the perceptions of athletes, can 
be explored.
Secondly, heightened arousal and state anxiety have been assumed in the literature to be 
constructs that underpin severe performance loss under stress. However, little attempt 
has been made to rigorously monitor these constructs. Thirdly, recent research has 
proposed both dispositional characteristics (Baumeister, 1984; Masters et al, 1993;
Chell, Graydon, Crowley, & Child, 2003), and methods of skill acquisition (Hardy, 
Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992), coupled with environmental factors, to be 
influential in severe performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing under stress. 
Clearly, future research needs to examine the combined effect of manipulated explicit 
task knowledge during skill acquisition and dispositional factors on these phenomena, 
whilst controlling for the issues associated with using a dual task paradigm.
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Finally, there has been considerable evidence (Wulf et al., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) 
indicating the advantages of adopting an external foci of attention, in comparison to an 
internal focus during skill acquisition. Recently Wulf and Shea (2002) have found that 
the advantages of an external focus are also transferable to skilled performance. 
Nevertheless, no research has examined the effects of different attentional foci on 
skilled performers predisposed to conscious processing under stress. Nor has current 
research identified a psychological intervention strategy for such performers to help 
prevent conscious processing in an ecologically valid environment.
The central purpose of this thesis was to examine in detail, using qualitative and 
quantitative procedures, psychological mechanisms that underpin severe performance 
loss in competitive sport. The following specific research aims were formulated:
1) To identify psychological mechanisms that underpin severe performance loss in 
competitive sport.
2) To explore how psychological mechanisms associated with severe performance loss 
in competitive sport interact.
3) To identify psychological coping strategies that could be used to counter severe 
performance loss in competitive sport.
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3.0. STUDY 1. ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE 
PERFORMANCE LOSS IN COMPETITIVE SPORT:
THE ATHLETES’ PERSPECTIVE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Examples where elite athletes occasionally have experienced severe performance loss in 
competitive sport (see Section 1.0) are characterised by a sudden and substantial 
deterioration of performance under stress. As a result of the complexity of such an 
experience several theories probably have a part to play in explaining this performance 
deterioration (e.g. choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984); catastrophe theory 
(Hardy, 1990); conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992); skill failure under 
pressure (Masters et al., 1993)). These theories provide different perspectives in 
attempting to explain severe performance loss phenomenon.
Current research has highlighted pressure and stress as fundamental antecedents 
associated with decrements in motor performance (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, Mullen & 
Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992; Masters et ah, 1993; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). Pressure 
increases the demands of performing well; stress is the process involving one’s 
appraisal of whether or not those demands can be successfully met (Lazarus, 1966,
1982, 2000; Lazarus & Folkman, 1985). The purported mechanisms through which 
such stress affects motor performance are wide ranging and depend on the theoretical 
position adopted. Some researchers have suggested that large deteriorations in 
performance can occur due to the effects of anxiety (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Masters et 
ah, 1993) and arousal (Easterbrook, 1959) that emerge from stress. These researchers 
argued that the combination of high cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal would 
have catastrophic effects on skill execution. Some purported effects of experiencing 
arousal and anxiety are that they can cause either a distraction (Eysenck, 1979) or a self­
focused attention (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992).
Substantial support has been provided for the stress-self-focus relationship. For 
example, Masters (1992) proposed the conscious processing hypothesis, which stated 
that heightened state anxiety precipitated by stress can direct attention to the process by 
which a well-learned skill is executed. This argument has led to suggestions that such 
attentional shifts are influenced by the method through which the skill was learnt
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(Masters, 1992). Motor skills have been proposed, initially, to be learned explicitly 
through conscious processing (Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967). Over time, with 
practise, motor skills are then thought to become implicit through automatic processing. 
It is therefore hypothesised by some authors that stress results in a regression to early 
learning phase strategies (Fuchs, 1962) and results in a movement characterised by 
inefficient co-ordination patterns and a freezing of the degrees of freedom within the 
movement sequence (Bernstein, 1967). Hence the movements lose effectiveness, which 
leads to large deteriorations o f performance.
The phenomenon under investigation in this study has sometimes been labelled as 
choking and describes an athlete when he/she experiences a severe loss in performance 
during a critical moment in competition (Baumeister & Showers, 1986). This suggests 
that the timing of the deterioration in performance is linked to specific characteristics of 
the situation such as the competition environment and the moment by moment status o f  
that performance and targets set. Baumeister (1984) proposed a model of choking, 
which hypothesised that arousal, created by pressure, heightens self-consciousness, 
which directs attention to the movement characteristics of a skill sequence. An anxious 
attempt is then made to consciously control the movement to ensure the correct 
execution o f the skill. This disrupts automaticity and impairs performance because 
explicit knowledge is no longer available to the conscious attention to successfully 
guide the execution o f a well-learned skill.
To test the choking model Baumeister (1984) conducted a series o f experiments. The 
outcome was that it is easier for highly self-conscious individuals to cope with pressure 
because they are used to performing whilst feeling self-conscious, in contrast to low 
self-conscious individuals who are not so accustomed to this process (Baumeister,
1984). This suggests that the role o f dispositional characteristics in a performer’s 
personality might have an explanatory role in large performance decrements. Further to 
this Masters et al., (1993) regard the primary mechanism by which skill regression 
occurs as reinvestment of controlled processing. They described this occurrence as 
having a greater or less disposition to rehearse explicit task knowledge, particularly 
when under stress.
The severe performance loss literature has been hampered by two main limitations: first, 
research underpinning theories used to explain this phenomenon has produced equivocal
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findings (e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Masters etal., 1993). Second, mechanisms associated 
with these theories have been derived from limited research, possessing no empirical or 
qualitative grounding in sport. Hence, explanations for this problem have been based 
on the most readily available theory (Baumeister, 1986). Research has not considered 
the athlete’s perspective on psychological mechanisms that might underpin severe 
performance loss in competition. Therefore, the primary aim o f this study was to 
explore psychological characteristics derived from the perceptions and interpretations of 
competitive athletes that had experienced, first-hand, severe performance loss in 
competitive sport. Through such an examination the value of the available theories used 
to explain severe loss in performance, and the perceptions of athletes could be explored. 
The rationale for using a qualitative approach in this study was to access an improved 
understanding of severe performance loss in competitive athletes. Previous research has 
exclusively used quantitative, outcome-based measures to examine this phenomenon 
without a qualitatively derived understanding (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy et al, 1996; 
Lewis & Linder, 1997; Masters, 1992; Masters et al, 1993).
3.2. METHOD
3.21. Participants
With institutional ethics approval, ten participants (male n=8; female n=2) aged 
between 16 and 30 years (mean = 24.1 years) were interviewed. Participants were 
performers in soccer (1) golf (1), cricket (3), squash (1), tennis (3) and basketball (1).
The rationale for using these sports was that they all have been commonly associated 
with performance deterioration from an anecdotal perspective. The rationale for using a 
wide range of sports was to access a broad understanding of severe performance loss 
across team and individual sports, involving fine, gross, open and closed motor skills.
The standard of participants ranged from club (n=2), county (n=5) to national level 
(n=3). Participants possessed a mean average of 12 years competitive experience (range 
= 5-19 years) and were selected from a pool of 150 'Sporting Experience Surveys' 
administered equally amongst the sporting groups. The criterion for participation was 
that the athletes had reported experiencing a substantial deterioration to performance 
during competition. Athletes were prioritised to be interviewed based on the substantial 
deterioration of their reported experience(s). Participation in the study was voluntary.
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Informed consent was sought from participants before data collection; confidentiality 
and anonymity was guaranteed (see Appendix 2).
3.22. Instruments
3.221. Sporting experience survey. Sports clubs were contacted to gain 
permission to distribute the survey to club members. The purpose o f the survey was to 
highlight athletes that had experienced a severe loss in performance when competing. 
Participants were selected for a follow-up interview based on the substantial 
deterioration of their reported experience. The survey comprised questions in general 
demographics (e.g. age, sport, years o f experience, and level) and specific questions 
about their experience(s) (see Appendix 3).
3.222. The interview guide. To standardise the interview protocol, an interview 
guide (see Appendix 4) was constructed that contained lead and elaboration-probe 
questions (Scanlan, Stein & Ravizza, 1991). The interview guide was piloted on 
athletes who had experienced severe performance loss during competition in order to 
develop and refine the protocol.
3.23. Procedure
3.231. Contacting participants. All participants were contacted and informed of 
the nature of the investigation. A generic interview guide, comprising the main lead- 
and elaboration-probe questions, was sent to participants one week prior to their 
interview. This guide was sent to make participants aware o f what was required of them 
during the interview and to help standardise the interview protocol (Scanlan et al., 1991; 
Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 1993a; Gould, Jackson & Finch, 1993b).
3.232. The interview. The interview format comprised o f four main sections:
1) general introduction, 2) description o f most severe performance loss, 3) other 
experiences of severe performance losses, 4) final comments and summary questions.
It was explained to the interviewee that the purpose of the interview was to develop an 
understanding o f their experience(s) of severe performance loss in competitive sport and 
that this would be the focus of the interview. A Dictaphone was used to record the 
interviews. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. All questions were open
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ended, allowing participants the freedom to convey their actions, feelings, thoughts and 
emotions. It was stressed that participants should not guess if  they could not remember 
certain aspects of their experience(s). After initial rapport was developed with each 
participant the interviewer asked the follow:
“...Please describe to me your most severe experience when you felt
you could not perform to your usual skill level.”
Once participants had recounted their experiences in as much detail as possible general 
probe questions (Pattern, 1990) were used to gain an in-depth account o f the event(s) 
(e.g., “Please could you describe for me any further actions, thoughts, feelings, or 
emotions that you remember experiencing that might have influenced this particular 
performance?”). Elaboration probe questions were also used to expand on participants' 
experiences (e.g., “What was it about these feelings (or actions, thoughts, emotions) that 
made them influential during this particular experience?”). To understand the 
information conveyed by participants clarification-probe questions were used (e.g., 
“Could you explain that in more detail please?”). Causal-probe questions were also 
used to identify the cause of specific feeling, thoughts and / or experiences (e.g. “Could 
you explain what caused that experience?”). Finally, before moving on to the next 
section a general probe-question was used to make certain no information had been 
omitted from the experience (e.g., “Can you think o f any other actions, thoughts, 
feelings or emotions that you feel were influential during this particular experience?”). 
These procedures, recommended by Patton (1990), were used to prevent the interviewer 
leading participants in their response.
3.24. Data preparation and analysis
According to several reputed researchers there is no absolute way to analyse qualitative 
data (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). Nevertheless, the most prominent 
technique used in sport psychology research has been some form of inductive content 
analysis (cf. Biddle, Markland, Gilboume, Chatzisarantis, & Sparks, 2001). This 
analysis allows dimensions, theories and relationships to emerge from the raw transcript 
data without proposing in advance what these important areas will be. In contrast, in a 
deductive content analysis the main variables and statements associated with specific 
research hypotheses are specified prior to data collection (Patton, 2002). Thus, the
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present study used inductive procedures to analyse the raw transcript data as 
recommended by Patton (1990) and successfully adapted to sport by Gould et al. 
(1993a, b). The rationale for using this procedure was that research underpinning 
theories associated with severe performance loss has produced equivocal findings 
(Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1993). Further, mechanisms associated with these theories 
have been derived from limited research that does not possess empirical or qualitative 
grounding in sport.
The same investigator conducted all interviews to ensure a standardised protocol. Two 
additional researchers read and re-read the transcripts and inductively analysed the data. 
This procedure required the researchers to organise the raw data into interpretable and 
meaningful themes that characterised the essence o f the dialogue. These were then 
categorised using inductive techniques. Similar quotes were clustered, enabling 
researchers independently to generate higher-order themes. Where necessary, second 
higher order themes were also generated. The highest generality was labelled the 
'general dimension'. This dimension clustered together higher order themes.
On completion of the inductive procedures a triangulation method was adopted to 
maximise the reliability and control for individual biasing during data analysis. During 
this process raw data themes were agreed on and interpretable and meaningful higher- 
order and general dimension themes employed. Finally, a validity check was conducted 
using deductive procedures to verify that the identified themes existed in the raw 
transcripts (Hanton & Jones, 1999). Any anomalies were discussed and rectified. The 
triangulation assessment produced an 82% agreement in the raw data themes.
Consensus was required when employing definitive higher-order and general dimension 
themes; 100% agreement was achieved.
3.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The inductive procedure identified eight general dimensions comprising 56 high-order 
themes, generated from 464 raw data themes (see Figures 3 .1 -  3.5). The data were 
divided into five categories: (1) factors influencing the occurrence of severe 
performance loss, (2) experiences during severe performance loss, (3) consequences of 
the occurrence of severe performance loss, (4) personality characteristics and (5) type of 
competition when severe performance loss was experienced. Numbers in parentheses,
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for all figures, highlight the number of athletes reporting identical raw data themes 
(when >1).
3.31. Factors influencing the occurrence of severe performance loss
3.311. Antecedents. The fourteen high-order themes, produced from 20% of  
raw data themes, were: ‘high expectations of others’, ‘high expectations of se lf, ‘crowd 
/ significant others’, ‘reputation’, ‘prior experiences’, ‘situational / environmental 
variables’, ‘too much time’, ‘apprehension’, ‘fear of failure’, ‘pressure’, ‘importance of 
sport’, ‘playing well’, ‘consequences to poor performance’, and ‘payment / rewards’.
All participants were inhibited by high expectations of themselves and/or of others (i.e. 
coach, peers, and parents) prior to performance loss, which led to an increase in 
pressure to win. Participants commonly reported experiencing apprehension and a fear 
o f failure in this occasion. One participant stated “I was frightened o f losing to this 
player”, another participant stated “I didn’t want to play; I didn’t want to be there (see 
Figure 3.1). This suggested that participants were in a negative frame of mind prior to 
the onset o f performance disruption. This was further exemplified by statements like 
“I’m going to lose this, I’ve lost it before, just couldn’t get that killer instinct”, or “the 
umpire at my end used to no-ball me a lot and obviously the thought of no-balling a lot 
was on my mind”, or “the more you wait the more your brain gets a little bit more 
muddled” (see Figure 3.1). In addition, all participants reported how important their 
sport was to them and how crucial it was to perform well and essentially, sustain their 
status or reputation as a performer.
3.32. Experiences during severe performance loss
3.321. Cognitive changes. The eleven higher-order themes, produced from 22 %  o f raw 
data themes, were: ‘inappropriate focus’, ‘unable to stay in the present’, ‘negative 
thoughts’, ‘obsessional thinking about technique’, Tack o f cognitive control’, Tack of 
confidence’, ‘self-presentation concerns/public self-consciousness’, ‘perception o f what 
significant others were thinking’, ‘magnification of thoughts’, ‘complacency’ and ‘self­
doubt’.
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Figure 3.1. Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
It had become an expectation just to rely 
on me
I was told that I was the fast bowler in the 
league and that I should be bowling really 
quick
I felt built up within the league 
They expected me to win (2)
You must win, you mustn’t come off the 
court until you have won 
You’ve got to beat them; you can’t let 
them win again
There were expectations from others (2) 
Maybe they will expect a little bit more 
than I can deliver
I was expected to do it but I knew the
dangers out there that could spoil it
I felt a great expectation
They did expect that it would just go
straight in and it didn’t
Again the expectations of others was there
on myself
I felt an increase pressure, tension and 
anxiety because I am expected to win —
My expectations were so high before hand 
nothing could make up for it, or even 
partly make up for what I’d just done 
I wanted to put on a good performance (2) 
My expectations were bowling fast, 
swinging the ball and taking wickets 
I would have to bowl quicker 
I honestly expected to beat him 
Got to win
My expectations were 4 good serves
I still had to impress
High expectations o f myself (4)
Expectations were put on me by myself 
Its all on me now, maybe I can do this but I 
don’t know, I’ve got to make it 
I was thinking the conditions are humid so 
the ball should be swinging 
I felt as if it was all resting on me 
I have to win as they are not as good as me 
I think it comes from the expectation I put 
on myself under when playing tennis __
High expectations 
Of others
High expectations 
Of self
~  Antecedents
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Figure 3.1. (Cont.) Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
Paying attention to others, rather than
going through my normal routine
My attention was focused on, is that person
there is this person there
He’s one o f those guys I’ve got it into my
head that I don’t like to play
I knew these guys were going to be judging
me
You know everyone is watching you (2) _
You know a lot is riding on this, a lot of 
pride at stake
There was more rivalry when playing this 
club
Being the captain o f the side and having 
the reputation o f  being one o f the better 
players in the county
I’m quite nervous as to what the rest o f the 
team thing o f me __
I had played a couple o f big matches in the 
past and just frozen so I was aware of that 
I was thinking back to when I was 15 when 
I missed that penalty 
I remembered the game when we lost to 
this team by 1 point last year and I just 
thought I want to make this shot 
I didn’t feel like I do other weeks 
things really didn’t feel right from the start 
I’m going to lose this, I’ve lost it before, 
just couldn’t get that killer instinct __
The umpire at my end he used to no-ball 
me a lot and obviously the thought o f no­
balling a lot was on my mind 
I hadn’t been bowling as much as I’d liked 
and this was the first time I had opened for 
Cornwall’s under 21s 
There was an umpire that I really didn’t 
like
I was captain opening the bowling 
The fact that he was a friend or so called 
friend
There was also a problem with the court __
I always find that the more time you have 
to think the more scenarios go through 
your head
We had a to wait a long time for the group 
in front to play, I had too much time to 
think about what club I was going to take 
The more you wait the more your brain 
gets a little bit more muddled —
Crowd /  significant 
Others
Reputation
Prior
experiences
Situational /
environmental
variables
Too much 
time
Antecedents
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Figure 3.1. (Cont.) Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
I was apprehensive (2)
I didn’t want to play; I didn’t want to be 
there
I wasn’t 100% committed to the shot I 
wanted to play
Tentative and apprehensive _
Its sort o f a fear, a fear o f losing 
That’s what it is fear of failure, definitely 
I’ve always had this inherent fear of 
bowling wides
The adrenaline had sort o f left me from the 
last hole and the fear had come 
I was frightened of losing to this player 
because you know he’s not even a team 
player
I didn’t know what was happening, it was
like the fear o f the unknown
Fear of not being able to close the game
out
It’s almost like I was frightened of making 
mistakes
When someone drives into the back of you,
this awful feeling o f dread and fear, it like
that, very, very specific
Its sort o f a fear; a fear o f losing
You are nervous and feel crippled by the
fear
I was frightened of making mistakes 
Fear o f failure does play on your mind and 
results in performance loss 
There is always that fear of failure —
Self-pressure (2)
Pressure from peers (2)
The pressure I felt was because it was only 
my second match for the college 
The pressure started to build and build as 
my score got better and better 
In pressure situations everything seems to 
come in like that and all I could see on this 
particular occasion was a very narrow strip 
of fairway
I felt a lot o f pressure I really did 
They were putting pressure on me 
(spectators)
I think I put myself under to much pressure 
I don’t know what happened it must have 
been the pressure 
I felt I cracked under the pressure 
As soon as things start to go wrong the 
pressure debilitates your performance 
Self made pressure and wanting to come 
back with a bang
_  Apprehension
Fear o f  
failure
— Pressure
Antecedents
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Figure 3.1. (Cont.) Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
It became so important to me, the course 
record was on
It was a very important match (2)
In the back of your mind you know how 
important this shot is
I was shooting 3 pointers and not missing 
Never had a problem with my serve so it 
wasn’t a problem at all 
I’d been playing well keeping us in there at 
one point
I had got back to full fitness and I was 
bowling well in matches —
That affects my performance maybe 
knowing that you are going to get 
substituted in the back o f  your mind 
I knew at that point I had blown the course 
record . _
You’ve lost the chance of getting your 
handicap cut. I would have probably been 
cut to almost scratch being as I was 6 
under, but mainly the course record _
Importance of 
Sport
Playing
Well
Consequences to 
Poor performance
Payment /  
Reward
— Antecedents
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All participants experienced some form of inappropriate focus. This included a 
preoccupation with negative thoughts, with little or no ability to control such thoughts 
from manifesting. This was typified by comments like “my mind was working on 
excuses straight away”, and “I’m standing over the ball knowing that I am going to do it 
(shank) again and there is nothing I can do about it”, and “mentally I was shot to pieces” 
(see Figure 3.2). Seven participants also reported an “extreme lack of confidence” (see 
Figure 3.2), which was accompanied by feelings o f self-doubt o f whether or not, in 
some cases they could actually perform at all. All participants expressed some feelings 
of self-consciousness and concerns about what others thought o f their performance.
One participant stated “I thought about what people might think if  I lost”, another stated 
“I felt conscious that they (spectators/peers) were probably analysing my weaknesses 
while I was playing” (see Figure 3.2). In addition, four participants were unable to get a 
perspective on the situation, which led to an extreme magnification of thoughts. One 
athlete stated “I thought I can’t bowl”, another stated “I felt a massive sense o f regret, in 
one over I was undoing 10 years o f good” (figure 3.2).
3.322. Somatic changes. The ten higher-order themes, produced from 19% of  
raw data themes, were: ‘nerves’, ‘tension’, ‘panic’, ‘general somatic responses’,
‘lethargy / fatigue’, ‘injury /illness’, ‘emotional intensity’, ‘body language’, Tack o f  
activation’, ‘arousal and emotional control’.
All participants reported experiencing some kind o f somatic and /or emotional change 
during performance disruption. Eight participants reported somatic changes, which 
manifested themselves in the form of butterflies, shaking, an increase in breathing, heart 
rate and sweating, and a sense o f panic; one athlete stated “I think I was having what 
most people refer to as a panic attack” (see Figure 3.2). Conversely, two athletes 
experienced a sense of lethargy and fatigue during performance. Seven athletes 
experienced intense emotions, this is typified by statements like “I felt like I could cry at 
that second”, “I felt down on myself and didn’t feel like I could bounce back, and 
“internally I was being chewed up” (see Figure 3.2). In some cases, participants felt 
their body language was affected by their emotions; one participant stated “my body 
language became very defeatist” (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
My focus was on everything bar the target 
area
My mind set was totally inappropriate prior 
to delivery
I was shouting and screaming to myself 
inside
My focus was taken away from other cues 
that required my focus, like the target 
I was thinking about my opponent and 
what he was doing
I was thinking how I could get one over on 
the marker rather than focusing on the 
game
I’m trying to coach myself while I am 
playing and you can’t really do that 
My focus just went out of the window 
I wasn’t concentrating on the shots I just 
wanted to get them out of the way 
My mind was working on excuses straight 
away
Willing him to lose it 
Attention wasn’t on what I’m actually 
trying to do but the process o f worrying 
about my Feet and where they were going 
to land
The fitness thing was on my mind the most 
and the fact that felt lethargic 
The thought of no-balling was on my mind 
I was worried about where my feet were 
going because this guy used to no-ball me 
a lot
I was worried, thinking what is he going to 
say (father) —
Your mind drifts back to, what’s going on?
I think in your head you are still thinking 
well that was in
I think all the shots I played on that hole I 
wasn’t focused on the shot, all I was 
thinking about was that first shot. Thinking 
why did I do that, why didn’t I take this 
club instead o f that one?
You are not concentrating on what you are 
doing you are off somewhere else 
I was focused on the fact that I thought she 
was cheating rather than the serve 
I was thinking about the end goal and 
winning
I was thinking about what was going on in 
front o f me —
Inappropriate
focus
Unable to stay in 
the present
— Cognitive 
Changes
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
I was thinking what is going to go wrong 
with this one 
Negative thinking
I just wanted to let go o f the thing and hope 
it made it down the wicket 
I started to get negative about things 
I was having negative thoughts, which was 
transferred across to the way I was playing 
If it’s a bad serve I’ll hang back on this one 
The first thing that comes into your head 
is, I’ve blown the course record 
I’m standing over the ball knowing that I 
am going to do it (shank) again and there is 
nothing I can do about it 
Very, very negative
I thought, am I good enough to be here?
Its like you are useless 
I was worried about bowling __
I was thinking don’t over step for the no­
ball, focus on your run up 
I was totally obsessed with my run up 
I became totally obsessed with hitting that 
patch of
I became obsessed —
I’d mentally got myself into a state
I crippled m yself mentally
Your brain gets scrambled there's to many
thoughts
My mind was too cloudy to concentrate
Mentally I wasn’t all there
Mentally I was shot to pieces
I lost everything, talent, focus, ability, you
name it, it just plummeted
There were other personal issues going on
in my head
You start thinking too much, like
the more you wait the more your brain gets
a little bit more muddled
I’d put myself in such a bad state of mind
I was running in trying to stop myself
feeling anxious
I had a full mind that day
All sorts of thing were whizzing round my
brain
I lost all sort o f  brainpower
I couldn’t get it out o f my head of what I’d
done, it was so stupid
These things are going round in your head
and take priority over the shot that you are
trying to play
Negative
thoughts
Obsessional 
Thinking about 
technique
Lack of cognitive 
Control
— Cognitive 
changes
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
My confidence was drained
My self-confidence had gone to rock
bottom
Your confidence just leaves you .
I lost all belief in my ability to be able to 
hit these shots
My self-confidence plummeted (2) 
Self-confidence was very low 
I didn’t have any confidence at all 
Confidence was visibly low 
I didn’t feel confident that it was going to 
happen that day
There was an underlying lack o f  
confidence that I could still do it as well as 
I had done it before (2)
I had an extreme lack o f confidence 
I felt that the confidence o f the team wasn’t 
really behind me
Obviously I wanted to look the best 
I have to look good, I have to look good 
rather than we need a goal for the team 
As far as I was concerned I looked like a 
prick
I felt self-conscious about what others were 
thinking of me
I was aware that my parents were watching 
me
I was concerned about what my coach 
thought of my performance 
I thought what people might think if I lost 
I felt conscious that they were probably 
analysing my weaknesses while I was 
playing
When things started to go wrong the
evaluation became more salient, as in, they
are coming to watch me play
I wasn’t thinking about taking wickets, just
to not make an idiot o f myself
I’d better not mess up because I’m going to
make myself look a pratt
I was trying to say, ‘oh, don’t be so self-
conscious’
I’m pretty self-conscious o f people 
watching me
My goals changed, usually my only 
thought would be how am I going to get 
this guy out, now I thought don’t look a 
fool get the ball down the other end please 
You are self-conscious because of your 
own expectations and you know when you 
are not fulfilling your own expectations 
I felt self-conscious about what others were 
thinking of me ___
Lack o f  
Confidence
Self-presentation 
concerns /  public 
self-consciousness
Cognitive
Changes
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
You’ve got father looking at me as much to 
say come on what are you doing, you are 
serving for the match here 
My perception was that the rest o f  the team 
was not that sympathetic because it was 
embarrassing for them 
My team mates were getting angry 
There was like a buzz going round the 
ground from the crowd o f  like semi- 
laughter, semi sort of embarrassment 
I was aware o f  what everyone else was 
thinking
I was aware o f  what the parents must be 
thinking
I was aware o f what the captain must be 
thinking
I was aware o f  the banter coming from the 
pavilion
I’m just losing it completely in m yself 
I bowled one bad over which just crucified 
me
I thought, I can’t bowl 
I didn’t have any direction as to what I was 
trying to do
I felt a massive sense o f  regret, in one over 
I’m undoing 10 years o f  good 
You are thinking what could go wrong 
rather than what could go right __
I thought well she’s not that strong this 
shouldn’t be a problem 
I thought this was going to be a walk over 
I'm thinking, ‘hey look I’m serving for the 
match going to be off court soon 
My thoughts were I’m going to be off in a 
minute because I’ve won this 
I suddenly went from not really knowing 
whether I would win the match, to thinking 
it should be a forgone conclusion, that I 
should go on and win from there ___
I suddenly started to question my ability 
There was a nagging element o f  doubt 
because I hadn’t been doing it how I would 
usually do it
You’ve got to put the ball on the spot can 
you do it?
I thought I can’t bowl anymore, I can’t 
bowl, I can’t bowl
Seeds o f  doubt were sown in my mind 
I suddenly started to question my ability 
I knew I wasn’t going to play a very good 
shot
Perception o f what 
Significant others were 
Thinking
Magnification 
of thoughts
Complacency
Self doubts
Cognitive
Changes
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
I was starting to feel nervous and worried 
I was shaking a bit
I was getting the shakes and getting 
nervous, and couldn’t understand what was 
going on
Nerves making me shake 
I felt physically gripped by nerves 
I remember getting so nervous I literally 
felt like I could swing straight through the 
ball
I was very nervous
I was shaking so much I was still stuck in 
my head
I felt very nervous before the match started 
(3)
I always used to feel a bit nervous when 
bowling anyway, but I did feel extra 
anxious
My legs were complete and utter jelly 
because I was so nervous 
I became more nervous and I think part of 
that was the fact that I was 3-0 up 
When you are up there playing you do 
shake a little bit
Nerves didn’t come into it when I was 
playing the game 
I was excited and nervous 
I wasn’t nervous before it happened 
I felt physically crippled by nerves
The tension was all the way up my back,
my hamstrings and my neck
The tension was whether I was going to be
able to control it or not
I was getting tense and uptight
Very tense, all my shots had a very short
swing
I felt even more stressed and more tense 
Tension built up
I was tensed up and using my wrist rather 
than my arm
Tension right up, butterflies, you name it 
everything just scales 
I really did tense up
I felt I tensed up because I didn’t think I 
shot that first ball as well I as I should have 
done
I felt hot and tight
— Nerves
Somatic
Changes
— Tension
Somatic
changes
Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
All o f a sudden my body was becoming so 
panicky
You start to panic when the ball comes 
towards you
I remember I started to panic 
I think I was having what most people refer 
to as a panic attack
I went from being sort o f normal nerves to 
extreme panic __
My legs turned to jelly, my whole body felt 
numb
My breathing was going fast, my arms 
were shaking, my legs were shaking 
I felt shaky, my head hurt 
M y heart rate increased, I felt hot, 
sweating, feeling incredibly light, airy, 
fuzzy
I can remember my hands being very 
sweaty
Massive butterflies (2)
I felt lead legged
Panic
Somatic
Changes
(Cont.)
General 
_  somatic 
responses
J
I felt lethargic
I felt really lethargic and everything felt so 
heavy
I think I was physically tired I’d had a long 
week
You just become lethargic and that results 
in your technique breakdown 
I just felt exhausted I couldn’t do anymore 
I just felt so tired
Suddenly I felt tired, but there was no 
reason for me feel tired 
I felt very tired, mentally and physically
I have had a back injury in the past, so that 
was playing on my mind 
I had an injury doing some athletic 
training, which meant I didn’t bowl for a 
while
I had been injured last year I had a 
shoulder injury
I was conscious about my back being bad 
I’d been ill
I wasn’t feeling particularly well 
Physically sick __
Anxiety levels rocketed 
I felt extremely anxious 
Everything just seemed to slow down 
Something got in side o f me 
I felt very down and annoyed with m yself 
I was feeling that things weren’t right, 
wasn’t comfortable with the way I was 
playing —
Lethargy / 
Fatigue
Injury / 
illness
Emotional
Intensity
Somatic 
changes (Cont.)
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
The whole experience was frightening 
I felt down on myself and didn’t feel like I 
could bounce back 
Shear frustration
I was annoyed with the way I was playing
I got angry after the bad line call
It felt absolutely horrid
Internally I was being chewed up
Gut wrenching
I felt really shit and down
I felt completely unnatural, it felt scary, it
felt very odd
I felt like I could cry at that second 
I was feeling incredibly upset 
I felt incredibly emotionally upset a big 
sense of letting myself and everyone down 
Things just got worse and worse and worse 
I couldn’t get the game together 
I became very frustrated 
I was fighting back the tears and I was 
thinking please god don’t hit the ball to me 
I was so embarrassed 
I got quite angry
I was feeling anxious so self-confidence 
was not quite as high 
The anxiety started to grip me 
I was traumatised
I just felt sorrow —
My body language became very defeatist 
My body language was very mechanical, 
very robotic __
I felt anger and a lack of control 
I felt a complete lack o f control 
I remember feeling angry when I was 
bowling 
I really lost it
At this point I am just crumbling 
Anxiety was way too high
Emotional 
Intensity (Cont.)
Body language
Lack of activation, 
Arousal & 
Emotional control
Somatic 
changes (Cont.)
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3.323. Movement, technical, and sensation characteristics. The ten higher- 
order themes, produced from 19% of raw data themes, were: ‘movement, tactical, and 
technical changes’, ‘directing focus to the process o f the task’, ‘mechanical’, ‘lack of 
fluidity’, ‘compensatory strategies’, ‘behavioural changes’, ‘disrupted perception and 
sensation’, Tack o f automaticity’, ‘self-absorption’, and ‘paralysis by analysis’. Seven 
participants began analysing their movement patterns associated with performance.
This is typified by statements such as “my run up went, it wasn’t bouncy”, and “you just 
try and push it down there and it isn’t your usual swing”, and “the balls were getting 
worse so I focused more on the technique; my action wasn’t side on”, and “I started 
trying to bowl, trying to bowl thinking what I was doing” (see Figure 3.2). Similarly, 
during skill disruption five participants reported a loss of sensation, things didn’t feel 
“comfortable”, “normal”, or “the same” as it usually did. Participant made statements 
such as “the ball felt like a lump of jelly in my hand”, “I ran into bowl and didn’t feel 
my arm turn over”, and “I felt incredibly light, I felt that if  a strong wind had come it 
would have blown me away” (see Figure 3.2). Another prevalent factor reported by 
participants was a feeling of being mechanical, and having no fluidity, which affected 
the natural flow o f their performance. One participant stated “it’s a nervie swing, it’s 
not a full swing, its more of a mechanical swing, it’s not fluid”, another participant 
reported “my run up attributed to me not having flow” (see Figure 3.2).
3.324. Lack of control and understanding: The eleven higher-order themes, 
produced from 9% of raw data themes, were: ‘instantaneous change’, Tack of 
opportunity for help’, ‘vividness / high recollection’, ‘the need to escape’, Tack of 
control o f outcome’, ‘motivation to perform’, and Tack of understanding’. Five 
participants experienced an instantaneous change in their perception o f themselves and 
their performance. As one participant described “one minute it (good performance) was 
there the next it wasn’t”, another participant described “a light had been on and 
someone had come and turned it o ff’ (see Figure 3.2). In addition, six participants 
reported a complete lack of control relating to the outcome of the skill they were 
executing and further, had no understanding of why and how it was happening. One 
athlete stated “I was hitting balls that were hitting the back fence without bouncing”
(see Figure 3.2). Finally, five athletes reported an intense compulsion to escape from 
the present situation that they were in. One athlete stated that “if  someone had said to 
me look take this pill and you will die I would have taken it right there”, another stated
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
My run up went, it wasn’t bouncy 
It was an important point I’ve got to keep it 
in court so I won’t do what I’ve done all the 
other times that I’ve kept the ball in play, 
I’ll do something a little bit different to keep 
the ball in play but inevitably it went into 
the bottom of the net
You just try and push it down there and its
not your natural swing
I went from really swinging at the ball to
sort o f just pushing it around
My grip had become so tight and the ball
was going all over the place
Almost stopping half way through my swing
I’ll just ease off a wee bit so that the shot
will be nice and smooth and then dump it in
the net
I was thinking where is my arm going to 
come in
I was focusing on getting the seam right in 
my hand
The balls were getting worse so I focused 
more on the technique; my action wasn’t 
side on
I started to focus on the end product of the 
shot, on the swing or how I came through 
the ball
I need to come over the ball more and these 
are all the things in my head that I am 
thinking
I was thinking, right the ball is coming to 
my forehand I must rotate 
When I was serving I focused on throwing 
the ball up and making sure I extended my 
arm and throwing the racket through the ball 
I’m thinking about the arc and my feet and 
all these things
I remember thinking a lot about my feet and 
where I let go of the ball 
I started to think well where am I letting go 
of the ball here, am I holding onto it to long 
or not long enough
I started trying to bowl, trying to bowl 
thinking what I was doing 
I just tried to focus on shooting the shot 
using the right technique 
I thought hang on lets get the technique 
right to make sure you don’t throw it instead 
of shooting it and try just try and do it right 
I was focusing so much on this end of what 
I was trying to do, when it got to the other 
end, it had gone
I am looking at my feet to make sure they 
are landing in the right place
Movement /  
Tactical / 
technical 
changes
Directing focus 
to the process 
o f the task
Movement,
— technical,
& sensation 
characteristics
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
I became totally mechanical 
I was so stuttery 
Very robotic
I was ridged and very mechanical 
Its like a nervie swing, its not a full swing, 
its more of a mechanical swing, its not 
fluid __
I never really got into a rhythm
My run up attributed to me not having flow
The rhythm goes
' I think that when I became anxious 
everything become a bit more rushed, you 
don’t take your time you just want to get it 
out o f the way
Its not a full swing, its more o f a 
mechanical swing, its not fluid 
I rushed it and off it went —
I tried to experiment with how I held the 
ball either with the my wrist cocked or my 
wrist loose
Just need to move my feet and give myself 
a nice big arc
I was trying to grip the ball harder because 
it felt totally alien to me 
I decided to hold the ball a bit tighter so it 
didn’t slip out
I focused even more on my run up 
I was trying to get my feet in the right 
place
I thought I’ll let the ball go later and the 
next ball bounced about 6 times 
I just wanted to guide it down the hole __
I wasn’t playing my natural strokes 
My routine ceased to exist 
I stopped moving my feet (1)
Every time I would play a shot I would 
mess up
I kept hitting daft shots 
The first serve started to go 
Just can not hit the ball for toffee 
Your pre-shot routine goes out o f the 
window
Slow between points as if  I wasn’t keen to 
get on with it
I didn’t feel relaxed, your swing goes 
completely to pot 
It was just a complete collapse 
There were a lot o f unforced errors on my 
part
I'tripped over my own feet -
Mechanical
Lack of 
Fluidity
Compensatory
Strategies
Behavioural
Changes
Movement,
technical,
& sensation
characteristics
(Cont.)
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
The ball, I was gripping it so tight 
I felt like I had to control it 
I wasn’t bowling I was letting it go like an 
apology
The ball didn’t feel real in my hand 
I just felt I was grabbing it rather than just 
letting it settle inside of my hand 
It didn’t feel natural; it didn’t feel normal 
The ball felt like a lump of jelly in my 
hand
I felt incredibly light; I felt that if  a strong 
wind had come along it would have blown 
me away
I ran in to bowl and didn’t feel my arm turn 
over
I couldn’t feel my arm therefore I didn’t 
know how to correct it 
I couldn’t even feel the ground underneath 
my feet
I stood there turning my arm over but I was 
still bowling wides, I couldn’t get the ball 
to go straight
Its like I hadn’t bowled before 
I couldn’t feel how to let go o f the ball 
I ended up with the worst swing ever 
I couldn’t recreate the feeling that I wanted 
I never felt my muscles respond in the right 
way
I felt my body, well it wasn’t part o f me 
and the ball was like a shot putt in my hand 
My whole arm felt numb 
When you don’t feel, in reality, what you 
want to feel there is a miss match there and 
your self-confidence is attached and a lot 
of self-doubt
He (professional player) can automatically 
go back to basics where as someone like 
m yself doesn’t have that robotic routine 
When I go to hit a tennis ball I don’t 
normally think feet, arms, head, brain yes, 
can I sweep the ball, yes you can do that 
now excellent —
I was conscious about being lethargic and 
maybe I was thinking about that 
I was already justifying my own values 
during the game
It was eating away inside o f me and I 
hadn’t had chance to refocus 
I was shouting and screaming to myself 
inside
Disrupted perception 
& sensation
Lack of 
Automaticity
Self-absorption
Movement,
technical,
& sensation 
characteristics 
(Cont.)
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
You start thinking too much, like I’ve 
missed before/what happens i f  I scuff it 
The more you wait the more you are 
thinking o f what can go wrong rather than 
what could go right
I was trying to think to much about how I 
was playing and that’s not a good thing 
I remember thinking about a lot o f things, 
like my feet and where I let go o f  the ball 
I started trying to bowl, trying to bowl 
thinking what I was doing, you cant do 
that, you cant try and bowl 
I think about them initially then I over 
think
I think I had psyched myself up too much, 
I’d got it into my mind and was thinking to 
deeply into the game 
The more you think the worse it gets 
because you get too many negative 
thoughts in your mind _
Paralysis by 
analysis
A light had been on and someone had 
come and turned it off (2)
Seeing the ball go like that, in an instant 
everything goes
One minute it was there the next it wasn’t 
My grip had gone, just like that 
My run up had just gone 
The technique just went completely out o f  
the window
During this downward spiral I felt like
suddenly everything got tight and I wasn’t
really swinging anymore
All o f  a sudden the ball comes over the net
and I couldn’t return the ball, it just
dropped into the bottom of the net
My focus had gone _
I wanted to speak to my coach, 
unfortunately we had only been out there 
20 minutes so it was at least 2 hours before 
I could talk with someone
The experience is very vivid, I can 
remember everything about it
Instantaneous
Change
Lack of 
opportunity 
for help
Vividness /  
high recollection
Movement,
_  technical,
& sensation 
characteristics 
(Cont.)
Lack o f  
— Control and 
understanding
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“you just feel like the whole world is watching you and you just want someone to open 
up a hole and just jump down it” (see Figure 3.2).
3.33. Consequences of the occurrence of severe performance loss
3.331. Situational factors. The four higher-order themes, produced from 4% of 
raw data themes, were: ‘impact on future mental states towards performance’, ‘transfer 
to other tasks’, ‘perception of why experience occurred’ and ‘tactical changes’.
All participants reported the experience had a profound impact on their lives and future 
performances, this was indicative o f the vivid recollection that athletes had of this 
particular performance(s). Future performances of six participants were, and in some 
cases are still, inhibited by the experience(s). One participant stated “it’s always in the 
back of your mind if  it can happen once it can happen again”, another stated “I still now 
sometimes feel mechanical and that is 5 years later” (see Figure 3.3). One participant 
reported not having taken a penalty kick since her experience when she missed. This 
negative experience has also transferred to other tasks as the participant now refuses to 
take free-kicks, and furthermore, will no longer take penalties in hockey, or shoot when 
playing netball. Four participants reported changes to their tactics since their 
experience(s). One participant stated “I have always taken a driver on that hole because 
of memories of what happened before” (see Figure 3.3).
3.34. Personality Characteristics
3.341. Personality characteristics. The higher-order themes, produced from 5% o f raw 
data themes, were: ‘positive characteristics’, ‘negative characteristics’, and ‘others’. 
Examples o f participants’ perceived positive characteristics after their experience of 
severe performance loss were “I’m quite smart” and “I don’t feel pressure as captain, I 
enjoy it” (see Figure 3.4). Examples o f participants’ perceived negative characteristics 
were “I’m quite a self-conscious person”, “I’m not the most confident of people”, and “I 
definitely have too much fear I think” (see Figure 3.4). Three athletes reported having 
an “obsessive” nature to their personality, which had manifested itself in their sport.
One participant admitted to be “extremely competitive” (see Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.2. (Cont) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes__________________ Higher Order Themes______________ General Dimension
I just need to get away from it
I was thinking I don’t want to be here
anymore
I just wanted to get off court and go home 
I was ready to just walk off court (2)
I was like please god let this ball go down 
the other end and let me get off this cricket 
field
I wanted to get the hole over as quickly as 
possible
If someone had said look take this pill and 
you’ll die I would have taken it right there 
You just feel like the whole world is 
watching you and you just want someone 
to open up a hole and just jump down it 
I really didn’t want to be there
All o f a sudden I didn’t have a clue what I 
was doing
The ball was going all over the place 
I wasn’t controlling the ball properly 
I started to make more unforced errors, 
which just felt out o f control 
I was not in control at all o f what I was 
doing
Totally out of control 
I felt worried, I didn’t know whether I was 
going to be able to control the ball 
I was just waiting for the lucky balls to 
come
I started to hit balls, which were hitting the 
back fence without bouncing 
I actually hit one straight out o f court 
The first ball shot over the wicket keepers 
head and went for 4 byes 
I eventually bowled 6 balls without 
bowling a legal delivery —
I was so determined to win 
I wasn’t really up for it 
I was motivated to do well 
I was striving for that extra bit of pace 
We had a bit o f a grudge against this team 
and I was determined to beat them
The need 
to escape
Lack of control 
o f outcome
Motivation to 
perform
Negative thoughts were there of what’s 
going on here
I was focused on my target but didn’t know 
how to get it there, I couldn’t understand it 
Obviously I didn’t know what was going 
on
At the time I could not understand, I could 
not work out what I was doing differently 
I just lost it, its like how, why? __
Lack of 
Understanding
Lack of 
Control and 
understanding 
(Cont.)
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Figure 3.2. (Cont.) Experiences During Severe Performance Loss
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes______________General Dimension
It has negatively affected my performance 
After this I didn’t play tennis for a while 
Not as confident 
I haven’t taken a penalty since 
You know it can happen again 
It’s always in the back o f your mind, if  it 
can happen once it can happen again 
I continually doubted m yself whether it 
(bowling action) was going to come back 
to me
My confidence was drained 
I still now sometimes feel mechanical and 
that is 5 years later 
I really didn’t want to play again
I won’t take penalties in hockey
I wont shoot in netball
I’m very reluctant to take free-kicks
I choked basically
I think that when you start to get protective 
of your score that is when things go wrong
Impact on 
Future mental states 
towards performance
Transfer 
To other tasks
Perception o f why 
Experience occurred
I remember staying back, erm, and err...I
would normally serve volley
I had to think about it, I had sort of
changed my whole game plan and reassess
exactly where I was and what score I had
I found myself hitting back very negatively — Tactical
hoping that he would make the mistakes Changes
and he would give me the win rather than
me looking for it
I have always taken a driver on that hole 
because of memories o f  what happened 
before —
Situational
Consequences
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Figure 3.4. Personality Characteristics
Raw Data Themes___________________Higher Order Themes General Dimension
Reputation now of being cool as a captain 
I don’t feel pressure as captain I enjoy it 
Enjoyment (2)
I wouldn’t say I was the kind o f person that 
gets jittery 
I’m quite smart 
Passion for the sport 
I like a big stage
I am very conscious of what other people 
think about me(l )
I sometimes dwell on things 
I am generally worried about what people 
think o f me
I am like Jekyll and Hyde
I'm a totally relaxed person until I get that
ball in my hand
It makes me feel terribly nervous at times 
I hate it when everyone looks at you, I hate 
it
I always hate taking penalties 
I’m quite a self-conscious person 
I’m not the most confident o f  people 
I definitely have to much fear I think 
I do worry about other people’s opinions 
and views I think it does matter 
I am not suited to individual sports at all
Extremely competitive 
Controlled obsession 
I have to look good 
Obsessive (2)
Positive
Characteristics
Negative
Characteristics
Others
Personality
Characteristics
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Figure 3.5. Type of Competition
County match (2) 
League match 
Club championship final 
Premier league match 
Club match 
Family handicap final 
Club championships 
First team match 
Quarter final cup game
Level of 
performance
Type of  
Competition
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3.35. Type of Competition when severe performance loss was experienced
3.351. Type of competition. The higher-order theme produced from 2 %  o f the 
raw data themes was ‘level of performance’ (see Figure 3.5). The theme produced 
under this general dimension encompasses the competitive level at which participants 
were performing when they experienced severe performance loss. The competitive 
standard o f participants ranged from club to national level.
3.4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The primary aim o f this qualitative analysis was to explore psychological mechanisms 
derived from the perceptions and interpretations of athletes that had experienced first­
hand, severe performance loss in competitive sport. Through such an examination the 
value o f the available theories used in the literature to explain severe performance loss, 
and the perceptions of athletes, could be explored. A schematic of the themes generated 
from this analysis was formulated to help reinforce the complex but interrelated nature 
of the phenomena under investigation (see Figure 3.6.).
The main findings of this study support self-focused attention rather than distraction 
theories to explain severe performance loss in competitive sport. Specifically, 
throughout the experiences described athletes follow a similar sequence o f events 
outlined by Masters' (1992) conscious processing hypothesis. This can be seen from the 
links between the generated higher-order and general-dimension themes. The themes of 
‘pressure’, ‘cognitive and somatic changes’, ‘inappropriate foci’ (e.g. self-absorbed), 
‘task focus’, and ‘lack of control of outcome’ are all characteristics that athletes 
reported experiencing during severe performance loss.
Masters (1992) proposed that heightened state anxiety precipitated by stress directs 
attention to the movement repertoire o f a normally automatic motor skill. Because o f  
the importance o f correct skill execution performance is guided consciously by the 
explicit task knowledge associated with early stages o f learning. This interferes with 
the normal processing of the motor schema, which disrupts automaticity and impairs 
performance. This switch from an automatic to a conscious processing system was 
characterised here by inappropriate foci and a lack o f cognitive control. This
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Figure 3.6. A Schematic o f Severe Performance Loss in Competitive Sport
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immediately preceded a movement focus and led to a preoccupation with the process by 
which skills were executed. The similarities between the conscious processing 
hypothesis (Masters, 1992) and the sequence o f events experienced in this study are 
exemplified by reported statements of feeling mechanical, followed by a disruption to 
the natural flow o f skill execution.
It was proposed that inappropriate foci and lack of cognitive control were the pivotal 
mechanism associated with automaticity disruption. This proposal is underpinned by 
the links made between the associated higher-order themes: ‘self-absorbed’, ‘too much 
time to think’, ‘thought magnification’, ‘public self-consciousness /  self-presentation 
concerns’. Self- absorption was the dominant theme. This process was heightened by 
'too much time to think' about a particular skill and magnified concerns about being 
negatively evaluated by others. This had an additive effect in terms o f the athletes' 
inability to rationalise or maintain a perspective on the situation, which further 
exacerbated the introspective process.
Baumeister (1984) proposed that self-absorption or what he calls self-consciousness can 
be heightened by anxiety and perceived negative evaluation by others; a contributing 
factor to the phenomenon o f choking under pressure. Baumeister (1984) reported that 
individuals dispositionally low in self-consciousness were more susceptible to the 
choking process than those high in dispositional self-consciousness. Confounding 
elements were identified between Baumeister's (1984) research and the findings o f this 
study. Athletes in this study reported being preoccupied with their feelings and 
thoughts (self-absorption), and having self-presentational concerns during their 
experiences which implied that they were high in self-consciousness. One athlete even 
stated "I'm quite a self-conscious person". Baumeister’s (1984) research findings were 
in contrast to the results o f this study. Further, the contention that explicit knowledge is 
no longer consciously available to guide performance to prevent choking under pressure 
(Baumeister, 1984) was clearly not supported by this study.
Masters et al. (1993) found a correlation (r = 0.59, P < 0.05) between high scores on the 
Reinvestment Scale and an individual’s propensity to experience skill failure-under 
pressure. The Reinvestment Scale comprises all the items used by Baumeister (1984) to 
measure dispositional public and private self-consciousness. It can therefore be inferred 
that individuals high in reinvestment were also high in dispositional self-consciousness.
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Further, Masters (1992) suggested conscious processing of explicit task knowledge to 
be the pivotal mechanism in the occurrence o f skill breakdown under pressure which 
supports the findings o f this study. These similarities add further support to the 
contention that athletes in this study followed a similar sequence of events outlined by 
Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis. In addition, it was speculated that the 
present athletes were predisposed to this phenomenon which supports the findings of 
Masters et al. (1993). However, caution must be taken with the interpretation o f these 
conclusions as this study did not formally measure dimensions of personality in relation 
to severe performance loss and therefore requires further investigation.
Heightened pressure was reported by athletes in this study to be contributing factors to 
the demise o f their performance. ‘Expectation o f self and others’, ‘motivation’, 
‘reputation and prior experiences’, were all linked to competition and an increase in 
pressure to win. When one or more of these factors were combined, the negative effects 
on performance appeared to be additive, which supports Baumeister and Showers'
(1986) prediction. Similarly, heightened state anxiety was reported. ‘Somatic / 
emotional changes’ manifested themselves in the form of ‘nerves’, and/or ‘tension’, 
and/or ‘panic’. ‘Cognitive changes’ manifested themselves in the form of  
‘apprehension’, and/or, ‘self-doubt’, and/or ‘fear o f failure’. Catastrophe model 
(Fazey & Hardy, 1988), developed to explain the interactive nature o f physiological 
arousal and cognitive anxiety on performance, offers some explanation as to why 
athletes in this study experienced a large and sudden loss of performance. However, 
this model does not take into account additional characteristics identified by this study 
to be influential. In addition, neither state anxiety nor pressure has been adequately 
monitored in the research on severe performance loss in competitive sport (Baumeister, 
1984; Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993). Hence, the present study provides a richer 
understanding and clarification of the antecedents and consequence o f the two 
constructs.
As already highlighted, the experiences described by the athletes in the present study 
follow a similar sequence o f events outlined by the conscious processing hypothesis 
(Masters, 1992). However, additional characteristics o f this phenomenon have been 
identified by this study. One finding reported in this study that has not been identified 
in the literature is the higher-order theme of'disruption to perception and sensation'. 
Athletes reported a discrepancy in sensation between how their skilled action and body
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felt during previous successful performances, to how their skilled action and body felt 
during this experience. One athlete stated “when you don’t feel, in reality, what you 
want to feel there is a mismatch there, and your self-confidence is attached to this and a 
lot o f self-doubt”. This suggested that the interpretation of the movement sensation is 
an important factor for correct skill execution.
Clearly, the correct sensation was not available during this experience. Wulf, McNevin, 
and Shea (2001) suggested that promoting an external movement-related focus can 
prevent performers from adopting an explicit (internal) focus on their movement 
dynamics. In addition, this type of focus is influential in allowing self-organised, 
automatic processes implicitly to regulate task execution. This suggests that athletes 
experience the correct movement dynamic coupled with the appropriate sensation when 
executing that movement via automatic processing. Therefore, by athletes adopting an 
internal movement-related focus in this study might have compounded the disruption of 
movement sensation, rather than appeased it, owing to an explicit, rather than a self- 
organised approach to skill execution.
This disruption to movement sensation might be a precursor that elicits a sudden switch 
in processing systems used to execute a skill (automatic to conscious processing). This 
is typified by one athlete who stated "I felt like I had to control it (the ball)". Therefore, 
it was proposed that in an attempt to recreate the desired movement sensation (which 
was perceived to be vital for successful performance), athletes in this study focused on 
the movement characteristic of the skill, thus promoting conscious processing. By 
regression to a conscious processing system there is a tendency to re-freeze the degrees 
o f freedom in the distal joints (Fuchs, 1962). Therefore, attempting to use this process 
to reinstate the desired sensation might explain why athletes experienced an increase in 
muscle tension and feelings o f being mechanical and having no fluidity or control over 
the outcome of their performance.
In an attempt to compensate for the loss of sensation, fluidity and disruption to 
performance, athletes reported using compensatory strategies. Another important 
finding reported in this study that has not emerged elsewhere. One athlete stated “I 
started trying to bowl, trying to bowl thinking what I was doing”. Athletes began to use 
additional conscious strategies, relating to the movement characteristics o f the task, 
which normally were executed automatically. This, ironically, led to a similar focus
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that had elicited performance loss in the first place and only served to exacerbate the 
perceived loss o f sensation and further disrupt the normal repertoire of the skill 
sequence.
Finally, athletes reported the need to escape from the situation; a further factor that has 
not been reported in the literature. One athlete stated, “if  someone had said look take 
this pill and you’ll die I would have taken it right there”. This statement exemplifies the 
extreme panic, apprehension, and desperate need to escape the situation. Furthermore, 
these negative cognitions were exacerbated when athletes realised that there was no 
escape and they must continue to compete. This continued to heighten feelings o f  
panic. Bandura (1986) proposed that the belief to execute a specific task successfully is 
essential in obtaining the desired outcome. Schlenker and Leaiy (1982) suggested that 
the discrepancy between expectation (self and others) to perform successfully, coupled 
with the apprehension and self-doubt to do so would intensify pressure. This might 
explain why athletes in the present study experienced an intense compulsion to escape 
the situation.
In conclusion, the exploratory nature of this study has identified antecedents and 
consequences of severe performance loss in a range o f competitive athletes. Distraction 
theories could not adequately explain the complex interrelated nature o f this 
phenomenon. Clearly, athletes in this study had access to large amounts of technical 
rule-based knowledge associated with the skills being performed. It would appear that, 
under stress, such athletes were susceptible to consciously rehearsing rule-based 
knowledge, particularly when questioning their ability to perform successfully. 
Consequently, athletes experienced a substantial deterioration to their performance. An 
aim o f this qualitative study was to examine empirically the value of the available 
theories used in the literature to explain severe performance loss. The themes generated 
from this study suggested that athletes experienced similar characteristics associated 
with the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992). However, additional 
characteristics were reported that have not been reported in the literature. It was 
proposed that the higher-order theme of'disruption to perception and sensation1 served 
as a precursor to athletes becoming preoccupied with the task components and the 
process of skill execution, which led to conscious processing and automaticity 
disruption. Similarly, compensatory strategies, ironically, adopted to recreate 'normal'
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movement sensation and successful skill execution, only served to promote greater 
conscious processing, automaticity disruption, and the need to escape.
The study has identified characteristics from the athlete’s perspective that have provided 
an improved understanding of severe performance loss in competitive sport.
Specifically, this study has established that having access to technical rule-based 
knowledge can lead certain athletes to use this information to guide performance while 
experiencing stress. This in turn disrupts the automatic skill sequence and impairs 
performance. Nevertheless, unanswered questions remain that require further 
investigation. Research should explore ways of developing more beneficial 
compensatory strategies that prevent conscious processing and promote automaticity, 
particularly in individuals who might be susceptible to this problem. For example, 
learning strategies that minimising the accumulation of rule-based knowledge during 
skill acquisition and performance strategies that suppress explicit knowledge during 
skill execution might be a way of countering this phenomenon. However, before such 
areas can be investigated this research programme needs to establish whether or not 
some individuals are more susceptible to rehearsing rule-based knowledge while 
experiencing stress than others. Clearly, athletes in this study possessed common 
characteristics. Two commonly reported characteristics central to the problem were 
‘directing focus to the process of the task’ and ‘self-absorption’ during performance. 
Both constructs have been linked to dimensions of personality, but possess conflicting 
elements in the literature (Baumeister, 1984; Masters et al., 1993). Future research 
needs to examine whether or not there are personality characteristics that mean some 
performers more susceptible to conscious processing of explicit task knowledge than 
others, particularly while experiencing stress.
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4.0 STUDY 2. DISPOSITIONAL REINVESTMENT AND STRESS IN SKILLED
SOCCER PLAYERS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Study one identified antecedents and consequences of severe performance loss in 
competitive sport, derived from the perceptions and interpretations of competitive 
athletes that had experienced, first hand, this phenomenon. Throughout the experiences 
described the results suggested athletes followed a similar sequence of events as 
outlined by Masters' (1992) conscious processing hypothesis. In particular, ‘self- 
absorption’ (including public and private self-consciousness and self-presentational 
concerns) and ‘directing focus to the process of the task’ were recurrent themes. 
Research has identified these themes as factors that predispose performers to choking 
(Baumeister, 1984) and skill failure under pressure (Masters et al., 1993) respectively. 
However, the research underpinning these theories is equivocal. Although the 
preceding study successfully overcame some of the disparities between previous 
theories and research, it did not control for dimensions of personality. Hence, the 
purpose of this study was to examine whether or not performers with specific 
personality characteristics were susceptible to severe performance loss in competitive 
sport.
Baumeister (1984) reported that individuals low in self-consciousness were more 
susceptible to choking than those high in self-consciousness as predicted by the public 
and private subscales of the dispositional self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein et al. 
1975). In contrast to Baumeister (1984), Masters et al. (1993) found a correlation (r = 
0.59, P < 0.05) between high scores on the Reinvestment Scale (comprising items from 
the Dispositional Self-consciousness Scale) and individuals’ predisposition to skill 
failure under pressure, precipitated by conscious processing. In study one high self- 
consciousness and conscious processing were highlighted as antecedents to severe 
performance loss under stress. However, it is not known whether participants were 
predisposed to self-consciousness or conscious processing as these factors were not 
formally measured. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to examine the effects of 
manipulated stress on performers either dispositional high or low in reinvestment as 
predicted by the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al. 1993). The rationale for using the
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reinvestment scale (Masters et al., 1993) over the Dispositional Self-consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) was that the findings o f study one followed a similar 
sequence of events to Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis. Moreover, this 
hypothesis provides the mechanisms that underpin the reinvestment process (Masters et 
al., 1993). Further, the Reinvestment Scale was specifically constructed as a predictor 
of skill failure under pressure in sport whereas the Dispositional Self-consciousness 
Scale was constructed to assess individual differences in self-awareness.
Study one of this thesis also identified heightened levels o f pressure and state anxiety as 
important antecedents to severe performance loss. Arousal (Baumeister, 1984) and state 
anxiety (Masters et al., 1993) have been identified as fundamental antecedents in the 
choking and skill failure under pressure literature, respectively. However, Baumeister 
(1984) made no attempt to monitor arousal or stress in his research. Further, Masters et 
al. (1993) only attempted to measure the somatic (physiological) sub-component of state 
anxiety, by recording heart rate. No provision was made for cognitive anxiety or self- 
confidence. Both o f these factors were identified as influential factors in the preceding 
study. In addition, research has not established directional (e.g. facilitative and 
debilitative) interpretations of individuals with a propensity to experience severe 
performance loss, which might allow a greater understanding of anxiety-rehearsal- 
performance breakdown. Therefore, another aim of the present study was to establish 
whether individuals low or high in reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993) differ in their 
responses and interpretation of anxiety under different conditions of stress. The sub­
components of state anxiety were monitored using the Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS)
(Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). The ARS primarily served as a stress manipulation 
check, as state anxiety is generally considered to be a by-product of stress (Levitt,
1980). Further, the ARS was used to assess the participants' level of anxiety prior to 
performance. In addition, a modified directional scale in line with the work o f Swain 
and Jones (1992) was used to assess the participants’ interpretation (e.g. facilitative or 
debilitative) of their anxiety prior to performance.
Finally, recent research that has tested explanations o f choking (Baumeister, 1984) and 
skill failure under pressure (Masters et al., 1993) has exclusively used experimental 
tasks which require fine, static motor skills (e.g. golf; commercial game “Role-up”). 
Further, such research has used only a short learning phase before testing the robustness 
of skills under stress. Although participants would have acquired some degree o f
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proficiency, it is unlikely that they developed their skills to an automatic level o f  
functioning. An additional criticism of Masters et al. (1993; Experiment 3) was their 
contention that the predictive power o f the Reinvestment Scale had been enhanced in 
field-based settings. This claim was based solely on a correlation found between 
collegiate squash and tennis players’ scores on the Scale and the presidents’ and team 
captains’ subjective opinion of their players’ susceptibility to fail under pressure. No 
other methods were used to ascertain whether such athletes were prone to skill 
breakdown, precipitated by conscious processing during competition. It is for these 
reasons the current predictive power of inventories that claim to estimate performance 
deterioration under stress possess limitations.
Masters et al. (1993) called for future research to examine the predictive power o f the 
Reinvestment Scale using different motor tasks. Therefore, a further aim o f this study 
was to examine the predictive power o f the Reinvestment Scale using a well-learned 
(automatic) gross, dynamic motor skill under stress. To remedy the limitations o f  
Experiment 3 (Masters et al., 1993) a field-based wall-volley soccer task was used in 
this study; a complex, dynamic motor skill involving several explicit components.
In summary, the main aim of study two was to examine the effects of manipulated stress 
on experienced soccer players who were either dispositionally high or low in 
reinvestment. The intent was to assess whether those players who scored high on the 
Reinvestment Scale would be more susceptible to conscious processing and therefore 
experience deterioration in performance under stress. Based on the predictions o f  
Masters et al. (1993) the following hypotheses were formulated.
Hi: Participants low in reinvestment will experience no significant difference in 
performance between the low and high stress conditions.
H2: Participants high in reinvestment will perform significantly worse in the high stress, 
than in the low stress condition.
i l l
4.2 METHOD
4.21. Participants
With institutional ethics approval, fourteen (mean age 21.4yrs) experienced (1st / 2nd 
team) male university soccer players participated in this study. Participation in the 
study was voluntary. Informed consent was sought from participants before data 
collection; confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed.
4.22. Experimental Task
McDonald’s (1951) Wall Volley Test, adapted and validated by McMorris, Gibbs, 
Palmer, Payne, and Toipey (1994), was used as the task for this study. This test 
involved performers kicking a soccer ball continuously at a wall target 7.6 metres away. 
The target comprised 9 zones, each of which were 30 cm wide (see Figure 4.1). The 
ball striking the centre zone scored 10 points, the next zone 8, the next zone 6, the next 
zone 4, and the last zone 2. Any ball striking outside the target zone scored zero. For 
each individual score to count, the ball had to hit the target and then rebound over the 
7.6 metre line. Test-retest reliability for this task was assessed using an Intra-Class 
Coefficient for total points scored (0.79). McMonis et al. (1994) suggested that the test 
is a valid measure of passing accuracy in soccer. The rationale for using the wall-volley 
soccer task was three fold: first, this task enabled the qualitative soccer data in study one 
to be expanded by using a quantitative group-based design. Second, this task was an 
available, valid measure of key skills in soccer, which could provide accurate 
performance data. Third, this field-based task required gross, dynamic motor skills 
which remedied the limitations of previous research.
4.23. Measures
4.231. Reinvestment. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) (see 
Appendix 6) was administered to assess the extent to which participants were 
predisposed to conscious processing under stress. This scale comprises 20 items 
(cf. Masters et al., 1993) which were taken from three associated inventories. These 
inventories were the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald,
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Figure 4.1. The Wall-Volley Soccer Task
30 cm
7.6 m
12 m Base Line
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& Parkes, 1982), the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987) and 
the Dispositional Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). One 
item from the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (Broadbent et al., 1982) was 
incorporated. This inventory was designed to assess slips of action, a concept defined 
as “the occasion when one’s actions do not proceed in accordance with intention” 
(Broadbent, et al., 1982, p. 1). The item used from the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire 
was “Do you have trouble making your mind up?”. Seven items were used from the 
rehearsal factor o f the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). 
This inventory was developed to assess individual differences in emotional control. 
Examples of the Emotional Control Questionnaire include “I often find myself thinking 
over and over about things that have made me angry” and “When I am reminded of past 
failures I feel as if  they are happening all over again”. The remaining items were taken 
from the public (6 items) and private (6 items) subscales of the Dispositional Self- 
Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). This scale was constructed to measure 
the concept of self-awareness, that is “the existence of self-directed attention, as a result 
of either transient situational variables, chronic dispositions, or both” (Fenigstein, et al., 
1975, p. 522). The public component of self-consciousness is the awareness and 
concerns of being a social entity. Examples of public self-consciousness items include 
“I’m concerned about the way I present m yself’ and “I’m concerned about what other 
people think o f me”. The private component o f self-consciousness relates to the 
mulling over o f  specific thoughts about oneself. Examples o f private self-consciousness 
items include “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I reflect about myself a lot”. 
Participants were required to endorse either true/false or yes/no for each item (scores 
range from a low of 0 to a high of 20). A coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) calculated 
by Masters, et al. (1993) indicated a suitable internal reliability o f the reinvestment 
factor (0.80). Test-retest reliability was obtained by a percentage o f the original sample 
completing the scale four months later. A Pearson product moment correlation of 0.74 
was found between the original and repeated scores.
4.232. Competitive State Anxiety. The Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS) (Cox et al., 
1996), a condensed version of the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) 
(Martens et al., 1990), was used throughout this study (see Appendix 7). This served 
primarily as a stress manipulation check. The ARS comprises three items, each item 
relates to one of the three subscales (somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety & self- 
confidence) on the original CSAI-2. The first statement relates to somatic anxiety,
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which states “I feel nervous, my body feels tight and / or my stomach tense”. The 
second statement relates to cognitive anxiety, which states “I feel concerned about 
performing poorly and that others will be disappointed with my performance”. The 
final statement relates to self-confidence, which states “I feel secure, mentally relaxed, 
and confident o f coming through under pressure”. For each of the three items, 
participants were required to assess both the intensity and direction o f their emotional 
response. Intensity responses to each item were scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (intensely so). The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients (across three 
samples of athletes) for the three intensity sub-scales ranged from .79 to .83 for 
cognitive anxiety, from .82 to .83 for somatic anxiety, and from .87 to .90 for self- 
confidence, thus indicating the scale to have sufficient reliability. An additional 
directional scale was incorporated into the questionnaire, which was adapted from the 
modified CSAI-29 (Swain & Jones, 1992). Directional responses to each item were 
scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (debilitative to perf.) to 7 (facilitative to perf.).
4.24. Procedure
The 14 participants were selected from a pool o f 35 experienced soccer players who 
completed the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993). Scores ranged from a low of 2 
to a high of 15 (M = 8.91, SD = 2.88). In accordance with Masters' et al. (1993) 
protocol, participants scoring greater than 1 SD above the mean (n=7) were placed in 
the high reinvestment group (M+SD = 11.79; range = 12-15); those scoring greater than 
1 SD below the mean (n=7) were placed in the low reinvestment group (M+SD = 6.03; 
range 2-6). Participants scoring between 6 and 12 were omitted.
All participants were required to perform in a high-and low-stress condition. Each 
condition lasted 90 s. Immediately prior to each condition participants completed the 
ARS (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). An habituation phase was obligatory one day 
before participants undertook their first test session, which required them to execute the 
soccer task (wall-volley) for 90 s. Performance and ARS (intensity & direction) scores 
were used as the dependent variable for each condition.
9 For an in-depth review of the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) see section 6.2.
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Prior to performing in the low stress condition participants were simply instructed to 
accumulate as many points as possible by repeatedly kicking the ball at the target from 
behind the 7.6 m line within a time constraint o f 90 s.
In the high stress condition several techniques were used to create pressure. All 14 
participants were required to be present to evaluate each other's performance throughout 
the duration of this condition (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). When observing, 
participants were required to sit in a semicircle approximately 3 m away from the 7.6 m 
performance line. Primarily, participants were told that the purpose o f this task was to 
analyse the accuracy o f individual passing techniques. A confederate was introduced to 
participants as a soccer coach to analyse individual techniques. The ‘coach’ then 
explained that each participant’s technique would be analysed on three separate 
constructs: control, footwork and recovery. These techniques were used to increase 
performers’ awareness that they were being evaluated (Baumeister, 1984, Masters,
1992). In addition, a camera was used to increase the evaluative process.
Second, performers were told that a negative scoring system was going to be used. 
Consequently, if  participants did not consistently hit the centre zone (10 points), points 
would be deducted. As a result, striking the 8 point zone subtracted 2 points; the 6 point 
zone 4 points; the 4 point zone 6 points; and the 2 point zone 8 points, while missing the 
target zone completely subtracted 10 points. These deductions were not used in the 
statistical analysis.
Finally, performers were told that 14 college soccer players were participating in this 
experiment and subsequent to testing they would be placed in rank order in accordance 
with both their score and evaluated technique. It was further stated that a ranking list 
would be sent to all participants for them to confirm their ability compared with other 
competitors.
To counteract any learning effects each experimental group was divided to form a 
randomised counter-balanced design.
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4.25. Data Analysis
To examine the interaction between reinvestment scores and performance under 
pressure a series of two-way (reinvestment x stress) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the second factor were calculated. A separate analysis o f variance 
was calculated using intensity and directional scores for each of the three subscales of 
the ARS. Specific differences were established using pairwise comparisons. The 
bonferroni technique was used to control for potential Type I errors. A paired-samples 
t-test was used to assess stress manipulation. Normality of distributions, homogeneity 
of variances and sphericity were confirmed (see Appendix 17 for statistical output).
4.3 RESULTS
4.31. Anxiety Data (ARS)
Anxiety as indicated by the means and standard deviations for the intensity and 
directional scores for high and low reinvestment groups are present in Tables 4.1 and
4.2 respectively, for each experimental condition. A paired-samples t-tested carried out 
on the ARS intensity scores for somatic anxiety (t (13) = -2.86, P < .05) and cognitive 
anxiety (t (13) = -2.28, P < .05) indicated that stress was successfully manipulated.
4.311. Somatic Anxiety. The reinvestment by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity Scale for somatic anxiety was significant (F (1,12) = 15.00, P < .01). Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that 
participants in the high reinvestment group reported significantly greater levels o f 
somatic anxiety in the high stress than the low stress condition. Additionally, they 
reported significantly greater somatic anxiety in the high stress condition than the low 
reinvestment group. There was no significant main effect for either the ARS intensity 
scale for somatic anxiety between the high and low stress conditions (F <1,12) = 5.17, P > 
.05), or the high and low reinvestment groups (F (1,12) = .53, P > .05).
The reinvestment by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety 
was significant (F (1,12) = 9.35, P < .05). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected 
using the bonferroni technique indicated that participants in the high reinvestment group 
reported somatic anxiety was significantly more debilitative in the high stress versus the
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Table 4.1. Anxiety Rating Scale Intensity Scores for the High and Low
Reinvestment Groups in each Experimental Condition. Values are
Means (M) ± Standard Deviations (SD)
Somatic Anxiety Cognitive Anxiety Self-confidence
Reinvestment Low Stress High Stress Low Stress High Stress Low Stress High Stress
group M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Low 1.86 1.21 2.43 0.53 2.00 1.53 2.14 1.07 5.00 1.53 4.57 1.13
High 1.43 0.53 3.43 1.40 1.57 0.79 3.29 1.38 5.29 0.49 2.57 1.13
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Table 4.2. Anxiety Rating Scale Directional Scores for the High and Low
Reinvestment Groups in each Experimental Condition. Values are
Means (M) ± Standard Deviations (SD)
Somatic Anxiety Cognitive Anxiety Self-confidence
Reinvestment Low Stress High Stress Low Stress High Stress Low Stress High Stress
Group M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Low 5.29 1.11 4.71 1.25 4.43 1.62 4.71 1.11 5.57 0.79 5.29 1.25
High 5.29 1.25 3.43 1.40 3.57 1.40 3.14 1.46 5.71 0.76 3.86 1.86
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low stress condition. Additionally, they reported somatic anxiety to be significantly 
more debilitative in the high stress condition than the low reinvestment group. There 
was a significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety between 
the high and low stress conditions (F (1,12) = 9.63, P < .05). There was no significant 
main effect for the ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety between the high and low 
reinvestment groups (F (1,12) = .70, P > .05).
4.312. Cognitive Anxiety. No significant interaction or main effects were found 
for the ARS intensity or directional scale for cognitive anxiety.
4.313. Self-confidence. The reinvestment by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for self-confidence was significant (F (1,12) = 16.34, P < .01). Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that the high 
reinvestment group reported significantly lower levels of self-confidence in the high 
stress versus the low stress condition. Additionally, they reported significantly lower 
levels of self-confidence in the high stress condition than the low reinvestment group.
A significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for self-confidence was found 
between the high and low stress conditions (F (1,12) = 16.69, P < .05). There was no 
significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for self-confidence between the high 
and low reinvestment groups (F (1,12) = 1.89, P > .05).
The reinvestment by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for self-confidence 
was found to be significant (F (1,12) = 18.15, P < .05). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that participants in the high 
reinvestment group reported self-confidence to be significantly more debilitative in the 
high stress than in the low stress condition. Additionally, they reported self-confidence 
to be significantly more debilitative in the high stress condition than the low 
reinvestment group, A significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for self- 
confidence was found between the high and low stress conditions (F (1,12) = 10.23,
P < .05). A significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for self-confidence was 
not found between the high and low reinvestment groups (F (1,12) = 1.03, P > .05).
4.34. Soccer Performance.
The means and standard deviations for the performance scores in each experimental 
condition for the high and low Reinvestment Groups are presented in Figure 4.2.
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Assumptions for sphericity were met. The reinvestment by stress interaction for soccer 
performance was significant (F (1,12) = 19.50, P < .05). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that the players in the high 
reinvestment group performed significantly worse in the high stress than in the low 
stress condition. Additionally, they performed significantly worse in the high stress 
condition than players in the low reinvestment group. There was no significant main 
effect for soccer performance between the high and low stress conditions (F (1,12) = 2.78, 
P > .05.), or for the performance between the high and low reinvestment groups (F (1,12) 
= .14, P > .05).
4.4 DISCUSSION
The main aim of this field-based study was to examine the effects of manipulated stress 
on experienced soccer players who were either dispositional high or low in reinvestment 
(Masters et al. 1993). The intent was to assess whether or not those players who scored 
high on the Reinvestment Scale would be more susceptible to the breakdown o f a gross 
dynamic motor skill, precipitated by conscious processing under stress. Another aim of 
this study was to examine participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety to assess 
stress. A further aim of this study was to examine the predictive power o f the 
Reinvestment Scale using a well-learned (automatic) gross, dynamic motor skill under 
stress. A paired-samples t-tested carried out on the ARS intensity scores for somatic 
anxiety and cognitive anxiety indicated that stress was successfully manipulated in this 
study.
Hypothesis one o f this study, which stated that participants low in reinvestment would 
experience no significant difference in performance between the low and high stress 
conditions, was supported. Further, hypothesis two of this study, which stated that 
participants high in reinvestment would perform significantly, worse in the high stress, 
than in the low stress condition, was also supported. Therefore, the main findings of 
study two support Masters et al’s. (1993) contention, that individuals high in 
reinvestment have a greater propensity to experience performance deterioration, 
precipitated by conscious processing, under stress than those low in reinvestment. As 
already established high reinvesters are also considered to be high in self-consciousness 
(Maxwell et al., 2000). Baumeister (1984) reported dispositionally high self-conscious 
individuals to be less likely to choke under pressure as they are used to performing
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whilst feeling self-conscious. Consequently, the present findings are in direct contrast 
to the contention of Baumeister (1984).
It was proposed that high reinvesters were susceptible to heightened state anxiety (and 
low levels of self-confidence) precipitated by stress and thus, attempted to control 
consciously, automatic implicit processes by explicit rule utilisation. This disrupted 
automaticity and impaired performance (Masters et al., 1993). Conversely, for 
participants low in reinvestment it was proposed that they were less susceptible to the 
deleterious effects of stress, which is indicative o f their comparatively low levels of 
state anxiety and high levels o f self-confidence. Presumably, this, in turn, enabled them 
to continue to adopt an appropriate focus, which promoted automatic, implicit 
regulation and thus, consistent performance under stress. However, the attentional 
processes undeipinning the performances of low and high reinvesters were assumed in 
this study. Thus, the Reinvestment Scale offered a measurement of an individual’s 
cognitive predisposition, rather than the direct assessment of specific information 
processing systems during performance.
A limitation of previous research is that state anxiety and stress manipulation had not 
been adequately monitored. In this study the ARS (Cox et al., 1996) was used as a 
stress manipulation check, whilst also measuring intensity and direction of somatic and 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. It was proposed that this method would be a 
rigorous way o f measuring stress manipulation and state anxiety prior to the 
experimental conditions.
The ARS intensity scores indicated that high reinvesters reported significantly greater 
somatic anxiety, and significantly lower self-confidence in the high stress than in the 
low stress condition. Further, high reinvesters reported significantly greater somatic 
anxiety and lower self-confidence in the high stress condition than low reinvesters did. 
High reinvesters indicated no significant difference in cognitive anxiety between the 
two experimental conditions. However, trends indicated an increase in cognitive 
anxiety but this did not reach significance. McDaniel et al. (1989) suggested that if  
consistent deterioration is experienced during performance, pressure may be 
exacerbated. Therefore, in situations where successful performance is expected 
cognitive anxiety is heightened. This could be true o f those players high in
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reinvestment during the high stress condition. However, anxiety was not assessed 
during the soccer task so this hypothesis could not be tested.
Conversely, low reinvesters reported similar levels and interpretations of state anxiety 
and self-confidence between the high and low stress conditions. It was suggested that 
low reinvesters might possess a greater stress threshold than high reinvesters. 
Baumeister (1984) suggested that highly self-consciousness individuals have a 
propensity to rehearse more in conditions where evaluation is likely. The Reinvestment 
Scale incorporates all the items from the Public and Private subscales of the 
Dispositional Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Hence, high 
reinvesters are considered to be highly self-conscious and thus, more likely to become 
anxious and stressed in conditions open to appraisal (Maxwell et al., 2000). Further, 
high reinvesters, because of their high self-consciousness, might also possess higher 
trait anxiety than low reinvesters. Unpublished data referred to by Maxwell et al.
(2000) indicated a significant correlation (r = 0.55) between the Reinvestment Scale and 
the trait section of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970). This 
suggests that high reinvesters are likely to be more anxious than low reinvesters, which 
might account for their differing performance in this study. In addition, perhaps the 
stress manipulation in the present study was not enough to create sufficient anxiety to 
elicit detrimental performance effects in participants low in reinvestment. Clearly, 
research needs to clarify this ambiguity if improved understandings of the processes that 
mediate the stress-rehearsal-performance breakdown occurrence are to be established.
Of specific interest to this investigation were the reported directional scores of the three 
subscales of the ARS. High reinvesters reported somatic anxiety to be significantly 
more debilitative in the high stress than the low stress condition. It was suggested that 
the increase in somatic anxiety was responsible for high reinvesters perceiving such an 
emotion to have negative performance effects in the high stress condition. Similarly, 
participants reported their self-confidence levels to be significantly more negative 
towards performance in the high stress than in the low stress condition. This hindrance 
to performance is reinforced by significantly lower levels of self-confidence being 
reported by high reinvesters prior to the completion of the high stress condition. 
Conversely, no significant difference was found in cognitive anxiety directional scores 
for high reinvesters between the high and low stress conditions. It was proposed that 
this was due to such participants experiencing no significant difference in the intensity
124
levels of cognitive anxiety between the two experimental conditions prior to 
performance.
According to Eysenck and Calvo (1992) additional resources are recruited as a by­
product of increased anxiety. Maxwell et al. (2000) found that high reinvesters produce 
a greater pool o f explicit task knowledge and rehearse that knowledge more frequently 
than low reinvesters under stress conditions. Therefore, perhaps it is the additional 
resources (as a by-produced of increased anxiety) that encourage and allow the frequent 
rehearsal of explicit task knowledge in high reinvesters under stress. This could also 
explain why such performers interpreted these additional, anxiety induced, resources as 
debilitative to their performance in this study. Hence, it was proposed that additional 
resources, perceived to be debilitative to performance in high reinvesters might be a 
moderating factor in the rehearsal-performance breakdown cycle.
In conclusion, study two of this thesis incorporated several changes in design to 
overcome the limitations of previous research. In doing so this study has indicated that 
high reinvesters have a greater predisposition towards severe performance loss, 
precipitated by conscious processing under stress, than low reinvesters in a gross, 
dynamic motor skill. The present findings support the research of Masters et al. (1993) 
and offer greater predictive power to the Reinvestment Scale in a field-based gross, 
dynamic motor skill. Further, high reinvesters were more susceptible to heightened 
somatic anxiety and decreased self-confidence which they perceived to be debilitative to 
performance under stress (which presumably were allocated to inappropriate task 
processes) than low reinvestment did.
The Reinvestment Scale can identify performers that might be susceptible to a loss in 
performance when executing either fine, static motor skills (Masters et al., 1993) or a 
gross dynamic motor skill under stress. The practical implications to these findings 
could enable coaches and sport psychologists to become aware and thus, make 
provision for performers who are susceptible to the negative effects o f stress in the 
future.
Study one o f the thesis established that certain athletes with access to explicit task 
knowledge led them to consciously process such information while experiencing stress; 
this was considered a central tenet in the occurrence of severe performance loss. Study
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two identified performers possessing specific traits (e.g. high reinvesters) that were 
susceptible to conscious processing; this was also considered a central mechanism in 
this phenomenon. Given that coaches consistently use orthodox, rule-based coaching 
styles performers consequently tend to possess large pools of explicit task knowledge. 
Hence, this knowledge is readily available to consciously rehearse, which is particularly 
problematic for those individuals predisposed to this phenomenon. First, future 
research needs to examine ways to minimise the accumulation o f explicit knowledge 
during skill acquisition. Second, research needs to establish whether or not doing so, 
can enhance the performance o f athletes who are predisposed to conscious processing 
under stress. A central aim o f this thesis was to explore how psychological mechanisms 
of severe performance loss interact. For this reason, the interrelationship between 
explicit task knowledge, conscious processing and dispositional reinvestment under 
stress will be examined throughout the remainder of this thesis.
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5.0 STUDY 3. DISPOSITIONAL REINVESTMENT, STRESS AND LEARNING 
STYLE IN BASKETBALL SKILL ACQUISITION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The findings of study two support the prediction that individuals high in reinvestment 
are predisposed to conscious processing, which can disrupt automaticity and impair 
performance (Masters et al., 1993). An explanation o f the conscious processing 
hypothesis, according to Masters (1992), is anchored in early stages o f motor learning 
during which time large amounts o f explicit task knowledge are developed. Moreover, 
the susceptibility to conscious processing is characterised by dispositional reinvestment 
and stress (Masters et al., 1993). However, no research to date has examined the 
combined effects of explicit knowledge manipulation during learning, dispositional 
reinvestment and stress. Hence, the logical progression of this thesis was to identify a 
learning method that fulfilled two aims: the first aim was to reduce the opportunity for 
conscious processing in individuals predisposed to this problem by minimise explicit 
knowledge accumulation. The second aim was to prevent learning progression from 
being inhibited as this has limited previous learning studies that have used a secondary 
task load to suppress explicit knowledge (Hardy et al., 1996; Masters, 1992; Maxwell et 
al., 2000). Thus, the puipose o f this study was to examine the combined effects o f two 
learning styles on dispositional reinvestment, tested under stress.
Initially, skills develop explicitly through conscious processing (Anderson, 1982; Fitts 
& Posner, 1967). Early stages o f skill acquisition involve overtly controlled 
(declarative or explicit) procedures, which are characterised by inconsistent, effortful 
and slow performance (Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967). Over time, with 
practice, motor skills are thought to become covertly controlled (procedural or implicit) 
and automatic in nature, which are characterised by consistent (McLeod, McLaughlin,
& Nimmo-Smith, 1985; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1984), effortless (Logan, 1978; 
1979; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), and fast (Neely, 1977; Posner, & Snyder, 1975) 
performance.
Masters (1992) found a motor skill learned implicitly (without the knowledge o f rules) 
was more robust under stress than a skill learned explicitly (with the rules of the task).
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Masters concluded that this was owing to implicit learners having limited rule-based 
knowledge available to the conscious to rehearse under stress (cf. Hardy, Mullen, & 
Jones, 1996; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, 1967; Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). 
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) replicated and extended this work and found support 
for Masters (1992). Hardy et al. (1996) proposed the secondary task enabled 
participants to become desensitised to self-regulated verbal distractions and thus, 
partially immune to the negative effects o f competitive anxiety.
Using a dual task paradigm has affected the way in which Masters’ (1992) and Hardy, 
Mullen, and Jones’s (1996) results have been interpreted. The explicit learning group 
demonstrated no significant decrease in performance under stress; data indicated that the 
learning curve of this group reached a plateau whereas the implicit group carried on 
improving. Consequently, it could be that the implicit learning group’ progressed at a 
slower rate owing to the dual task placing greater demands on working memory.
Perhaps the participants in the implicit learning group had not yet reached their plateau 
and thus, continued to improve regardless of the created stress condition. This 
contention is supported by Maxwell et al. (2000) who found that an implicitly learned 
skill, using a secondary task, suppressed acquisition even after the completion o f 3000 
trials.
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) called for future research to examine alternative ways 
to manipulate explicit task knowledge during skill acquisition. In this study two 
methods o f learning were used -  process and holistic. A  holistic method o f learning 
was chosen over an implicit method of learning because of the heavy load that a dual­
task paradigm places on working memory, so inhibits learning progression (cf. Hardy, 
Mullen, & Jones, 1996; MacMahon & Masters, 2002; Masters 1992; Maxwell et al., 
2000). In the holistic learning method participants were required simply to just ‘do their 
best’. It was suggested that this learning method would not overload working memory 
and therefore not impede skill development. Furthermore, it was expected that holistic 
learning would allow skill acquisition to develop with little or no conscious awareness 
of the explicit rule-based knowledge of the task. Hence, it was assumed that holistic 
learners would gain a smaller pool of explicit knowledge than process learners. The 
process learning method was developed in accordance with Masters’ (1992) explicit 
learning protocol.
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In summary, recent research has proposed both that dispositional characteristics 
(Baumeister, 1984; Chell, Graydon, Holder, 2003; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Masters et al.,
1993), and methods of skill acquisition (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992), 
coupled with environmental factors (e.g. stress) influence severe performance loss, 
precipitated by conscious processing, under stress. However, no research has examined 
the combined effect of these factors. Hence, the primary aim of this study was for 
participants dispositionally low or high in reinvestment to learn a skill using either a 
holistic or process method of learning. The effectiveness of the two learning methods 
was then examined under low and high conditions of stress. The intent was to 
determine whether or not a skill learned with restricted explicit knowledge could 
prevent severe performance loss under stress, precipitated by conscious processing in 
individuals predisposed to this process.
A basketball free-throw task was chosen for this study, as it is a static, closed skill 
involving several component parts. The ARS (Cox et al, 1996) was again administered 
immediately prior to the two experimental conditions. The ARS assessed stress 
manipulation and participants’ levels and interpretations o f anxiety. In accordance with 
previous research (Masters, 1992; Masters et al., 1993; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996) 
the following hypotheses were formulated.
Hi: Low reinvesters using the process learning method will experience no significant 
difference in performance between the low and high stress conditions.
H2: Low reinvesters using the holistic learning method will experience no significant 
difference in performance between the low and high stress conditions.
H3: High reinvesters using the process learning method will perform significantly worse 
in the high stress, than in the low stress conditions.
H4: High reinvesters using the holistic learning method will experience no significant 
difference in performance between the low and high stress conditions.
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5.2 METHOD
5.21. Participants
With institutional ethics approval, forty male novice basketball players (mean age = 
19.38; range = 18-42) participated in this study. Criterion for participation in this study 
was for individuals to have had no consistent recreational practice or formal training in 
basketball. Participation in the study was voluntary. Informed consent was sought from 
participants before data collection; confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed.
5.22. Experimental Task
An adapted version of Landin, Herbert, and Fairweather’s (1993) basketball free-throw 
shooting task was used for this study. Participants had to shoot at a standardised 
basketball ring (diameter 0.45 m) and backboard (1.22 x 1.88 m) set at a height o f 2.5 m 
from behind a free-throw line 4.2 metres away (see Figure 5.1). Throughout the 
experiment participants received five points for a swish (in without hitting backboard or 
ring), four for in-off-the-ring, three for in-off-the-backboard, two for striking the ring, 
one for striking the backboard, and zero points for missing completely. The rationale 
for using a basketball free-throw task was two fold: first, this task enabled the 
qualitative basketball data in study one to be expanded by using a quantitative group- 
based design. Second, research has not examined the interaction between basketball 
skills and severe performance loss.
5.23. Measures
5.231. Reinvestment. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) (see 
Appendix 6) was administered to assess the extent to which participants were 
predisposed to conscious processing under stress. For details of the Reinvestment Scale 
see section 4.231 (study 2).
5.232. Competitive State Anxiety. The Anxiety Rating Scale (Cox, Russell, & 
Robb, 1996) (ARS), a condensed version o f the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 
(CSAI-2) (Martens et al., 1990), was used throughout this study (see Appendix 7). For 
details of the ARS see section 4.232 (study 2).
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Figure 5.1. The Adapted Basketball Free-Throw Task
0.45m
4.2m
Ring
Free Throw Line
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5.24. Procedure
The 40 participants were selected from a pool of 150 novice basketball players who had 
completed the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993). Scores ranged from a low of 0 
to a high of 18 (M = 8.50, SD = 3.70). In accordance with Masters' et al. (1993) 
protocol, participants scoring greater than 1 SD above the mean (n = 20) were placed in 
the high reinvestment group (M+SD = 12.20; range = 14-18); those scoring greater than 
1 SD below the mean (n = 20) were placed in the low reinvestment group (M+SD = 
4.80; range 0-4). Participants scoring between 4 and 14 were omitted.
5.241. Learning Phase. In the skill acquisition phase participants were required 
to learn an adapted basketball free-throw shooting task, individually, either using a 
holistic (no task instructions) or process (task instructions) method. The learning phase 
took place over a period o f two weeks, which incorporated four sessions (see Figure
5.2). In accordance with Masters’ (1992) protocol, in each session participants had 100 
free-throw shots as 10 blocks of 10. Participants learning the basketball free-throw task 
holistically were required simply to do their best, and were not given any explicit 
instruction on the technical aspects of the task. The only proviso was that participants 
improved as much as possible.
Participants learning the task using a process method were given 8 explicit instructions 
about the specific components required to perform the shooting task successfully. Eight 
explicit rules were chosen for this learning method as advocated by a professional 
basketball coach (Cousy & Power, 1975) for the successful development o f a free-throw 
technique. The technical instructions were as follows:-1. Feet should be shoulder width 
apart. 2. The ball should be bounced to compose oneself prior to shooting. 3. The ball 
should be placed onto the fingertips of the dominant hand and balanced with the non­
dominant hand. 4. The ball should be brought forward over the right eye. 5. The knees 
should flex then extend upward during the shot. 6. The ball should be released directly 
above the head. 7. The extension of the legs should be co-ordinated with the upward 
movement of the arm. 8. After the ball had been released the hand and wrist should 
follow through, reaching as if to dunk the ball into the basket (Cousy & Power, 1975). 
Participants were required to read the 8 instructions prior to each learning phase and 
after every set of 10 free-throw trials. Scores from each set of learning trials were 
recorded and used for data analysis. Participants were instructed not to practise
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basketball free-throw shooting outside the prescribed skill acquisition phase and test 
phase, respectively.
5.242. Retention Phase. Within a week of completing the skill acquisition 
phase and up to 4 days prior to undertaking the test phase, each participant was required 
to complete a learning retention test. The retention test comprised 30 free-throw trials; 
the first 10 trials were used as a warm-up phase and were not used for data analysis (see 
Figure 5.2).
5.243. Test Phase. In the test phase participants performed 30 free-throw trials 
in both a low and high stress environment. The first 10 trials of each stress condition 
were used as a warm-up phase and were not used for statistical analyses (see Figure
5.2). Immediately prior to each condition participants completed the Anxiety Rating 
Scale (ARS; Cox et al., 1996). Participants were made aware of the 5 point scoring 
system immediately prior to each test condition. Performance and ARS scores were 
used as the dependent variables for each condition.
In the high stress condition several techniques were used to create pressure. In 
accordance with the randomised-counterbalanced format, participants from half o f each 
experimental sub-group were required to evaluate each other’s performance during this 
condition (cf. Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Participants were told that the purpose of 
the task was to analyse individual shooting techniques, in relation to accuracy. A 
confederate was introduced to the participants as a ‘professional basketball coach’. This 
technique was used to heighten performers’ awareness that they were being evaluated 
(Baumeister, 1984, Masters, 1992). The coach explained that participants would be 
assessed on their accuracy and shooting technique. It was also explained to participants 
that they would be analysed on three separate constructs o f their technique; these were 
control, balance, and fluidity. In addition, a camera was used to heighten the evaluative 
process. Participants were informed that the video footage would be used for an 
additional analyse of their technique.
Finally, performers were told that they would be placed in rank order in accordance with 
their score and evaluated technique. It was further stated that a ranking list would be 
distributed to all participants for them to confirm their ability compared with other 
competitors.
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In the low stress condition, participants were simply instructed to accumulate as many 
points as possible from the 30 basketball free-throw shots; pressure was kept to a 
minimum. To counteract any biasing effect each reinvestment-by-leaming group was 
divided to form a randomised-counterbalanced design for the two stress conditions. At 
the end of the study participants were debriefed and thanked for their involvement.
5.25. Data Analysis
To examine whether all participants were at a similar skill level at the outset of the 
learning phase a one-way (reinvestment) analysis of variance was calculated. To 
examine whether learning had taken place during the skill acquisition phase, and been 
retained by the two reinvestment groups, and each learning subgroup a three-way 
(Reinvestment x Learning Group x Time) analysis of variance with repeated measures 
on the third factor was calculated. The effectiveness of holistic and process learning 
methods, on participants high or low in reinvestment, under different conditions of 
stress was examined using a series o f two-way (Learning x Stress) analyses o f variance 
(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor. These analyses were 
calculated independently on the test scores for the high and low reinvestment groups, 
respectively. In addition, independent analyses of variance were calculated on each of  
the three intensity sub-scales of the ARS for the high and low reinvestment groups, 
respectively; this served primarily as a stress manipulation check. Specific differences 
were established using pairwise comparisons. The bonferroni technique was used to 
control for potential Type I errors. Normality o f distributions, homogeneity of 
variances and sphericity were confirmed (see Appendix 18 for statistical output).
5.3 RESULTS
5.31. Pre-test Phase
A one-way analysis of variance was calculated on the pre-test scores to ensure that the 
two reinvestment groups were similar prior to the onset o f the study. Assumptions for 
sphericity were met. There was no significant difference between the high and low 
reinvestment groups (F (i^ 8) = . 102, P > 0.1). This indicated that levels o f performance 
were similar prior to the onset of this study regardless of reinvestment group.
136
5.32. The Skill Acquisition / Retention Phase
The learning curves for each of the high and low Reinvestment groups, in each learning 
Subgroup are depicted in Figure 5.3. A three-way (Reinvestment x Learning group x 
Time) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the third factor was calculated for 
the skill acquisition phase. Assumptions for sphericity were met. The free-throw scores 
for the pre-test, final 20 trials of the skill acquisition phase, and the retention test were 
used as the dependent variables. The reinvestment by learning by time interaction for 
free-throw performance was not significant (F (2,12) -  -46, P > 0.1). This indicated not 
only that all participants, regardless of reinvestment or learning group acquired a similar 
amount of skill at the task, but that they had also retained a similar amount of skill up to 
one week later. There was a significant main effect for time (F (2,72)= 85.00, P < 0.001). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that 
all participants were significantly better at the free-throw task in the final 20 trials of the 
skill acquisition phase than in the pre-test. Similarly, all participants performed the task 
significantly better in the retention test than in the pre-test. This indicated that a 
significant amount of learning had taken place for all participants, during the skill 
acquisition phase. In addition, no significant difference in free-throw performance was 
found between the final 20 trials of the skill acquisition phase, and the retention test.
This indicated learning that had taken place over the skill acquisition phase had been 
retained up to a week later. There was no significant main effect for free-throw 
performance between the high and low reinvestment groups (F (2,72)= .51, P > 0.1), or 
the holistic and process learning subgroups (F (2,12) -  -58, P > 0.1). Figure 5.3 depicts 
the learning curves for the two Reinvestment Groups, in each learning subgroup.
Results from the learning and retention phases of this investigation indicated that skill 
acquisition did not differ significantly between the high and low reinvestment groups, 
regardless of the method in which they learned the task. For this reason, a statistical 
comparison was not necessary between the two reinvestment groups for the test phase of 
this investigation. Therefore, separate two-way (learning group x stress) analyses of 
variance with repeated measures on the second factor were calculated on the high and 
low reinvestment groups, respectively.
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5.33. Test Phase: Anxiety Data CARS)
Anxiety as indicated by the means and standard deviations for the intensity and 
direction scores for the low and high reinvestment groups, in each learning subgroup, 
are present in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively, for each stress condition. Analysis of the 
ARS data, predominately, served as a stress manipulation check. A separate series of 
two-way analyses of variance with repeated measures on the second factor were carried 
out on the intensity o f the three components of the ARS for the low and high 
reinvestment groups, respectively. Assumptions for sphericity were met.
5.331. Low Reinvestment Group
5.3311. Somatic Anxiety. The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for somatic anxiety was not significant (F (i,i8) = 0.10, P > .05). There 
was a significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for somatic anxiety between 
the high and low stress conditions (F (1,18) = 12.23, P < .01). This indicated that stress 
was successfully manipulated. There was no significant main effect for the ARS 
intensity scale for somatic anxiety between holistic and process learning subgroups
(F (1,18) = 2.15, P >  .05).
The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for somatic 
anxiety was not significant (F (i,is) = 0.12, P > .05). There was no significant main 
effect for the ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety between the high and low stress 
conditions (F (i,i8) = 1,88., P > .05). There was no significant main effect for the ARS 
directional scale for somatic anxiety between holistic and process learning subgroups 
(F (i,i8)= 1.40, P >  .05).
5.3312. Cognitive Anxiety. The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for cognitive anxiety was not significant (F (i,i8) = 0.18, P > .05). There 
was a significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for cognitive anxiety between 
the low and high stress conditions (F (i,is) = 22.22, P < .001). This also indicated that 
stress was successfully manipulated. There was no significant main effect for the ARS 
intensity scale for cognitive anxiety between holistic and process learning subgroups
(F (i,i8) = 0.88, P > .05). The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS
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Table 5.1. Anxiety Rating Scale Intensity Scores for the Low and High
Reinvestment Groups in each Learning Sub-Group for each Stress
Condition. Values are Means (M) ± Standard Deviations (SD)
Somatic Anxiety Cognitive Anxiety Self-Confidence
Low Stress High Stress Low Stress H igh Stress Low Stress H igh Stress
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
LR-Process 1.80 0.63 2.30 0.82 1.80 0.79 2.40 0.70 5.10 0.74 4.70 0.95
HR-Process 2.80 0.42 5.10 0.74 2.40 0.84 4.80 1.03 4.80 1.14 2.30 1.06
LR-Holistic 2.10 0.57 2.70 0.48 1.60 0.52 2 .1 0 0.57 4.60 0.97 4.10 1.20
HR-Holistic 2.40 0.84 5.20 1.14 2.50 1.08 5.20 1.14 4.20 1.03 4.00 1.42
LR = Low Reinvestment Group 
HR = High Reinvestment Group
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directional scale for cognitive anxiety was not significant (F (1,18) = 1.10, P > .05).
There was no significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for cognitive anxiety 
between the low and high stress conditions (F (1,18) = 0.20, P > .05). There was no 
significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for cognitive anxiety between 
holistic and process learning subgroups (F (1,18) = 3.04, P > .05).
5.3313. Self-Confidence. The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for self-confidence was not significant (F (1,18) = 0.03, P > .05). There 
was no significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for self-confidence between 
the high and low stress conditions (F (i,i8) = 2.71, P > .05), or the holistic and process 
learning subgroups (F (i^s)= 2.61, P > .05).
The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for self- 
confidence was not significant (F (i,is) = 0.18, P > .05). There was no significant main 
effect for the ARS directional scale for self-confidence between the high and low stress 
conditions (F (1,18) = 1-62, P > .05), or the holistic and process learning subgroups 
(F (1,18) = 1-73, P > .05).
5.332. High Reinvestment Group
5.3321. Somatic Anxiety. The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for somatic anxiety was not significant (F (i,is) = 1.64, P > .05). There 
was a significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for somatic anxiety between 
the high and low stress conditions (F (1,18) = 170.87, P < .001). This indicated that stress 
was successfully manipulated. There was no significant main effect for the ARS 
intensity scale for somatic anxiety between the holistic and process learning subgroups 
(F (1.,8) = 0.35, P > .05).
The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for somatic 
anxiety was not significant (F (i;i8)= 1.95, P > .05). There was a significant main effect 
for the ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety between the high and low stress 
conditions (F (i,i8) = 140.60, P < .001). There was no significant main effect for the 
ARS directional scale for somatic anxiety between the holistic and process learning 
subgroups (F (ij8)= 1.03, P > .05).
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Table 5.2. Anxiety Rating Scale Directional Scores for the Low and High
Reinvestment Groups in each Learning Sub-Group for each Stress
Condition. Values are Means (M) ± Standard Deviations (SD)
Somatic Anxiety Cognitive Anxiety Self-Confidence
Low Stress High Stress Low Stress High Stress Low  Stress High Stress
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
LR-Process 4.50 1.43 4.20 1.03 4.60 1.07 4.10 1.20 5.90 1.29 5.70 1.25
HR-Process 4.60 0.84 2.70 0.67 4.20 1.34 2.70 1.16 4.50 0.97 2.60 1.17
LR-Holistic 5.10 1.20 4.60 0.84 4.90 1.88 5.10 1.29 5.40 0.84 5.0 1.15
HR-Holistic 4.70 1.25 3.20 1.03 4.30 1.25 3.10 1.20 4.40 0.97 3.60 1.51
LR = Low Reinvestment Group 
HR = High Reinvestment Group
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5.3322. Cognitive Anxiety. The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS 
intensity scale for cognitive anxiety intensity was not significant (F (i,is) = 0.21,
P > .05). There was a significant main effect for the ARS intensity scale for cognitive 
anxiety intensity between the high and low stress conditions (F (i,i8)= 60.80, P < .001). 
This also indicated that stress was successfully manipulated. There was no significant 
main effect for the ARS intensity scale for cognitive anxiety intensity between the 
holistic and process learning subgroups (F (j,is) = 0.60, P > .05).
The learning group by stress interaction for the ARS directional scale for cognitive 
anxiety intensity was not significant (F (i,is) = 0.31, P > .05). There was no significant 
main effect for the ARS directional scale for cognitive anxiety between the high and 
low stress conditions (F (i,is) = 25.14, P > .05). There was no significant main effect for 
the ARS directional scale for cognitive anxiety between the holistic and process 
learning subgroups (F (i,is) = 0.30, P > .05).
5.3323. Self-Confidence. The learning group by stress interaction for self- 
confidence intensity was significant (F (1,18) = 21.54, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that participants in the 
high reinvestment -  process group reported significantly lower levels o f self-confidence 
in the high stress versus the low stress condition. There was a significant main effect 
for the ARS intensity scale for self-confidence between the high and low stress 
conditions (F (i,i8) = 29.69, P < .001). There was no significant main effect for the ARS 
intensity scale for self-confidence between the holistic and process learning subgroups 
(F (i,,8)= 1-42, P > .05).
The learning group by stress interaction for self-confidence direction was significant 
(F (i,i8)= 7.51, P < .05). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni 
technique indicated that participants in the high reinvestment - process group reported 
self-confidence to be significantly more debilitative in the high stress than in the low 
stress condition. Further, participants in the high reinvestment - process group reported 
self-confidence to be significantly more debilitative in the high stress condition than the 
high reinvestment -  holistic group did in the low stress condition. There was a 
significant main effect for the ARS directional scale for self-confidence between the 
high and low stress conditions (F (i,is) = 45.25, P < .001). There was no significant
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Figure 5.3. Performance Scores for the Low and High Reinvestment Groups in each
Learning Sub-Group in each Stress Condition. Values are Means (M)
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main effect for the ARS directional scale for self-confidence between the holistic and 
process learning subgroups (F (i^g)= 0-86, P > .05).
5.34. Test Phase: Free-Throw Performance
The means for test scores for the low and high reinvestment groups, in each learning 
sub-group, for each stress condition are presented in Figure 5.3. Separate two-way 
analyses of variance with repeated measures on the second factor were carried out on 
the low and high reinvestment groups, respectively. Assumptions for sphericity were 
met.
5.341. Low Reinvestment Group. The learning group by stress interaction for 
test scores was not significant (F (i?ig) = 1.55, p = .23). There was no significant main 
effect for test scores between the high and low stress conditions (F (i^g) = 2.12, P > .05), 
or the holistic and process learning subgroups (F (i^g) = .405, P > .05). This indicated 
that participants low in reinvestment performed the basketball skill to a similar level 
regardless of stress, or method used to leam the task, which supports hypothesis 1 and 2 
of this study.
5.342. High Reinvestment Group. The learning group by stress interaction for 
test scores was found to be significant (F (i,ig) = 7.71, P < .05). Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that those in the high 
reinvestment -  process learning group performed significantly worse in the high stress 
versus the low stress condition, which offers support for hypothesis 3 of this study. 
There was no significant main effect for test scores between the high and low stress 
conditions (F (i,ig) = .659, P > .05) or the holistic and process learning subgroups (F (i,ig) 
= . 155, P > .05). These findings also indicated that the high reinvestment -  holistic 
learning group performed the basketball skill to a similar level regardless of stress, 
which offers support for hypothesis 4 of this study.
5.4 DISCUSSION
The main aim of this study was to assess participants dispositionally low and high in 
reinvestment when using either a holistic or process method of learning. The 
effectiveness of the two learning methods was then examined under different conditions
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of stress. The primary intent was to assess whether by limiting explicit knowledge 
during skill acquisition severe performance loss could be prevented in individuals 
predisposed to conscious processing under stress.
The ARS primarily served as a stress manipulation check, whilst also examining the 
participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety prior to performance. Participants low 
and high in reinvestment reported their perceptions of cognitive and somatic anxiety to 
be significantly greater in the high stress in comparison to the low stress condition. 
These findings suggest that the method used to manipulate stress in a laboratory setting 
was successful.
Hypotheses one and two of this study, which stated that low reinvesters would maintain 
performance under high conditions of stress, regardless o f adopting either a holistic or 
process learning method were supported. The present findings support Masters et al. 
(1993; Chell et al, 2003) as low reinvesters performed to similar levels under low and 
high conditions o f stress. This was regardless of explicit task knowledge manipulated 
during skill acquisition. It was proposed that low reinvesters were not predisposed to 
performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing. Consequently, performance 
under different conditions of stress was relatively uninfluenced by manipulated levels of 
explicit knowledge during skill acquisition.
Hypothesis three o f this study, which stated that high reinvesters adopting the process 
learning method would perform significantly worse in the high stress in comparison to 
the low stress condition was supported. It was proposed, in accordance with Masters et 
al. (1993; Chell et al., 2003) that anxiety-induced conscious rehearsal of explicit rules 
associated with early stages of learning led to automaticity disruption and performance 
impairment in high reinvesters under stress.
Hypothesis four of this study, which stated that high reinvesters adopting the holistic 
learning method would perform to similar levels under low and high conditions o f  
stress, was also supported. This finding does not support the contention of Masters et 
al. (1993; cf. Chell at al., 2003). They, as part of the validation of the Reinvestment 
Scale, used data relating to participants who had learned a motor skill explicitly, from 
Masters’ (1992) study. A significant correlation was revealed between high reinvesters 
and a performance decrement under stress. However, direct comparisons could not be
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made between the present findings and Masters et al’s (1993) study, as they did not 
examine different learning styles. Of specific interest to this study would have been for 
Masters and his Colleagues to have also examined the relationship between the implicit 
learning data (Masters, 1992) and the Reinvestment Scale. Further, neither could a 
direct comparison be made between the present findings and Masters (1992) study, as 
he did not measure dispositional reinvestment. In combination, however, Masters’ 
(1992) and Masters et al’s. (1993) research does offer support for the findings of this 
study. It was proposed that by minimising explicit task knowledge through holistic 
learning, severe performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing, under stress 
could be prevented in individuals high in reinvestment.
Of particular interest were the trends that indicated participants who learned the task 
holistically, regardless of reinvestment, performed better in the high stress than the low 
stress condition (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5). This suggested that high conditions of stress 
facilitated the performance of participants who had used a holistic learning method. 
Masters (1992; Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996) found that participants who learned a 
skill implicitly continued to improve under high conditions o f stress. It was suggested 
that these participants had not reached asymptote, owing to the secondary task placing 
greater demands on working memory. Consequently, the participants continued to 
improve regardless of stress (Hardy et al., 1996). This study attempted to control for 
this anomaly in two ways. Firstly, a holistic learning method was used, instead o f an 
implicit learning method. This was to eliminate the ramifications o f using a secondary 
task. Secondly, the comparison made between the last twenty trials of the learning 
phase and the retention phase ensured that all participants, regardless of their adopted 
learning style, had reached asymptote. It was proposed that the holistic learning method 
used in this study did not place additional demands on working memory, unlike implicit 
learning styles. Consequently, this method not only helped prevent learning retardation, 
but appeared to facilitate performance under stress.
Wulf et al. (1998; Wulf et al., 1999) provided evidence that an external focus resulted in 
greater benefits for learning and performance, than an internal focus. Wulf et al. (2000; 
also see Al Abood et al., 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 
2001) found that an extemal-movement effect related focus facilitated superior learning 
and performance, in comparison to focusing on other external sources o f information. 
Thus, preventing an explicit focus and allowing self-organisation processes to implicitly
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regulate task performance. Further, an external focus has been suggested to place 
minimal demands on working memory in comparison to an internal focus, which 
imposes large demands on working memory (Maxwell & Masters, 2002). Participants 
adopting the holistic learning method in the present study were given no explicit task 
rules and were instructed to just ‘do their best’. It was speculated that this might have 
encouraged participants to focus on the outcome (e.g. extemal-movement effects related 
focus) of performance, which allowed systems to self-organise more naturally, 
unconstrained by conscious control (Wulf et al., 2000; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; 
Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001). This contention is supported by Maxwell and Masters 
(2002) who found that an implicit, external mode o f learning and performance was the 
default option for performers, even when an explicit, internal focus is stipulated 
(Maxwell & Masters, 2002).
A processing efficiency perspective (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) suggests increased effort 
might compensate for anxiety induced distractions by increasing attentional resources 
under stress. This can facilitate performance in cases where additional resources are 
channelled into appropriate processes (e.g. extemal-movement effects related). Hence, 
if  holistic learners in the present study did allocate additional resources into systems that 
promote automaticity, this might explain their incremental performance trends under 
stress. However, it is important to note that neither mental effort nor attentional focus 
was controlled for in this study. Future research should monitor these factors in order to 
gain a richer understanding o f the relationship between attentional foci, mental effort 
and dispositional reinvestment.
Of further interest to this investigation were the ARS scores. Low reinvesters indicated 
a significant increase in both somatic and cognitive anxiety in the high stress, in 
comparison to the low stress condition (no significant differences were found for self- 
confidence). Low reinvesters indicated no significant differences for the directional 
component o f the ARS, even though a main effect for intensity was observed for 
somatic and cognitive anxiety. Be that as it may, scores for state anxiety were still 
relatively low, even in the high stress condition. The mean state anxiety scores were 
similar for high reinvesters under low stress in comparison to scores for low reinvesters 
under high stress conditions (see Figure 5.1 & 5.2). The ARS scores in this study 
follow a similar pattern to those found in study two and therefore, offer further support
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to the proposed relationship between dispositional reinvestment and trait anxiety 
(Maxwell et al., 2000)
Analysis of the ARS (intensity and direction) scores for high reinvesters indicated no 
significant differences between the holistic and process learning groups for somatic or 
cognitive anxiety, in either the low or high stress conditions. This suggests that 
additional factors, other than anxiety, were responsible for the lack o f consistency in 
free-throw performance for the high reinvestment-process learning group under high 
stress. The high reinvestment -  process group reported a significant decrease in self- 
confidence in the high stress, which they reported to be negative to performance, in 
comparison to the low stress condition. Where as, the high reinvestment -  holistic group 
reported similar levels of self-confidence in the high and low stress conditions. Further 
the high reinvestment -  process group reported significantly lower levels of self- 
confidence in the high stress condition than the high reinvestment -  holistic group did.
Bandura (1986) proposed that the belief to execute a specific task successfully is 
essential in obtaining the desired outcome. Schlenker and Leary (1982) suggested that 
the discrepancy between expectation (self and others) to perform successfully coupled 
with the apprehension and self-doubt to do so would intensify pressure. Therefore, 
perhaps self-confidence when performing under pressure was a mediating factor, which 
offers additional support as to why the high reinvestment-process group demonstrated a 
significant decrement in performance and the high-reinvestment-holistic group, did not. 
This finding also supports Hardy (1990) who contended that self-confidence increases 
the probability that individuals will be able to sustain performance even when 
experiencing high levels of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal. Be that as it 
may, it is still not clear why the two learning groups reported significantly different 
levels of self-confidence in the high stress condition. The answer may lie in the 
different processes that underpin the two distinct styles of learning. Clearly, additional 
research is needed in this area if a more definitive explanation is to be established.
In summary, minimising the accumulation of explicit knowledge during skill acquisition 
can prevent severe performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing in high 
reinvesters executing a basketball free-throw task under stress. Low reinvesters were 
not predisposed to this phenomenon in the present study (Masters et al., 1993; Chell at 
al., 2003). Consequently, performance, under different conditions o f stress was
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relatively uninfluenced by manipulated levels o f explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition. High reinvesters were predisposed to performance loss under stress in this 
study (Masters et al., 1993; Chell at al., 2003). Anxiety-induced conscious rehearsal of 
explicit rules associated with early stages of learning led to automaticity disruption and 
performance impairment in those who adopted the process learning method. In contrast, 
by minimising explicit task knowledge conscious processing and thus, performance 
impairment were prevented in those who adopted the holistic learning method. Further, 
it was speculated that, as a default option (Maxwell & Masters, 2002), this learning 
style could have evoked an external movement-effects related focus, which, in turn, 
allowed the motor system to more naturally self-organise, unconstrained by conscious 
control (Wulf et al., 2000; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001).
The main findings o f this study indicate that severe performance loss under stress, 
predicted by dispositional reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993), is not just contingent 
upon the interaction between personality and environmental factors, but also the way in 
which a skill is learned. Furthermore, the findings o f this study question the predictive 
power of the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) in athletes that may have 
acquired a skill through a limited pool of explicit knowledge.
The ARS (Cox et al., 1996) used in studies two and three o f this thesis to assess stress 
manipulation and participants’ levels and interpretations o f anxiety possesses limitations 
(Krane, 1994). The rationale for using the ARS in studies two and three was based on 
its simplicity and short user-friendly format. In an attempt to glean a richer 
understanding of the relationship between anxiety and conscious processing a direction 
scale was incorporated into the questionnaire. This was adapted from the modified 
CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992), but possessed no psychometric data (See Section 
4.232). Clearly, stress was successfully manipulated in these studies. However, the 
changes in ARS intensity and direction scores for the three subscales that took place 
between studies two (see Section 4.31) and three (see Section 5.33) for low and high 
reinvesters under stress were inconsistent. The reasons proposed for this anomaly were 
two fold; first, the intensity scale was not sensitive enough to ascertain an accurate and 
consistent level o f state anxiety due to the limitation associated with single item 
measures (Krane, 1994). Second, the adapted direction scale had no psychometric 
qualities established. For these reasons, caution should be taken when using the ARS in 
future research.
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This study has practical implications for coaches and sport psychologists. First, the 
present findings of this study question the orthodox coaching strategies commonly used 
in sport today. Perhaps coaches should minimise the amount of explicit knowledge that 
is given to athletes during skill acquisition. As a consequence, such athletes might 
develop more holistic skills, which are implicitly regulated, unconstrained by conscious 
control (Wulf et al., 2000). However, minimising explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition might be less beneficial in such sports as rock climbing, than in fast ball 
sports like tennis (Hardy et al., 1996). For this reason, more research is required in this 
area to examine the effect o f explicit knowledge reduction during learning on a variety 
of different sporting skills.
Second, recent research has endorsed the use of technical-orientated goals, which 
require athletes to focus on specific components of a skill during performance (Orlick & 
Partington, 1988; Kingston, Hardy, & Markland, 1992). The present findings challenge 
the effectiveness of using technical-oriented goals. Coaches and sport psychologists 
advising performers to focus on multiple technical-orientated goals might serve as a 
catalyse for conscious processing, rather than automaticity, particularly in those high in 
reinvestment. Therefore, perhaps athletes should be encouraged to use pre-performance 
routines (Boutcher, 1990) that promote holistic orientated goals, which direct attention 
towards more global aspects o f  skills. This might help athletes develop more productive 
mechanisms such as chunking and automaticity (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; 
Kingston & Hardy, 1994).
An aim of this thesis was to identify psychological coping strategies that could be used 
to counter severe performance loss in competitive sport. A challenge for this research 
programme is that coaches still consistently use orthodox, rule-based coaching styles in 
sports today. Hence, athletes generally possess explicit knowledge o f the skills required 
to perform their sport. Thus, the holistic-based learning strategy adopted in this study is 
inapplicable to such athletes. Specifically, this learning strategy is unable to help high 
reinvesters counter the problem. Consequently, strategies that promote a more holistic- 
based approach to skill execution need to be established for experienced performers 
who already have access to explicit task knowledge. For example, Wulf et al. (2000) 
found that adopting an external movement-effect related focus promoted automatic 
motor performance, unconstrained by conscious control. Further, Mullen and Hardy
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(2000) found that using a secondary task during putting execution enhanced the 
performance o f skilled golfers while experiencing stress. Nevertheless, research has not 
examined coping strategies for performers who are predisposed to conscious processing. 
A challenge for future research will be to try and help high reinvesters to maintain 
performance by establish strategies that promote automaticity and prevent conscious 
processing while experiencing stress.
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CHAPTER VI
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6.0. STUDY 4. DISPOSITIONAL REINVESTM ENT, STRESS AND 
FOCUS OF ATTENTION IN SKILLED GOLFERS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The findings o f study three indicated that by minimising explicit task knowledge during 
skill acquisition, performance deterioration could be avoided in those predisposed to this 
problem while experiencing stress. It was suggested that this could be because o f limited 
task rules being available in which to reinvest in. However, because o f  the orthodox way 
motor skills are taught the majority o f experienced athletes will already possess a pool of 
explicit knowledge. Consequently, this knowledge is already available to the conscious to 
reinvest in, which is particularly problematic for those individuals predisposed to this 
phenomenon. Therefore, the purpose o f study four was to examine ways o f preventing 
conscious processing, in skilled performers who were predisposed to this problem, by 
manipulating attentional foci or loading on working memory.
The preceding studies o f this thesis have indicated support for the contention that focusing 
internally on the movement characteristics o f a skill sequence can disrupt automaticity and 
impair performance (Baumeister, 1984; Gallwey, 1976, 1981; Scheider & Fisk, 1983; W ulf 
& Weigelt, 1997). W ulf and her colleagues have provided evidence that an external focus 
consistently results in greater learning benefits than an internal focus in several different 
motor skills (W ulf et al., 1998). Specifically, recent research has observed an extemal- 
focus that directed perform ers’ attention to the movement effects, rather than to other 
external sources o f information, facilitated superior learning and perform ance (Al-Abood et 
a l ,  2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001; W ulf et a l ,  2002). 
Enhancement in learning and performance has also been observed in sport skills including 
golf (W ulf et a l ,  (1999) tennis (Maddox, Wulf, & Wright, 2000) soccer and volleyball 
(W ulf et a l ,  2000) thus adding support to the generalisability o f the effects.
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Conscious attempts to control movement interfere with automatic motor control processes, 
whereas focusing on the movement effects enable the systems to self-organise more 
naturally, unconstrained by conscious control (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). Wulf, 
McNevin, and Shea (2001; see also Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001) referred to this concept as 
the constrained-action hypothesis. Kingston and Hardy (1994) called for a more holistic 
goal type to motor control in the belief that this would promote productive mechanisms 
such as chunking and automaticity. Although an extemal-movement effects related focus 
advocated by Wulf, McNevin, and Shea (2001) is not necessarily a holistic goal per se, it 
promotes a holistic, automatic response in terms o f  movement dynamics.
The research o f W ulf and her Colleages (1997; 1998; 1999; 2000) has primarily 
investigated the impact o f  different attentional foci on skill acquisition. More recently 
W ulf et al. (2002) have found that adopting an external focus o f attention also advantages 
experienced sport performers (e.g. volleyball & soccer). However, W u lf s research has not 
tested findings under competitive stress where the temptation to reinvest in explicit task 
knowledge is at its utmost (Masters 1992); nor have they used participants who are 
predisposed to this process. An aim o f this study was to examine different attentional foci 
(internal and external) on skilled golfers, high in reinvestment under stress. This was to 
establish whether promoting an extemal-movement effects related focus could prevent 
conscious processing and in turn, performance loss under stress.
An alternative to preventing individuals from developing explicit knowledge about how to 
perform skills is to reduce the opportunity for reinvesting in that knowledge when under 
stress (Jackson & Wilson, 1997). Limiting the amount o f  explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition by suppressing working memory with a secondary task has been found to be 
more robust under stress (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992). However, as 
discussed in the previous study this implicit method o f  skill acquisition has practical 
implications (Masters, 1992). Primarily, skill progression is suppressed as a result o f  
unmanageable processing demands placed on the learner by the secondary task (Maxwell et 
al., 2000). Recently Mullen and Hardy (2000) used a random letter generation task 
(Baddeley, 1966) in skilled golfers and found that performance decrements under stress 
were prevented. However, no research has examined whether interfering with the operation
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o f the central executive o f the working memory system could prevent skilled performers, 
predisposed to conscious processing, from experiencing performance loss under stress.
Another aim o f  this study was to examine whether interfering with the operation o f  the 
central executive through the use o f  a random letter generation task (Baddeley, 1966) could 
prevent skilled golfers, predisposed to conscious processing, accessing their explicit 
knowledge base during the execution o f a putting task. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) 
postulated that skills, which are over-learned, are “activated automatically without the 
necessity o f  active control or attention” (p. 2). I f  automatic skills require no conscious 
attention, by suppressing working memory, via random letter generation, conscious 
processing should be prevented and automaticity promoted. However, by placing maximal 
demands on working memory it was not known whether this would prevent critical 
environmental cues from being processed and thus, still lead to a reduction in performance. 
Mullen and Hardy (2000) suggested that owing to the random letter generation preventing 
performance decrements under stress sufficient attentional resources were available for 
successful skill execution. Be that as it may such participants were not predisposed to 
conscious processing.
A further aim o f this study was to measure mental effort (Zijlstra, 1993) and time-on-task. 
This was to explore the conflicting predictions o f  the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck 
& Calvo, 1992) and the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) in accordance 
with directing increased effort to performance as a result o f heighten anxiety. Both 
theories predict that anxiety will result in additional effort expenditure and a desire to tell 
oneself what to do (Oldham, 2001). From a conscious processing perspective increased 
effort is thought to lead to performance decrements owing to a switch in task control from 
an automatic to conscious processing systems. This process is thought to be exemplified by 
performers spending greater time-on-task (Masters, 1992). From a processing efficiency 
perspective, increased effort may compensate for anxiety induced distractions by increasing 
attentional resources, thus preventing performance impairment. However, these predictions 
are contingent upon where these additional resources are allocated. If, for example, 
additional effort is directed towards appropriate processes (e.g. external-holistic movement 
related effects), performance might be facilitated. Conversely, i f  directed toward
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inappropriate processes (e.g. internal movement dynamics), performance might be impaired 
(Mullen & Hardy, 2000).
A go lf putting task was chosen as the experimental task for this study as it’s a fine motor 
skill involving many component parts that could be rehearsed or consciously controlled 
under stress (Masters, 1992). In an attempt to remedy the limitations (see Section 5.4 - 
study 3) identified in the preceding two studies relating to inconsistencies in the ARS (Cox 
et al., 1996) the modified CSAI-2 was used to assess stress manipulation and participants’ 
levels and interpretations of anxiety in the present study. It was expected that this 
instrument would provide a more sensitive measure o f  anxiety and thus provide a richer 
understanding o f the anxiety-performance loss relationship. In accordance with the 
conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992), the constrained-action hypothesis (Wulf, 
McNevin, & Shea, 2001) and the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) the 
following hypotheses were formulated.
Hi -  Participants performing in the internal-process condition under stress w ill perform 
significantly worse in comparison to the baseline measure.
H2 -  Participants performing in the external-holistic condition under stress w ill perform to a 
similar level in comparison to the baseline measure.
H3 -  Participants performing in the arbitrary-random letter generation condition under 
stress w ill perform to a similar level in comparison to the baseline measure.
H4 -  Participants will invest significantly greater mental effort in all 3 experimental 
conditions in comparison to the baseline measure.
Hs -  Participants will spend significantly greater time-on-task in all 3 experimental 
conditions in comparison to the baseline measure.
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6.2. METHOD
6.21. Participants
With institutional ethics approval, 12 (mean age = 27.8; range =  19-41 years) experienced 
(playing experience ranged from 7-26 years) male golfers possessing a handicap o f  15 or 
less (Handicap - M = 9.83; SD = 4.53; range = 4-15) participated in this study. Three 
golfing professionals independently agreed that handicappers o f  15 or less would have well 
established putting skills. Mullen and Hardy (2000) used less experienced golfers with a 
handicap o f  18 or less who were assumed to possess automatic putting skills. Participation 
in the study was voluntary. Informed consent was sought from participants before data 
collection; confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed.
6.22. Experimental Task
A laboratory-based go lf putting task was used for this study. The putting surface was flat, 
with no undulation around the putting area and was composed o f  ‘astro-turf (short tufted, 
artificial green grass). Participants used their own putter throughout the experiment. 
Standardised white Pinnacle golf balls were provided (4.27 cm in diameter). The hole was 
a standard size o f  10.8 cm in diameter. Ten golf balls were placed 5 feet away from the 
hole (see Figure 6.1.). Bawden, Maynard, Graydon and Chell (1999) found putts o f  
between 3 and 4 feet to be a prime distance for this skill to fail under pressure. However, 
rigorous pilot testing suggested that 5 foot putts were more appropriate to prevent a ceiling 
effect in laboratory based conditions. Skilled golfers would expect to hole such a putt and 
failing to do so would intensify pressure when faced with a similar situation (Masters,
1992; McDaniel et. al., 1989). The rationale for using a go lf putting task was two fold: 
first, this task enabled the qualitative golf data in study one to be expanded by using a 
quantitative group-based design. Second, severe performance loss is arguably more 
prevalent in go lf putting than any o f  the other sports used in study one.
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Figure 6.1. The Adapted Golf Putting Task Format
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O
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6.23. Measures
6.231. Reinvestment. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) (see 
Appendix 6) was administered to assess to what extent the participants w ere predisposed to 
conscious processing under stress. For details o f the Reinvestment Scale see Section 4.231 
(study 2).
6.232. Competitive State Anxiety. The modified Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory -  2 (CSAI-2; Swain & Jones, 1992) was used throughout this study (see 
Appendix 8). Participants were required to complete the modified CSAI-2 immediately 
prior to the baseline measure and 3 experimental conditions. This served primarily as a 
stress manipulation check. This scale comprises three subscales; cognitive anxiety, somatic 
anxiety and self-confidence. The inventory comprises 27 items, w ith nine items in each 
subscale. Each participant rated the intensity with which each sym ptom  was being 
experienced on a scale anchored by 1 (not at all) and 4 (very much so). Scores on each 
subscale ranged from 9 to 36. Internal consistency (cronbach coefficient alpha) ranged 
from 0.79 to 0.90 (Martens et al., 1990). Swain and Jones’ (1992) directional subscales 
were also used in the assessment. For the directional scale each sym ptom  was rated on a 
scale ranging from -3 (very debilitative) to +3 (very facilitative). D irection scores ranged 
form -27 to + 27. Internal reliability has been reported with a coefficient o f  0.89 for 
cognitive anxiety and 0.81 for somatic anxiety (Swain & Jones, 1996).
6.233. Mental Effort. The Mental Effort Scale (MES; Zijlstra, 1993) was used 
throughout this study (see Appendix 9). Participants were required to com plete the MES 
immediately after the baseline measure and 3 experimental conditions. This 
unidimensional scale provides a retrospective measure o f invested effort into the execution 
o f a predetermined task. The scale is presented as a vertical axis w ith a range from 0 to 
150. There are three verbal anchors on the right-hand side o f the scale corresponding to 0 
(not at all effortful), 75 (moderately effortful) and 150 (very effortful). Individuals are 
required to mark a point on the scale that represents the effort they have invested in the 
task. This scale has reliability across a range o f laboratory and real-life settings (r = 0.88 in 
the laboratory and r = 0.78 in work settings). The MES has also been shown to correlate
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strongly with validated psychophysiological measures o f  mental load (e.g. spectral 
variations in heart period variability; Zijlstra, 1993).
6.234. Time-on-task. The total time taken for participants to complete each set o f  
10 trials in the baseline measure and the 3 experimental conditions were recorded in 
seconds (secs.). An overall average was found for completing the task in the baseline 
measure and the 3 experimental conditions. Time-on task was measured from addressing 
the first ball to striking the last ball for each set o f  10 trials.
6.235. Social Validation interviews. Conscious processing has predominantly been 
assumed in the literature from outcome based measures (Hardy et al, 1996; Masters, 1992; 
Masters et al., 1993). Thus, to establish a richer understanding o f the influence o f  the three 
experimental conditions in relation to performance semi-structured social validation 
interviews (see Appendix 13) were conducted (Bennett, 2000; Kazdin, 1992). Further these 
interviews were also used to ascertain the thoughts, feelings, emotions and focus o f  
participants prior to, and during performance.
6.24. Procedure
Twelve participants were selected from a pool o f  256 experienced golfers who had 
completed the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993). Scores ranged from a low o f  1 to 
a high o f 17 (M = 8.03, SD = 3.80). In accordance with Masters' et al. (1993) protocol 
twelve participants scoring greater than 1 SD above the mean were selected for this 
experiment (M+SD =  14.22; 1.48; range = 13-17). All other participants were omitted. 
Informed consent was sought from participants before data collection.
6.241. Experimental Conditions. This study included 3 conditions, other than the 
baseline condition, each requiring a different focus and demand on working memory.
These were an ‘internal-process focus’ (I-P) condition, an ‘external-holistic focus’ (E-H) 
condition and an ‘arbitrary-random letter generation focus’ (A-RLG) condition.
6.242. Internal-Process Focus. In this condition participants were required to focus 
on internal aspects relating to explicit components o f  their putting performance. By
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promoting an internal focus whereby participants focused on explicit task knowledge, it 
was expected that this process would lead to conscious processing and automaticity 
disruption (Masters et al., 1993). Participants were instructed to focus on specific coaching 
points in the 3 stroke phases prior to each putt (e.g. Back Swing Phase - rotate the hands 
backwards, transferred weight on to the back foot; Contact Phase - head still at ball impact; 
Follow-through Phase -  rotate the hands forward, transfer weight onto the front foot) (see 
Appendix 11).
6.243. External-Holistic Focus. In this condition participants adopt an extefnal- 
effects related focus associated with performance outcome (e.g. ball trajectory, direction 
and velocity). It was expected that this focus would discourage an internal movement- 
based focus and thus, promote a holistic, automatic movement response by allowing self­
organisation processes to implicitly regulate performance (Al-Abood et al., 2002, Wulf, 
McNevin, & Shea, 2001). Participants in this study were instructed to focus their attention 
towards the ball, its intended direction, speed and outcome. Specifically, they were asked 
to see the line and speed o f each putt and its ideal destination prior to each putt (see 
Appendix 11).
6.244. Arbitrary-Random Letter Generation Focus. In this condition participants 
were required to carry out a secondary task to suppress any explicit task knowledge being 
available to working memory whilst executing the putting task. By occupying the central 
executive o f the working memory system, it was expected that conscious processing would 
be prevented. In accordance with Baddeley’s (1966) random letter generation task 
participants in this study were required to call out a random letter every 1.5 seconds (see 
also Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992) to the click o f a metronome. It was 
made salient to participants that they must continue to generate letters throughout the 
putting task. In addition, participants were instructed to give priority to the randomness o f  
the letters generated (see Appendix 11).
Participants were instructed to incorporate the prescribed focus o f  each condition into their 
regular putting routine during the practice phase. This was to keep the test phase consistent 
with the baseline measure. Before each condition it was highlighted to all participants the 
importance o f  adhering to the specific instructions o f  each condition, regardless o f  how it
affected their performance. Adherence to each condition was evaluated through the semi­
structured interviews. After each set o f  10 trials participants were asked to reiterate their 
focus for each condition, respectively. This was to ensure that participants were continuing 
to use the prescribed focus, along side their regular putting routine.
6.245. Baseline Measure. At the outset o f this study participants were required to 
complete 30 putts to gain a baseline measure o f  putting performance. The first 10 were 
used as practice putts. No stress manipulations were administered. Participants were 
instructed to hole as many putts as possible.
6.25. Practice Phase
In this phase participants were required to complete 30 practice putts in each o f the 3 
conditions. Stress was not manipulated. This was to familiarise participants with each o f  
the 3 prescribed foci. Participants were instructed to hole as many putts as possible using 
the specified focus.
6.26. Test Phase
In the test phase participants were required to perform all 3 experimental conditions in a 
high stress environment. Each condition comprised 20 trials. Participants completed the 
experiment on the same day. Two hours was allowed to elapse between each condition.
This was to control for any potential crossover effect between the different foci strategies 
used in each condition. To counteract any biasing effect participants were divided into 
subgroups to form a randomised-counterbalanced design for the three conditions. Each 
practice phase for the respective conditions was immediately followed by the test phase.
6.27. Stress Manipulation
Several techniques were used to create stress. Participants in each o f  the three sub-groups,
in accordance with the randomised-counterbalanced format, were required to be present to
evaluate each other’s performance during each experimental condition (cf. Hardy, Jones, &
Gould, 1996). Firstly, participants were told that the purpose o f  the task was to analyse
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different attentional foci on individual putting techniques, in relation to accuracy. A  
confederate was introduced to the participants as a ‘professional go lf coach’. This 
technique was used to heighten participants’ awareness that they were being evaluated 
(Baumeister, 1984, Masters, 1992). The coach explained that participants would be 
assessed on their putting technique, accuracy and ability to adhere to the specific prescribed 
focus. In addition, a camera was used to heighten the evaluative process. Participants were 
informed that the video footage would be used to further analyse their overall performance 
by the university’s biomechanists.
Secondly, a negative scoring system was used. Participants were told that they would  
receive one point for holing a putt and minus one point for missing a putt, further point 
deductions would be made for missing additional putts required to complete the task. The 
experimenter verbalised the score after each putt. This technique was used to give  
participants the impression that they were performing to a lower level than they actually 
were. These deductions were not used in the statistical analysis.
Finally, a competitive element was used. Participants were told that they would be placed 
in rank order in accordance with their overall performance. It was further stated that a 
ranking list would be distributed to all participants for them to confirm their positioning in 
respect to other competitors.
Participants were instructed that they would have to hole any missed putts at the end o f  
each 10 trials. This was to prevent participants simplifying the task by striking the ball at 
an unrealistic pace to hole putts and to promote greater ecological validity. Balls that were 
found to be in the line o f  subsequent putts were marked, removed and replaced for putting 
completion at the end o f the 10 trials. The marking process did not inhibit the continuity o f  
the participants’ performance. The additional time taken to complete the task and the 
additional performance score were omitted from the statistical analysis. At the end o f  the 
experiment, when all data had been collected, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their involvement.
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6.28. Data Analysis
To examine the robustness o f  internal, external and arbitrary foci tested under stress in 
participants’ dispositionally high in reinvestment a series o f one-way analyses o f variance 
with repeated measures (ANOVA) were calculated on the putting scores, mental effort and 
time-on-task, respectively. Separate one-way analyses o f  variance were calculated on each 
o f the three intensity and direction sub-scales o f  the modified CS AI-2 for each 
experimental condition. Specific differences were established using pairwise comparisons. 
The bonferroni technique was used to control for potential Type I errors. Normality o f  
distributions, homogeneity o f  variances and sphericity were confirmed (see Appendix 19 
for statistical output).
6.3 RESULTS
6.31. Anxiety Data ("Modified CS AI-2)
Anxiety as indicated by the means and standard deviations for the intensity and direction 
scores is presented in Table 6.1 for the baseline measure and each experimental condition. 
Analysis o f the modified CSAI-2 data indicated that stress was successfully manipulated in 
this study. A  series o f one-way analysis o f  variance with repeated measures were carried 
out on the intensity and direction o f  the three components o f the modified CSAI-2. 
Assumptions for sphericity were met.
6.311. Somatic Anxiety. There was a significant main effect for the intensity scale for 
somatic anxiety (F (3, 33) =  7.40, P < .01). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using 
the bonferroni technique indicated significantly greater levels o f reported somatic anxiety 
in the 3 experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure. There was a 
significant main effect for the direction scale for somatic anxiety (F (3 , 33) =  18.41, P < .01). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated 
somatic anxiety to be significantly more debilitative in the 3 experimental conditions in 
comparison to the baseline measure.
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Table 6.1. CSAI-2 Intensity and Direction Scores for the Baseline Measure and Three
Experimental Conditions. Values are Means (M) ±  Standard Deviations
(SD)
Somatic Anxiety
Intensity Direction 
M SD M SD
Cognitive Anxiety
Intensity Direction 
M SD M SD
Self-Confidence
Intensity Direction 
M SD M SD
Baseline 17.17 3.24 3.08 6.49 16.83 4.15 2.42 7.08 23.50 4.70 4.67 8 . 2 2
I-P 22.83* 3.95 -4.25* 9.01 23.33* 2.35 -3.75* 6.97 20.42 4.87 2.58 8.39
E-H 22.58* 5.95 -5.25* 9.11 23.08* 3.50 -4.92* 7.46 20.58 5.02 2.50 10.04
A-RLG 24.33* 6.61 -6.50* 10.06 25.50* 4.10 -7.75* 10.52 17.17* 4.97 -4.58* 12.40
* = < 0.05 compared with Baseline
I-P = Internal-Process Condition
E-H = External-Holistic Condition
A-RLG = Arbitrary-Random Letter Generation Condition
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6.312. Cognitive Anxiety. There was a significant main effect for the intensity 
scale for cognitive anxiety (F (3, 33) = 28.09, P <  .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated significantly greater levels o f  reported 
cognitive anxiety in the 3 experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure. 
There was a significant main effect for the direction scale for cognitive anxiety (F (3,33) = 
16.47, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique 
indicated cognitive anxiety to be significantly more debilitative in the 3 experimental 
conditions in comparison to the baseline measure.
6.313. Self-Confidence. There was a significant main effect for the intensity scale 
for self-confidence (F (3, 33) = 9.30, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected 
using the bonferroni technique indicated significantly lower levels o f reported self- 
confidence in the arbitrary-random letter generation condition than in the baseline measure. 
There was a significant main effect for the direction scale for self-confidence (F (3 ,33) = . 
7.59, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique 
indicated self-confidence to be significantly more negative to performance in the arbitrary- 
random letter generation condition than in the baseline measure.
6.32. Putting Performance
The means for putting scores for the baseline measure and 3 experimental conditions are 
presented in Figure 6.2. A  one-way analysis o f  variance with repeated measures was 
carried out on the putting scores for the baseline measure and 3 experimental conditions, 
respectively. Assumptions for sphericity were met. There was a significant main effect for 
putting scores (F (3,33) = 13.60, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons corrected using 
the bonferroni technique indicated that participants performed significantly worse in the 
internal-process condition in comparison to the baseline measure. In addition, participants 
performed significantly worse in the external-holistic condition in comparison to the 
baseline measure. Participants also performed significantly worse in the internal-process 
condition in comparison to the arbitrary-random letter generation condition.
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6.33. Mental Effort
The means and standard deviations for the mental effort baseline measure and 3 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 6.3. A  one-way analysis o f variance with 
repeated measures was carried out on the effort scores for the baseline measure and 3 
experimental conditions. Assumptions for sphericity were met. There was a significant 
main effect for effort (F (3, 33) = 25.55, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that participants reported significantly 
greater effort in all 3 experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure. In 
addition, participants reported significantly greater levels o f  effort in both the internal- 
process (P = .006) and arbitrary-random letter generation (P = .021) conditions than in the 
external-holistic condition.
6.34. Time-on-Task
The means and standard deviations (secs.) for time-on-task baseline measure and 3 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 6.4. A  one-way analysis o f variance with 
repeated measures was carried out on the mean time-on-task data for the baseline measure 
and 3 experimental conditions. Assumptions for sphericity were met. There was a 
significant main effect for time-on-task (F (3, 33) =  15.19, P < .001). Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons corrected using the bonferroni technique indicated that participants spent 
significantly greater time-on-task in the internal-process and external-holistic conditions in 
comparison to the baseline measure. In addition, participants spent significantly more time- 
on-task in the internal-process condition than in the arbitrary-random letter generation 
condition (P = .000).
6.35. Social Validation Data
The aims o f  the semi-structured interviews were three fold. First was to assess participants’ 
adherence to each experimental foci. Second was to derive a richer understand o f  the 
effects o f the different attentional foci on performance. Third was to examine the 
participants’ feelings, thoughts and emotions during each condition. The interviews took 
place after completing each condition. The data were divided into five sections: baseline,
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Table 6.2. Mental Effort Baseline Measure and Three Experimental Conditions.
Values are Means (M) ±  Standard Deviations (SD)
Baseline I-P E-H A-RLG
M SD M SD M SD M SD
102.08 18.15 132.08*+ 8.38 114.58* 17.38 131.67*+ 10.94
* = < 0.05 compared with Baseline 
+ = < 0.05 compared with E-H
I-P = Internal-Process Condition
E-H = External-Holistic Condition
A-RLG = Arbitrary-Random Letter Generation Condition
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Table 6.3. Time-on-Task Baseline Measure and the Three Experimental Conditions.
Values are Means (M) ±  Standard Deviations (SD) (secs.)
Baseline I-P E-H A-RLG
M SD M SD M SD M SD
98.96 13.32 130.93*+ 19.29 127.79* 12.45 100.96 26.71
* = < 0.001 compared with Baseline 
+ = < 0.0001 compared with A-RLG
I-P = Internal-Process Condition
E-H = External-Holistic Condition
A-RLG = Arbitrary-Random Letter Generation Condition
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internal-process, external-holistic, arbitrary-random letter generation and general 
characteristics. Each section produced common themes within the data.
6.351. Baseline Phase. Three common themes were elicited from the interviews. 
These were feeling relaxed, self-expectation and pressure. During the baseline measure the 
most commonly cited characteristics were feelings o f being relaxed with the nature o f the 
putting task. One participant stated “I felt relaxed, I always do when there’s no pressure 
on”. Participants commonly reported that they would expect to successfully hole a 5 foot 
putt. However, one participant stated that 5 foot was “certainly a distance where a shot 
could be dropped”. Although participants commonly reported being at ease with the task 
during the baseline measure, two participants reported feeling some increase in the 
importance to perform well. One participant stated “I felt some pressure in the fact that I 
wanted to hole every putt and generate a good score”. This is indicative o f  high reinvesters 
who, regardless o f  pressure, still always want to give a good account o f  themselves and 
hence invest a considerable amount o f  mental effort into the task (Masters, 1993).
6.352. Internal-Process Focus. Four common themes were elicited from the 
interviews. These were focus adherence, normal focus /  compensatory strategies, cognitive 
responses and the loss o f  sensation /  rhythm. Participants commonly reported being able to 
adhere to the specific foci stipulated for this condition. However, 3 participants reported 
attempting to revert back to their normal focus when things started to go wrong. Be that as 
it may, their normal focus still directed attention towards explicit task information, which 
compounded the problem.
Five participants reported the internal-process condition to be similar to their normal focus 
when playing golf. Four o f  these participants also admitted to being over analytical and 
consequently inconsistent when putting. Three participants reported this focus to be in 
antithesis to their normal attentional style. One participated stated “thinking about the 
technique is the worst thing I can do, I started to think I’m going to pull this one to the left 
and I did every time”. Another stated “normally, I stand there and just do it”. Two 
participants reported stating “I preferred the technical focus, think you’ve got to have 
technique.” And “It’s something I know I need to do when I’m putting (focus on technical
aspects), whereas normally I don’t really think about it a great deal”.
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The most common cognitive characteristics were thinking too much, negative thoughts / 
self-consciousness and mental effort. Three participants reported ‘thinking too much’, in 
particular about the technical aspects o f putting. One participant stated “Thinking too much 
about the technique, you know wrist over the ball, head still and all that, getting the ball in 
the hole becomes a problem”. Five participants reported becoming more aware o f  their 
negative feelings and thoughts and the fact that others were watching, particularly when 
performance started to deteriorate. One participant stated “I started to think, you could end 
up with a negative score here and that started to eat away at me”. Another stated “I felt 
tense and aware o f what I was doing”. Another participant stated “I was thinking about 
missing it (the putt) and how far it’s going to go past for when I’m putting back -  it’s the 
wrong focus”. One participant started to focus more on the outcome, stating “Because it 
was competition I started to think about my score more”.
Two participants reported the internal-process focus to require high mental effort. One 
participant stated “It took a lot o f effort (the internal-process focus) - 1 normally feel rather 
than think”. “I started to put more effort into putts following a miss, than the putts after I’d 
holed” another stated. This supports Masters (1992) belief that automatic skills are not 
meant to be effortful and explicit, but rather effortless and implicit. Three participants 
reported a loss o f  sensation /  rhythm during their putting stroke. One participant stated “I 
had no feeling o f  the putt”. Another stated “You know when your putter has gone back too 
far, but it’s too late you’ve lost your rhythm”. The themes generated from this interview 
data are in-line with the main characteristics reported in study one by athletes who had 
experienced a severe loss to their performance during competition.
6.353. External-Holistic Focus. Three common themes were elicited from the
interviews. These were focus adherence, normal focus, and cognitive responses. Seven
participants reported being able to adhere to the specific foci stipulated for this condition.
Five participants reported, at times, reverting back to an explicit based focus, particularly
after missing putts. One participant did state “once I had gone through the process o f
watching the ball go in the hole, I found it really difficult then not to focus on a couple o f
swing thoughts”. Four participants reported the external-holistic focus to be similar to their
normal mode o f  focus. Participants making statements like “It’s important to picture the
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direction o f  the ball” typified this. “It was a natural reaction, keeping a straight line and 
just putting the ball, no thought o f  stance or head, I found that e a s y ”  and “It’s what I feel 
most comfortable with, it’s where my strengths lie”. In contrast, one participant stated 
“focusing on the direction o f  the ball is all very well, but i f  you haven’t got the technique 
it’s not going to go in the hole”.
The most common cognitive characteristics were mental effort and negative thoughts. Six 
participants reported investing the majority o f their effort into seeing the correct line and 
destination o f  the putts rather than the process o f putting itself. One participant stated “I 
normally stand there and just do it rather than thinking about it, coz if  I think I put too 
much effort into it and make a right hash o f  it”. Seven participants reported experiencing 
negative thoughts, in particular in between seeing the line and destination o f  the putt and 
actually striking the ball. One participant stated “when I missed a few, you know the 
negatives start to creep in”. This suggests at times some participants invested additional 
effort into worrying about their performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).
6.354. Arbitrary-Random Letter Generation. Four common themes were elicited 
from the interviews. These were focus adherence, cognitive responses, loss o f  sensation 
and rhythm / automaticity. Participants commonly reported being able to adhere to the 
specific foci stipulated for this condition. The most common cognitive characteristics were 
effort, non-awareness, negative thoughts /  over-analysis prevention. All participants 
reported investing a high amount o f  effort into this condition. Moreover, participants 
reported investing this effort predominantly into the randomness o f  the letters they 
generated rather than the putting itself. In addition, participants commonly reported finding 
the task mentally tiring. Participants also commonly reported having no awareness o f  
anything outside the process o f  generating random letters. Eight participants reported not 
even knowing their score at the end o f  the test phase. Four participants were not even 
aware o f  aiming the ball at the hole or as to whether each putt had gone in the hole or not. 
Seven participants reported the secondary task to prevent any negative thoughts or over­
analysis occurring. One participant stated “It stops you thinking negatively and getting 
over analytical or thinking about the previous putt, you couldn’t do both at the same time -  
you just get on and putt”. Another stated “any negative thoughts or distractions were
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masked by the random letter generation”. In contrast, one participant stated “it (secondary 
task) was too distracting”.
Participants commonly made reference to the impact that the secondary task had on rhythm 
and automaticity o f their putting stroke. One participant stated “I could get into a rhythm 
with the metronome -  it helps you get in your zone”. Another stated “I could not focus at 
all on the line or putting technique it was just habit, that was walking up and bum, bum, 
bum like a machine gun - 1 was just focused on the randomness o f  the letters”. “I definitely 
didn’t concentrate as hard on the putting -  it became something I just did. I almost wasn’t 
bothered what result I got” another participant stated. These statements suggest that the 
secondary task not only helped to promote rhythm and automaticity, but also helped 
participants to become desensitised to the negative effects o f  stress. Finally, two 
participants reported having no feeling at all during this condition.
6.355. General Characteristics. Three common themes were elicited throughout the 
series o f interviews, which relate to general characteristics o f  the participants. These were 
an inability to deal with pressure, self-consciousness, and high expectation /  
competitiveness.
Five participants reported an inability to perform when the pressure was really on. One 
participant stated “the difference is pressure -  there are those who can handle it and those 
that can’t, I think I’m one that just bottles it”. Another stated “I felt under pressure, I’m not 
very good under pressure -  found it difficult to relax”. Four participants reported being 
self-conscious and in particular concerned what others thought o f them. One participant 
stated “I find it hard when people are watching, I hate the first tee coz you’ve always got 
people watching you -  it’s a distraction”. Finally, six participants reported having high 
expectations and /  or being extremely competitive. One participant stated “I think I could 
have done better, having said that even if  I had got 10 out o f  10 I would have still thought I 
could have done better, that’ just the way I am. I’m very competitive in sport and every 
day life as w ell”. Another stated “I know it’s only a game, but you always want to win”. 
The themes within this data offer additional support for the successful manipulation o f  
stress in this study.
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6.4 DISCUSSION
The main aim o f this study was to examine different attentional foci on skilled golfers, high 
in reinvestment to establish whether severe performance loss could be prevented under 
stress. All participants completed the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) prior to 
carrying out the baseline measure and each experimental condition. The CSAI-2 primarily 
served as a stress manipulation check, whilst also examining the participants’ levels and 
interpretations o f  anxiety prior to performance. Participants reported their perceptions o f  
cognitive and somatic anxiety to be significantly greater and more debilitative to 
performance in the three experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure. 
These findings suggest that the stress manipulation was successful. N o significant 
differences in cognitive or somatic anxiety for intensity or direction were found between 
the three experimental conditions. This suggests that additional factors were responsible 
for lack o f consistency in putting performance between the three conditions.
In the social validation interviews participants reported experiencing negative thoughts in 
the internal-process and external-holistic conditions particularly when performance started 
to deteriorate. Skilled golfers would expect to hole such putts and failing to do might have 
intensified pressure when faced with a similar situation (Masters, 1992; McDaniel et. al., 
1989). This suggests that anxiety might have been heightened during performance, 
particularly, subsequent to putts being missed, which would not have been assessed by the 
modified CSAI-2.
Hypothesis one, which stated that participants would experience a significant deterioration 
in performance when adopting the internal-process focus in comparison to the baseline 
measure, was supported. Individuals high in reinvestment are predisposed to conscious 
processing, which can disrupt automaticity under stress (Masters et al. 1993). By adopting 
an internal focus, performance can be impaired as this prevents self-organisation processes 
implicitly regulating task performance (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea 2001). The findings o f  the 
present study support the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters et al., 1993) and the 
constrained-action hypothesis (Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). It was proposed that the 
internal-process focus served as an additional catalyst for promoting conscious processing,
176
compounded by the negative affects o f stress, in individuals with a propensity to this 
phenomenon.
Hypothesis two, which stated that participants would perform to a sim ilar standard when 
adopting the external-holistic focus in comparison to the baseline measure, was not 
supported. In the present study participants performed significantly worse in the external- 
holistic condition than in the baseline measure. These results were not supportive o f Wulf, 
McNevin, and Shea (2001) who found an extemal-effects related focus to facilitate 
performance, via automatic systems unconstrained by conscious control. However, W ulf et 
al. (2001) neither manipulated stress nor dispositional reinvestment.
The main objective o f  the external-holistic focus was to discourage an explicit task focus 
and direct attentional resources (plus additional effort elicited from anxiety) into systems 
that promote automaticity. The results suggest that this did not happen and periods of 
conscious processing still occurred. In the social validation interviews participants 
commonly reported having explicit task thoughts (e.g. "swing thoughts"), particularly after 
missing putts. This m ight have intensified pressure when participants were faced with the 
next putt (Masters, 1992; McDaniel et. al., 1989). In addition, participants commonly 
reported experiencing negative thoughts in between seeing the correct direction and 
destination o f each putt, and striking the ball. This supports O ldham ’s (2001) contention, 
which suggested that anxiety can result in a desire to tell oneself w hat to do. This process 
is exacerbated in those predisposed to reinvestment through the rehearsal o f explicit task 
knowledge (Maxwell et al., 2000). It was speculated that participants were able to channel 
their attention towards automatic, implicit processing systems during successful spells in 
performance (Wulf, M cNevin, & Shea, 2001). This was supported by  the social validation 
interviews. However, this focus was unable to prevent participants, under stress, from 
experiencing some negative thoughts and accessing their explicit knowledge base during 
critical times throughout the task, in particular after missing putts. Consequently, this led 
to periods o f internalisation and episodes o f conscious processing.
A limitation o f the external-holistic condition is that participants m ight have imaged the 
direction, speed and destination o f some putts internally, which m ight have encouraged a
movement dynamic (internal) rather than a movement effects related focus. W einberg and
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Gould (1995) stated that ‘internal imagery makes it easies to bring in the kinesthetic sense, 
feel o f movement, and approximate performance skills. For example using an internal 
imagery perspective a golfer might become more aware o f  how their body feels and looks 
during their swing’ (p.287). Thus, perhaps conscious processing, at times, might have been 
heightened in skilled golfers under stress by the use o f  an internal imagery perspective. 
Clearly, future research needs to control for the utilization o f imagery perspectives, which 
might inadvertently encourage rather than discourage an internal focus o f  attention in high 
reinvesters under stress.
Hypothesis three, which stated that participants would perform to a similar level when 
adopting the arbitrary-random letter generation condition in comparison to the baseline 
measure, was supported. In addition, participants performed significantly better in the 
arbitrary-random letter generation condition than in the internal-process condition. In the 
social validation interviews participants commonly reported having no awareness o f their 
putting action or in some cases even the outcome in the random letter generation condition. 
Further, participants commonly reported the secondary task to prevent them thinking 
negatively or becoming over analytical. Mullen and Hardy (2000) found that performance 
decrements were prevented when participants generated random letters under stress.
Similar results were found in the present study with the addition o f using participants 
predisposed to conscious processing. In the social validation interviews participants 
commonly reported concentrating less on putting and more on generating random letters. 
Consequently, putting became 'something they (the participants) just did1. This suggests 
that participants high in reinvestment became desensitized to state anxiety and stress (e.g. 
self-regulated verbal distractions and conscious processing), which supports the contention 
o f  Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996). It was proposed that participants in the arbitrary- 
random letter generation condition were prevented from processing explicit task knowledge 
and self-regulated verbal distractions, owing to the demands imposed on working memory 
by the secondary task. This promoted automaticity and enabled skilled golfers, high in 
reinvestment, to sustain a consistent level o f  performance under stress.
O f particular interest was that participants reported their self-confidence levels to be
significantly lower, which they perceived to be more negative to performance in the
arbitrary-random letter generation condition in comparison to the baseline measure. In the
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social validation interviews participants reported this focus to be completely new and alien 
to them in relation to their usual routines and focus, which could explain this finding. This 
indicates that participants might have benefited from additional practice using this focus. 
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) suggested that a random letter generation task enabled 
participants to become desensitized to the potential negative effects o f state anxiety. 
Presumably, therefore such participants also became desensitized to the potential positive 
effects o f self-confidence. Thus, it was proposed that self-confidence was not an influential 
factor during this condition owing to the interference with the operation o f  the central 
executive, which prevented participants having any recourse to their feelings, thoughts or 
emotions. No significant differences in self-confidence for intensity or direction were 
found between the internal-process or external-holistic conditions in comparison to the 
baseline measure. However, trends were in the expected direction. Similar to anxiety, self- 
confidence might also have fluctuated when performing in either the internal-process or 
external holistic conditions particularly when performance started to deteriorate.
A  further aim o f  this study was to assess the predictions that participants would invest 
greater mental effort (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and spend greater time-on-task under stress 
(Masters, 1992) as a function o f  heightened anxiety. This additional effort was expected to 
facilitate or debilitate performance depending upon where this additional effort was 
invested (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Mullen and Hardy (2000) proposed that increases in 
effort as a function o f anxiety could maintain or even improve performance provided it’s 
directed towards promoting automatic processing systems. However, reinvestment was not 
measured in these studies.
Hypothesis four, which stated that participants would invest significantly greater mental 
effort in all three experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure, was 
supported. Interestingly, participants reported investing a similar amount o f  effort in the 
internal-holistic condition in comparison to the arbitrary-random letter generation 
condition. When in the internal-process condition, participants commonly reported 
directing their effort into "thinking too much about the technical aspects o f  putting". It was 
proposed that additional effort invested into adopting this focus exacerbated the 
deautomatisation process and promoted inconsistent performance, in high reinvesters,
under stress (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Masters et al., 1993).
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In contrast, when in the arbitrary-random letter generation condition participants commonly 
reported directing their effort into generating random letters, to the point where one 
individual stated "It (putting) became something I just did". Study one called for 
compensatory strategies, during the loss o f form, which promoted automaticity rather than 
disrupted it. It was proposed that additional effort invested into prioritising the generation 
of random letters was a strategy that promoted automaticity and consistent performance, in 
individuals predisposed to conscious processing, under stress. Although it would appear 
that investing additional effort into the secondary task was a successful compensatory 
strategy, this would have almost certainly been at the expense o f  processing efficiency  
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). This was due to loading heavily on working memory via the 
secondary task, not skill execution. Mullen and Hardy (2000) suggested that additional 
effort as a function o f anxiety was required for participants to cope with the demands o f  the 
secondary task and successful skill execution under stress. This suggests that in the present 
study additional attentional resources were essential for high reinvesters to maintain 
performance in comparison to the baseline measure.
During the external-holistic condition participants reported investing significantly less 
effort into the task than the other two conditions under stress. It could be contended that 
that at times participants did successfully adopt an external focus as this has been reported 
to discourage conscious processing and thus minimise the demands imposed on working 
memory (Maxwell et al., 2001;2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). However, it would 
appear that this focus was unable to prevent high reinvesters from periodically investing 
effort into accessing explicit task knowledge and negative thoughts during performance. It 
was proposed that this condition periodically encourage participants to invest effort into 
motor systems that more naturally self-organise unconstrained by conscious control, which 
promoted automaticity. Be that as it may, this was not enough to discourage bouts o f  
conscious processing (particularly after missing putts) and prevent performance decrements 
in conditions open to negative appraisal.
Hypothesis five, which stated that participants would spend significantly greater time-on-
task in all three experimental conditions in comparison to the baseline measure, was only
partial supported. In the present study participants spent significantly more time-on-task in
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the internal-process and external-holistic conditions in comparison to the baseline measure. 
It was proposed that in the internal-process condition participants used this additional time 
to focus on explicit task knowledge, which increase the demands imposed on working 
memory whilst exacerbating the deautomatisation problem. Similarly, but to a lesser 
extent, in the external-holistic condition it was speculated that participants used some o f  
this additional time to focus on explicit task knowledge (particularly after missing putts), in 
between the preparation and execution o f  putts. During other periods it would appear that 
time was spent focusing externally, which minimised conscious processing and working 
memory load thus promoting episodes o f  automaticity. These findings were supported by  
the social validation data.
Interestingly, participants spent a similar amount o f  time-on-task in the arbitrary-random 
letter generation condition (M = 98.96) in comparison to the baseline measure (M =
100.96). It can be inferred that participants in this condition were not able to access explicit 
task knowledge or process negative cognitions, which can take up additional time and 
resources when performing (Masters, 1992). It was proposed that the secondary task in this 
condition served two purposes. Firstly, it enabled participants to become desensitised to 
stress. And secondly, it promoted automaticity during task execution, which encouraged 
participants to spend less time-on-task.
O f further interest was that some participants in the practical assessment interviews
reported experiencing a loss o f sensation in their putting stroke both in the internal-process
and arbitrary-random letter generation condition. In the internal-process condition one
participant stated “I couldn’t feel the putt”. This offers support for study one o f this thesis
in that processing explicit task knowledge disrupts the natural flow o f performance to the
point where individuals can lose that all important ‘feeling’ associated with correct skill
execution. Athletes in study one commonly reported a loss o f  sensation as a consequence
o f severe performance loss. Such athletes reported using compensatory strategies to
recreate the correct sensation, which directed greater effort and attention towards the task
rules and thus, continued to impair performance. However, participants in the arbitrary-
random letter generation condition might have experienced a perceived loss o f sensation,
simply because the demands placed on working memory prevented them from processing
this information. Similarly, it could be that no performance decrement took place, as
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participants were unable to direct attention towards recreating the correct sensation, which 
might involve the processing of explicit task knowledge (see Section 3.4 - study one).
In summary, manipulation o f attentional foci under stress can influence putting 
performance in high reinvesters. The internal-process focus encouraged high reinvesters to 
execute the putting task via conscious processing. This disrupted automaticity and 
impaired performance under stress (Masters et al., 1993). The external-holistic focus 
encouraged high reinvesters to execute the task via automaticity. However, participants 
still lapsed into bouts o f conscious processing, particularly after m issing putts, which 
impaired performance under stress. Finally, the arbitrary-random letter generation 
condition desensitised high reinvesters to stress. By taking up w orking memory this 
prevented conscious processing and promoted automaticity. This enabled participants to 
perform to their usual standard when under stress.
This study found that interfering with the operation o f the central executive, severe 
performance loss under stress could be avoided in skilled golfers, high in reinvestment. 
However, there are two main limitations o f  the random letter generation task used in the 
present study that might prevent this strategy being used as an applied intervention for 
skilled golfers. Firstly, participants commonly reported the m etronom e to facilitate the 
rhythm of their putting action. It is not known whether it was the sound o f the metronome, 
the generation o f random letters or the combination of both that helped participants 
maintain performance under stress. Furthermore, verbalising random  letters to the sound o f 
a metronome might not be a practical strategy in a golfing environm ent. Secondly, golfers 
performing on a course are still required to consciously process critical environmental cues 
(e.g. green undulation) to ensure the correct direction and destination o f  each putt prior to 
execution. These limitations prevent the present findings being extrapolated into the world 
o f go lf or indeed, other sports. Clearly, future research needs to identify an intervention 
strategy that can be practically applied to sport, which reduces access to explicit task 
knowledge, whilst still enabling environmental cues to be processed.
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CHAPTER VII
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7.0. STUDY 5. DISPOSITIONAL REINVESTMENT AND STRESS IN SKILLED 
GOLFERS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PUTTING INTERVENTION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis has identified psychological mechanisms that could underpin severe 
performance loss in competitive sport. Further, this research has established factors that 
could influence intervention strategies for individuals predisposed to this problem. Study 
four found that, in a stressful environment, skilled golfers high in reinvestment maintained 
performance in a secondary task loading condition. It was proposed that the secondary task 
(Baddelely, 1966) prevented explicit task knowledge and self-regulated verbal distractions 
being processed thus, enabling desensitization to the negative effects o f  state anxiety 
(Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). This promoted implicit, 
automatic regulation o f putting execution, which in turn, enabled skilled golfers, high in 
reinvestment to maintain performance under stress.
Limitations from study 4 question the ecological validity o f  using a random letter 
generation task. Shouting out random letters to the sound o f  a metronome is not practical 
whilst playing competitive golf. Nor is it functional in allowing critical environmental cues 
(e.g. green speed /  undulation) to be processed whilst putting. Further, it was not known 
what effect the metronome had on performance. Finally, study 4 was conducted in a 
laboratory environment. Hence, the purpose o f the present study was to establish a 
practical and functional psychological intervention for skilled golfers predisposed to 
conscious processing and automaticity disruption under stress in an ecologically valid 
environment.
Findings from study 4 indicated that participants became desensitized to the negative 
effects o f  stress (Mullen & Hardy, 2000), which could have simplified the nature o f  the 
task. It was the perceived negative evaluation by others that is coupled with the missing o f  
a 5  foot putt that made the task demanding for skilled golfers, high in reinvestment, rather 
than the putt per sa. However, golfers in the preceding study were not required to process 
critical environmental cues, which is an essential part o f putting whilst playing golf.
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Therefore, it is not known whether the random letter generation task would inhibit the 
execution o f a more complex putting task where golfers would have to make decisions in 
relation to the correct direction, speed and destination for each putt.
Study 4 used an external-holistic focus in an attempt to prevent conscious processing and 
promote automaticity. This focus was unable to prevent skilled golfers (high in 
reinvestment), from experiencing some negative thoughts and at times processing explicit 
knowledge during putting execution, which led to a decrement in performance under stress. 
However, this focus did enable golfers to process external information (e.g. direction, speed 
and destination) prior to each putt. It was proposed that an external-holistic focus (decision 
making phase) combined with secondary task load (execution phase) would enable 
environmental cues to be processed prior to putting, whilst preventing conscious processing 
during putting. In addition, it was also proposed that the use o f  external imagery during the 
decision making phase o f  the intervention might also help promote an external focus and 
thus, prevent an internal, process focus.
The random letter generation task has been used in laboratory-based skill acquisition 
(Hardy et al., 1996; MacMahon & Masters, 2002; Masters, 1992; Maxwell, 2000) and one 
performance study (Mullen & Hardy, 2000) to suppress the development and processing of  
explicit knowledge. However, no research has attempted to adapt the random letter 
generation task as part o f  a putting intervention for skilled golfers predisposed to conscious 
processing, in an ecologically valid environment. Likewise, current research has not 
incoiporated a decision making phase to enable golfers to process environmental cues prior 
to putting in an ecologically valid environment.
The present study sought to establish whether a psychological putting intervention could 
help promote automaticity and maintain the performance o f  skilled golfers predisposed to 
conscious processing under stress. An aim o f the present study was to establish a two- 
phase putting intervention. It was proposed that the decision making phase (phase 1) would 
enable golfers to focus externally on processing critical environmental cues prior to putting. 
It was also proposed that introducing a secondary task load (a random letter generation 
task) during the putting execution phase (phase 2 ) would prevent conscious processing and 
promote automaticity. *
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The modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) was used as a stress manipulation check, 
whilst also examining the golfers’ levels and interpretations o f  anxiety prior to 
performance. Mental effort (Zijlstra, 1993) and time-on-task (secs.) were also measured to 
explore the conflicting predictions o f  the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992) and the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) in accordance with 
directing increased effort to performance as a result o f  heighten anxiety. A  single subject 
replication-reversal (ABAC) design was considered the most beneficial for this study as it 
controlled for the monitoring o f reversals in behaviour (Kazdin, 1992).
The following research hypotheses were formulated:
Hi - Golfers w ill experience a decrement in putting performance in a stress condition 
without the use o f  a psychological intervention (phase B).
H2 - Golfers using the two-phase psychological intervention will be able to maintain their 
putting score in a stress experimental condition (phase C).
7.2. METHOD
7.21. Participants
With institutional ethics approval, three (mean age = 30; range = 20-42 years) experienced 
(competitive experience - range 5-18 years) male golfers, high in reinvestment, possessing 
a handicap o f  10 or less (mean handicap = 7; range = 2-10) participated in this study. It 
was a requisite o f this study that participants possessed a well-learned, automatic putting 
stroke. Three golfing professionals independently agreed that handicappers o f  15 or less 
would have w ell established putting skills (Mullen & Hardy (2000) used less experienced 
golfers with a handicap o f 18 or less who were assumed to possess automatic putting 
skills). Participation in the study was voluntary. Informed consent was sought from  
participants before data collection; confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed.
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7.22. Experimental Task
A golf putting task was used for this study. The putting surface used was a practice green 
located at the Hallamshire Golf Club (Sheffield, UK.). Participants were required to use 
their own putter throughout the experiment. Standardised white pinnacle golf balls were 
provided (4.27 cm in diameter). The holes were all a standard size o f  10.8 cm in diameter. 
The practice green consisted o f 10 holes. Ten balls were placed around the green; each ball 
related to a specific hole. The 10 balls w ere placed a distance o f  5 feet away from each 
hole. To prevent participants from establishing a learning effect that could occur by 
continually putting from the same position two additional procedures were incorporated. 
Firstly, the balls were placed in one o f  five predetermined positions, within a lateral range 
o f 2 ’ feet, for each set o f 10 trials. Secondly, for every other set o f  10 trials throughout the 
study participants were required to com plete the series o f putts in reverse order. Both the 
predetermined position and reverse order o f  each set o f 10 trials was identical for each 
participant and each experimental phase. This and the undulating nature o f the green 
ensured that participants had to make a decision about the correct direction, speed and 
destination o f each putt. The number o f  putts holed during each experimental phase 
measured golf putting performance. Each experimental phase consisted o f  four sets o f  50 
putts over a duration o f two weeks. Prior to completing each set o f  50 trials participants 
were permitted 10 habituation trials. These habituation trials were placed in predetermined 
positions, which differed from those used for the experimental task. Participants were 
required to perform a total o f 1000 putts, on twenty occasions (10 x 50 putts) throughout 
the ten week o f  this study. The rationale for using a golf putting task was two fold: first, 
this task enabled the findings of study four to be expanded by using a single-subject 
replication-reversal design. Second, the lack o f ecological validity o f  the putting task used 
in study four could be rectified.
7.23. Measures
7.231. Reinvestment. The Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) (see Appendix 
6 ) was administered to assess to what extent the participants were predisposed to conscious 
processing under stress. For details o f  the Reinvestment Scale see Section 4.231 (study 2).
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7.232. Competitive State Anxiety. The modified Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory -  2 (CSAI-2; Swain & Jones, 1992) was used throughout this study (see 
Appendix 8 ). Participants were required to complete the modified CSAI-2 immediately 
prior to each phase o f  the experiment, with the exception o f the intervention phase. The 
modified CSAI-2 served as a stress manipulation check. This inventory was also used to 
assess whether the two-phase putting intervention influenced perceived state anxiety and 
self-confidence levels prior to performance under stress. For details o f  the modified 
CSAI-2 see Section 6.232 (study 4).
7.233. Mental Effort. The Mental Effort Scale (MES; Zijlstra, 1993) was used 
throughout this study (see Appendix 9). Participants were required to complete the scale 
immediately after each phase o f  the experiment. For details on the Mental Effort Scale see 
Section 6.234 (study 4).
7.234. Time-On-Task. The total time taken for participants to complete the initial 
10 trials for each set o f  50 putts, in each experimental phase was recorded in seconds (s). A  
mean average for time-on-task was identified in the initial 10 trials o f  each set o f 50 putts, 
for each experimental phase. Study four found that participants spent ’too much time 
thinking1 about each putt, which resulted in indecisive and ambivalent decision making. 
Golfers were asked to keep their analysis-time consistent for each putt.
7.235. Imagery. The revised version o f  the Movement Imagery Questionnaire 
(MIQ-R; Hall & Martin, 1997) was used to assess the participants’ visual and kinesthetic 
imagery ability (see Appendix 10). The MSQ-R is a shortned version o f  the Movement 
Imagery Questionnaire (Hall & Pongrac, 1983). This eight item inventory assesses visual 
and kinesthetic imagery ability on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 (very hard to see or 
feel) and 7 (very easy to see or feel). Participants are provided with descriptions o f specific 
actions that they perform, then image, and then rate themselves on their imaging ability. A  
sample item from the MSQ-R is as follows: S t a r t i n g  p o s i t i o n :  Stand with your feet slightly 
apart and your hands at your side. A c t i o n :  Bend down low and then jump straight up in the 
air as high as possible with both arms extended above your head. Land with your feet apart 
and lower your arms to your sides. M e n t a l  t a s k :  Assume the starting position. Attempt to
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feel yourself making the movement just performed without actually doing it. N ow  rate the 
ease or difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task (Hall & Martin, 1997). 
The MIQ factorial integrity has been supported (Atienza, Balaguer & Garcia-Merita, 1994). 
The MIQ-R has indicated high correlations with the MIQ for both the visual (r = -.77) and 
kinesthetic (r = -.77) scales (Hall & Martin, 1997). The MIQ-R is scored in the opposite 
direction to the MIQ, which is reflected in the negative correlations. These high 
correlations indicate convergent validity between the already validated MIQ and the MIQ- 
R. It was considered, in accordance with Hall and Martin (1997) that participants scoring 
16 or more on the visual and kinesthetic subscales o f the MIQ-R were proficient at using 
imagery and therefore, did not require formal imagery training during the intervention 
phase.
7.236. Social Validation Interviews. Conscious processing has, predominantly been 
assumed in the literature from outcome based measures (Hardy et al, 1996; Masters, 1992; 
Masters et al., 1993). Thus, to establish a richer understanding o f the intervention 
effectiveness social validation interviews (see Appendix 16) were conducted after the 
second stress phase (phase C) o f this study (Bennett, 2000). For questions 1, 3, 7, 8 , and 9 
participants were asked to provide a score from a 7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 (not at 
all) and 7 (very much so).
7.24. Experimental Design
A  single subject A l, B, A2 and C research design (Kazdin, 1992) was used to investigate 
the effects o f a psychological intervention strategy upon experienced golfers who were 
predisposed to severe performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing under stress. 
This design ensured that the stress manipulation was sufficient to induce a substantial 
decrement in performance prior to introducing the intervention strategy. Before 
introducing the initial stress phase a stable putting performance baseline was established for 
each golfer (Kazdin, 1992). The initial baseline (A l) was examined over four sets o f 50 
trials ( 2 0 0  putts), which were conducted on four occasions over a two week period. 
Subsequent to establishing a stable baseline the first stress phase (B) was introduced. The 
second baseline (A2) was then introduced, followed by the intervention phase. Finally, the
189
second stress phase was introduced (C). In accordance with Kazdin (1992) all phases o f  
this study comprised equal putting trials (4 x 50 trials) and time frames (2 week). The 
present study lasted a total o f  ten weeks. Rigorous pilot testing suggested that participants 
required 200 trials to produce a stable baseline and adapt to the invention strategy. Pilot 
testing also indicated that participants became more confident in using the random letter 
generation task whilst putting, after a practice phase o f  200 putts. The rationale for using 
200 trials in each experimental phase was based on the findings from the pilot testing.
7.25. Treatment: The Psychological Intervention
The psychological intervention for the present study consisted o f  two phases: a decision 
making phase and an execution phase. The intervention was administered to all 
participants subsequent to the completion o f the second baseline phase. The intervention 
was administered and developed over a period o f  two weeks. All participants were 
required to complete 4 sets o f  50 trials on four separate occasions. This phase took place 
on a different practice green from the one used for the experimental task to control for 
participants getting used to the undulation o f the green. The trials were set at a 
predetermined distance o f between 4 and 6 feet away from the hole to control for 
participants practicing the putting distance used in the experimental task. Participants were 
asked not to practice the intervention or experimental task at any other time throughout the 
duration o f  the experiment.
7.251. Decision-Making Phase o f Each Putt. The primary aim o f this phase was to 
promote an external focus whilst enabling participants to process critical environmental 
cues, in a holistic manner, to help prevent over-analysis prior to putting. During the 
decision-making phase o f the intervention participants were required to image the correct 
direction, speed and destination prior to the execution o f  each putt. This phase was similar 
to the external-holistic foci used in study four. In an attempt to control for limitations o f  
study four golfers were required to follow an imagery script (see Appendix 14), which was 
specifically developed to help keep them externally focused during this phase. In addition, 
to encourage golfers to image, externally during the decision making phase, they were
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required to watch a two minute video o f  a golf professional putting10. Golfers were then 
encouraged to image the correct direction, speed and destination o f  each putt as though they 
were watching themselves on a television screen. Golfers were required to watch the video 
after every 20 putts to help sustain an external imagery perspective. Golfers were also 
encouraged to keep their analysis-time consistent for each putt. If participants were unsure 
of the correct line, speed and destination o f  a certain putt they were encouraged to stop, 
walk away and start their routine again.
7.252. Execution Phase o f  Each Putt. During the execution phase participants were 
required to complete the random letter generation task (Baddeley, 1966). Immediately after 
completing the decision-making phase participants were required to start generating 
random letters. This was the cue for participants to address the ball and 'just putt'. 
Participants were required to stop generating random letters after striking the ball for each 
putt. Participants were instructed to prioritize the randomness o f  the letters generated. In 
the first set o f  trials participants were required to execute 50 putts whilst verbalising letters 
out loud to the sound o f a metronome every 1.5 seconds. During the second set o f  50 putts 
participants were required to execute each putt whilst generating random letters without the 
sound o f  the metronome. In the third set o f trials participants were required to execute the 
first 25 putts following the same format used for the previous set o f trials. In the final 25 
putts o f  the third set o f  trials participants were required to execute each putt whilst 
generating random letters internally every 1.5 seconds. For the internal putting phase one 
trial in every set o f ten putts was randomly chosen. During this trial participants were 
required to generate random letters verbally. This was used to check that participants were 
continuing to use the random letter generation task under non-verbal conditions. In the 
fourth set o f  trials participants were required to follow the same format used for the final 
fifty putts o f  the previous set o f trails. In addition, during this set o f putts participants were 
required to hole out each putt using the same intervention strategy. Participants were asked 
not to practice the intervention strategy or play any additional go lf during this time.
10 The rational for using a video o f a go lf professional putting rather than the participants themselves was that 
a video recorder would have to be present in order to gain footage. A  video camera was used as a stressor in 
phase 1 and 2 o f the competition. Thus, it was felt that using a video camera whilst leaning the putting 
intervention might confound the results in the second stress condition.
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7.26. Procedure
Three golfers were selected from a pool o f 256 experienced golfers who had completed the 
Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993) for study 4 o f  this thesis. None o f  the golfers 
selected for this study had been involved in any previous research. In accordance with 
Masters et al.’s (1993) protocol 3 participants scoring greater than 1 SD above the mean 
were selected for this experiment (mean = 14.3; range = 14-15). All other participants were 
omitted.
7.261. Phase A l. In the initial baseline phase participants were required to hole as 
many putts as possible (200 trials). Stress was kept to a minimum. This phase was 
completed independently o f the other participants; the experimenter was the only other 
person present. To keep the baseline phase consistent with the stress phase participants 
were required to hole any missed putts, at the end o f each set o f  ten trials. This was to 
prevent participants simplifying the task by striking the ball at an unrealistic pace to hole 
putts. The additional time taken to complete the task and the additional performance score 
were omitted from the statistical analysis.
7.262. Phase B. In the initial stress phase several techniques were used to create a 
stressful environment. All participants were required to be present to evaluate each other’s 
performance during this phase (cf. Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Firstly, participants were 
told that the purpose o f  this phase o f  the experiment was to analyse individual putting 
techniques in relation to accuracy. A  confederate was introduced to the participants as a 
‘professional go lf coach’. This technique was used to heighten participants’ awareness that 
they were being evaluated (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992). The coach reiterated that 
participants would be assessed on their putting technique and accuracy. In addition, a 
camera was used to heighten the evaluative process. Participants were informed that the 
video footage would be used by the University’s biomechanists (who was also present) to 
further analyse their overall performance.
Secondly, a negative scoring system was used. Participants were told that they would  
receive one point for holing a putt and minus one point for missing a putt, further point 
deductions would be made for missing additional putts required to complete the task. The
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experimenter verbalised the score after each putt. This technique was used to give 
participants the impression that they were performing to a lower level than they actually 
were. These deductions were not used for analysis.
Thirdly a competitive element was used. Participants were told that the winner o f  the 
competition would be awarded £50. Participants were also told that they would be placed 
in rank order in accordance with their overall performance. It was further stated that a 
ranking list, displaying their results would be distributed to all participants for them to 
confirm their positioning in respect o f other competitors.
Finally, an additional evaluation element was used. Participants were told that following 
the recent success o f  the European 'Ryder Cup' team the BBC was producing a 
documentary entitled 'Putting on the Pressure'. Participants were informed that as part o f  
the documentary the University had been contacted in relation to the sport science support 
that they were providing for the members o f  the English G olf Union (EGU). It was 
explained to participants that the BBC were also interested in using footage from the 
cutting edge golf research that was currently being conducted through the University.
Hence, footage from the experiment might be incorporated into the documentary, which 
was due to be broadcast in January 2005. A  confederate, possessing as a cameraman was 
introduced as an employee o f the subsidiary broadcasting company Meridian. The 
confederate used an authentic professional television camera and equipment to record phase 
one and two o f the competition.
Several measures were taken to promote an ecological valid environment. Firstly, 
participants were required to hole any missed putts. This was to prevent participants 
simplifying the task by striking the ball at an unrealistic pace to hole putts. The additional 
time taken to complete the task and the additional performance score were omitted from the 
statistical analysis. Secondly, participants played one hole at a time in accordance with g o lf  
etiquette. Thus, the winner o f each hole had the honor o f going first on the subsequent hole 
(followed by the participant who achieved the next lowest score). During each hole 
participants were required to play in sequence. The participant furthest away from the hole 
was required to play their next shot. The exception to this strategy was the first 10 putts for
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each set o f  50 trails, which were executed individually so that an average measure o f time- 
on-task could be established.
7.263. Phase A2. The second baseline phase was identical to the initial baseline 
measure. This ensured that participants returned back to their original performance level 
after the stress phase. On completion o f this phase the psychological intervention was 
introduced.
7.264. Phase C. Stress manipulation was identical to that o f  Phase B o f  the study. 
Participants were required to use the psychological strategy developed during the 
intervention phase. At the end o f the experiment, when all data had been collected, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their involvement.
7.3 RESULTS
7.31. Pre-Experimental Measures
The scores from the Reinvestment Scale and the MIQ-R are presented in Table 7.1. The 
scores from the Reinvestment Scale indicate that all three participants were high in 
reinvestment based on the criteria from the preceding study. The scores from the MIQ-R 
indicate that all three participants met the imagery proficiency level (16 or more on the 
visual and kinesthetic subscales) stipulated by Hall and Martin (1997). Therefore, 
participants did not receive formal imagery training during the intervention phase o f this 
study.
7.32. Anxiety Data (Modified CSAI-2)
The Modified CSAI-2 intensity and directional scores for somatic anxiety, cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence are presented in Table 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. The modified 
CSAI-2 was predominantly used as a stress manipulation check. A  comparison o f anxiety 
responses was made between the four phases o f  the study.
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Table 7.1. Scores for the Reinvestment Scale and Movement Imagery Questionnaire -
Revised
Reinvestment
Scale
Movement Imagery 
Questionnaire -  Revised
Visual Kinesthetic
Participant 1 15 24 24
Participant 2 14 2 0 2 2
Participant 3 14 2 0 21
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Table 7.2. Modified CSAI-2 Intensity Scores for Somatic Anxiety, Cognitive Anxiety
and Self-Confidence
A l B A2 C
Participants Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C
1 10 10 36 18 19 18 10 9 36 2 0 19 21
2 16 15 24 25 23 16 12 15 26 25 19 2 0
3 15 17 28 24 25 13 16 14 28 26 23 14
Key
Som -  Somatic Anxiety (intensity)
Cog — Cognitive Anxiety (intensity)
S-C -  Self-Confidence (intensity)
A l = Phase one -  The initial baseline measure 
B = Phase two -  The initial stress condition 
A2 = Phase three -  The second baseline measure 
C = Phase four -  The two-phase putting strategy condition
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Table 7.3. Modified CSAI-2 Direction Scores for Somatic Anxiety, Cognitive Anxiety
and Self-Confidence
A l B A2 C
Participants Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C Som Cog S-C
1 27 27 27 -1 -2 3 27 27 27 -2 -1 9
2 2 1 14 -9 -9 1 3 2 15 -9 -11 7
3 12 10 17 -3 -3 1 12 10 15 -5 -5 -1
Key
Som -  Somatic Anxiety (direction)
Cog -  Cognitive Anxiety (direction)
S-C -  Self-Confidence (direction)
A l = Phase one -  The initial baseline measure 
B = Phase two -  The initial stress condition 
A2 = Phase three -  The second baseline measure 
C = Phase four -  The two-phase putting strategy condition
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7.321. Somatic Anxiety. Participant 1 reported greater intensity scores for somatic 
anxiety in the initial stress (18) and treatment (20) conditions in comparison to the initial 
baseline (10) and second baseline (10) conditions. The directional scores for participant 1 
reported somatic anxiety to be largely more debilitative to performance in the initial stress 
(-1) and treatment (-2) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (27) and second 
baseline (27) conditions. Participant 2 also reported greater intensity scores for somatic 
anxiety in the initial stress (25) and treatment (25) conditions in comparison to the initial 
baseline (16) and second baseline (12) conditions. The directional scores for participant 2 
indicated somatic anxiety to be more debilitative to performance in the initial stress (-9) and 
treatment (-9) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (2) and second baseline (3) 
conditions. Similarly, participant 3 reported greater intensity scores for somatic anxiety in 
the initial stress (24) and treatment (26) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (15) 
and second baseline (16) conditions. The directional scores for participant 3 indicated 
somatic anxiety to be more debilitative to performance in the initial stress (-3) and 
treatment (-5) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (12) and second baseline (12) 
conditions. The intensity and directional scores for somatic anxiety suggest that stress was 
successfully manipulated in this study.
7.322. Cognitive Anxiety. Participant 1 reported greater intensity scores for 
cognitive anxiety in the initial stress (19) and treatment (19) conditions in comparison to 
the initial baseline (10) and second baseline (9) conditions. The directional scores for 
participant 1 reported cognitive anxiety to be largely more debilitative to performance in 
the initial stress (-2) and treatment (-1) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (27) 
and second baseline (27) conditions. Participant 2 also reported greater intensity scores for 
cognitive anxiety in the initial stress (23) and treatment (19) conditions in comparison to 
the initial baseline (15) and second baseline (15) conditions. The directional scores for 
participant 2 indicated cognitive anxiety to be more debilitative to performance in the initial 
stress (-9) and treatment (-11) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (1) and 
second baseline (2) conditions. Similarly, participant 3 reported greater intensity scores for 
cognitive anxiety in the initial stress (25) and treatment (23) conditions in comparison to 
the initial baseline (17) and second baseline (14) conditions. The directional scores for 
participant 3 indicated cognitive anxiety to be more debilitative to performance in the initial 
stress (-3) and treatment (-5) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (10) and
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second baseline (10) conditions. The intensity and directional scores for somatic and 
cognitive anxiety in phase one and two o f  the competition suggest that stress was 
successfully manipulated in this study.
7.323. Self-confidence. Participant 1 reported lower intensity scores for self- 
confidence in the initial stress (18) and treatment (21) conditions in comparison to the 
initial baseline (36) and second baseline (36) conditions. The directional scores for 
participant 1 reported self-confidence to be largely more debilitative to performance in the 
initial stress (3) and treatment (9) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (27) and 
second baseline (27) conditions. In addition, participant 1 reported higher levels o f self- 
confidence to be more facilitative to performance in the treatment condition in comparison 
to the initial stress condition. Participant 2 also reported lower intensity scores for self- 
confidence in the initial stress (16) and treatment (20) conditions in comparison to the 
initial baseline (24) and second baseline (26) conditions. The directional scores for 
participant 2 indicated self-confidence to be more debilitative to performance in the initial 
stress (1) and treatment (7) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (14) and second 
baseline (15) conditions. In addition, participant 2 reported higher levels o f self-confidence 
to be more facilitative to performance in the treatment condition in comparison to the initial 
stress condition. Participant 3 reported lower intensity scores for self-confidence in the 
initial stress (13) and treatment (14) conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (28) 
and second baseline (28) conditions. The directional scores for participant 3 indicated self- 
confidence to be more debilitative to performance in the initial stress (1) and treatment (-1) 
conditions in comparison to the initial baseline (17) and second baseline (15) conditions.
7.33. Putting Performance Data
The putting performance scores for each participant are presented in Figure 7.1 and Table 
7.4. Each participant indicated an increase in performance in the second stress condition in 
comparison to the initial stress condition. Further, each participant demonstrated an 
increase in performance in the second stress condition in comparison to the initial baseline 
measure. In addition, each participant performed to a similar level in the second stress 
condition in comparison to the second baseline measure. Participant three performed 
consistently better in the second stress condition than in any other phase o f  the experiment.
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Table 7.4. Golf-Putting Scores at each Experimental Phase o f the Study. Values are
Means (M) =fc Standard Deviations (SD)
A l B A2 C
Participants M SD M SD M SD M SD
1 37.75 2.06 33.0 1.63 40.0 2.16 39.75 1.26
2 38.25 2.36 33.5 3.87 39.5 2.38 37.5 4.04
3 35.0 1.41 28.75 2.87 37.5 1.29 38.25 1.71
Key
A l = Phase one -  The initial baseline measure 
B = Phase two -  The initial stress condition 
A2 = Phase three -  The second baseline measure 
C = Phase four -  The two-phase putting strategy condition
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Participant 1 improved from a mean score o f 33.0 during the initial stress condition to a 
score o f  39.75 in the treatment condition. The putting scores o f  participant 2 also improved 
from a mean score o f  33.5 in the initial stress condition to a score o f 37.5 in the treatment 
condition. Similarly, participant 3 improved performance from a mean score o f  28.75 in 
the initial stress condition to 38.25 in the treatment condition. These findings suggest that 
the two-phase putting intervention consistently improved performance. Further, it can be 
inferred that the intervention prevented golfers high in reinvestment from consciously 
processing explicit task knowledge and thus, experiencing severe performance loss under 
stress.
7.35. Mental Effort Data
The mental effort scores for each participant are presented in Table 7.5. Each participant 
reported a large decrease in mental effort in the second stress condition in comparison to 
the initial stress condition. Further, each participant reported greater mental effort in the 
initial stress phase than any other phase o f  this study. Participant 1 reported a decrease in 
mental effort from a mean score o f 120 during the initial stress condition to a score o f 50 in 
the treatment condition. The mental effort scores o f  participant 2 also decreased from a 
mean score o f 140 in the initial stress condition to a score o f  90 in the treatment condition. 
Similarly, participant 3 reported a decrease in mental effort from a mean score o f  140 in the 
initial stress condition to 30 in the treatment condition. These findings suggest that the 
two-phase putting intervention consistently reduced mental effort taken to perform the 
putting task under stress. It can be inferred that mental effort was taken up by generating 
random letters rather than the explicit putting knowledge, which high reinvesters are 
susceptible to processing under stress. Thus, suggesting that putting became secondary to 
generating random letters, which might have promoted automaticity during the task.
Finally, all participants invested greater mental effort into putting in the two baseline 
measures in comparison to the second stress condition. This suggests that the participants 
still invested considerable resources into putting, which might have detracted away from 
automatic performance, under low stress conditions.
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Table 7.5. Mental Effort Scores at each Experimental Phase o f  the Study. Values are
Means (M)
A l B A2 C
Participants M M M M
1 1 0 0 1 2 0 90 50
2 140 140 140 90
3 130 140 90 30
Key
A l = Phase one -  The initial baseline measure 
B = Phase two -  The initial stress condition 
A2 = Phase three -  The second baseline measure 
C = Phase four -  The stress intervention condition
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Table 7.6. Time-on-Task (secs.) for the First Ten Putts, for each Set o f  50 Trials at each
Experimental Phase o f  the Study. Values are Means (M) ±  Standard
Deviations (SD)
A l B A2 C
Participants M SD M SD M SD M SD
1 1 2 0 8.29 2 1 1 1 1 .2 2 168 9.00 197 5.48
2 253 2 1 .2 1 286 30.77 249 15.25 262 8 .6 6
3 187 12.69 205 15.26 158 9.64 143 4.03
Key
A l = Phase one -  The initial baseline measure 
B = Phase two -  The initial stress condition 
A2 = Phase three -  The second baseline measure 
C = Phase four -  The stress intervention condition
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7.36. Time-On-Task Data
Time-on-task for each participant is presented in Table 7.6. Each participant spent less 
time-on-task in the second stress condition in comparison to the initial stress condition. 
Participant 1 spent more-time-on-task indicated by an average time o f  211 s. during the 
initial stress condition in comparison to a time o f  197 s. in the treatment condition. 
Participant 2 also spent more-time-on-task indicated by an average time o f  286 s. during the 
initial stress condition in comparison to a time o f 262 s. in the treatment condition. 
Similarly, participant 3 spent more-time-on-task indicated by an average time o f 205 s. 
during the initial stress condition in comparison to a time o f 143 s. in the treatment 
condition. These findings suggest that the two-phase putting intervention consistently 
reduced time spent executing the putting task under stress. However, participant 1 and 2 
still spent more time-on-task in the treatment conditions than the two baseline conditions.
In contract, participant 3 spent less time-on-task in the treatment condition than the two 
baseline conditions.
7.37. Social Validation Data
At the end o f the study social validation interviews were conducted independently with 
each participant. The questions addressed to participants in the interviews served to 
establish a richer understanding o f  the intervention effectiveness, whilst assessing their 
feelings, thoughts and emotions throughout the study. Each participant was asked a series 
o f 10 questions. Participants were also asked to provide a score for questions 1 ,3 ,7 , 8 and 
9 (relating to the treatment condition) from a 7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 (not at all) 
and 7 (very much so). Social validation scores for these questions are presented in Table 
7.7.
7.371. Participant 1. In the initial stress phase participant one stated “as you get 
better and as you start playing more your expectations obviously go up, so, therefore, you 
start looking at it (the putt) more from different angles, or different ways. At the 
professional level it’s serious stuff where they take ages looking at everything (e.g. line, 
speed and destination o f putts).. .1 think the competition made me look at putts
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Table 7.7. Score for Questions 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 o f  the Social Validation Data for the 
Treatment Condition
Practical Assessment Questions Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3
Qu. 1. Were you able to use the two- 
phase putting strategy consistently 
throughout the task?
6 4 6
Qu. 3. Are you able to recall the putts 
you holed and missed? 7 6 6
Qu. 7. Did you find the two-phase 
putting strategy positive or negative? 7 6 7
Qu. 8. Would you feel confident using 
this strategy during competition? 7 6 7
Qu. 9. How smooth did your putting 
stroke feel? 7 5 7
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m ore.. .sometimes I stood over putts and, you know, I had two or three possible lines in my 
head, I couldn’t decide. Then you miss and get even more tentative. Whereas, in the 
second stress phase participant one stated “the strategy (two-phase putting intervention) 
was very basic, but good, because it helped keep things very simple. You can’t question 
things when you’re over the putt, coz, well you’re too busy thinking o f  letters. In the 
decision-making phase I found it easy to line putts up, but having that sort o f  out-of-body 
experience, seeing yourself putting (external imagery), I didn’t like that. The second phase 
though (random letter generation), that helped me to stay positive, it meant I had to choose 
one line and just go with it, coz you know you have to, you can’t do both (e.g. think o f  
several lines and generate random letters)”. In addition, participant one suggested replacing 
the first phase o f the two-phase putting strategy with random letters when faced with short 
putts. He stated “you see a putt and it’s there, you don’t need a lot o f thought about it, but I 
end up thinking too much and talk m yself out o f it. The random letters w ill help me to see 
the putt and have a go at it”.
7.372. Participant 2. In the initial stress phase participant two stated “I spend too 
much time thinking about it (the putt).. .1 stood over the ball and started dithering and 
thinking.. .1 started to pull, push, tweak and actually play the ball.. .when you square the 
club up you start thinking is it square, I might need to .. .should I .. .do I need to .. .all sorts of 
things.. .and you know that with a 5 footer your club needs to go back 3”.. .it’s after a 
couple o f bad shots, because I’ve spent so long on the set-up, I commit then think I need to 
do more -  every golfer w ill say the same, they tweak, it’s human nature, it’s competition 
and you want to do the best. One thing I do have is a photographic memory for golf, I can 
recall every bad shot I’ve ever played and from what position. I think that’s the down fall 
for me, I do that in putting and then I start tweaking it. It’s that couple o f  seconds before 
you strike the putt, that’s when things go wrong”. Whereas, in the second stress condition 
participant two stated “After about 4 or 5 putts (in the second set o f 50 trials) I was doing 
really well, then I missed a couple and started tweaking instead o f just accepting 
it .. .Whether it was the edge o f  competition -  do you stick with what you know or do you 
use something that’s new .. .slightly didn’t get into the groove at the start -  it’s purely 
because I’d reverted back to my old style o f  putting, I started questioning m yself and I 
suffered. I realized I was going wrong and went back to generating random letters. Once I 
started generating random letters again I holed putts. I am going to use that (the random
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letter generation task), I think it’s great. It’s all about commitment (referring to making a 
decision on the line o f  the putt), you need that distraction (random letters) to enable you to 
go with that line and prevent the tweaking. I need something to distract me as soon as I’ve 
picked the line o f the ball. I’m going to use that (two-phase putting strategy) not only with 
my putting, but with my irons and with my driver”.
7.373. Participant 3. In the initial stress phase participant three stated “I spent a lot 
o f time looking and thinking about it (putts), too many thoughts in my head. I spent a lot o f  
time watching everyone else’s line and putts”. Whereas in the second stress phase 
participant three stated “I was a lot more confident than in the first competition phase.. .1 
was looking at a quick line and then just hitting it (the ball). I thought a lot less than I did 
several weeks ago (initial stress phase). I wasn’t watching everyone else’s line. I was 
focused on myself. Once I had decided on a line and speed I started the second phase o f the 
putting strategy (random letters). In the decision making phase there was not much change 
to my normal routine. In the execution phase I felt like a metronome, just up, over it, 
practice swing and go. I didn’t even bother watching the ball to the hole, just stayed 
focused on the letters. I wasn’t aware o f anything when I was standing over the ball, you 
don’t have to think how smoothly the club is going through the ball that just seems to 
come. In the first competition phase I was having two or three bad putts every ten holes. I 
only had one during the whole o f  the second phase, so a massive improvement.. .best it’s 
been for a long time, in fact I don’t remember it being better. The reason for that is I spent 
less time thinking about it (putting) and it made me feel more confident”. It was a lot better 
than a few weeks ago (initial stress phase) because you know I was trying too hard, I got 
behind and then you try even harder and I was watching everybody’s putt and everybody’s 
line, trying to get back and they were sinking theirs (putts) and I’d still got to take mine, but 
in the second competition phase I felt confident in my putting stroke”.
In response to the social validation procedure all the participants stated that both 
competition phases were very important to them, that the treatment facilitated their 
performance, in particular the random letter generation task. Further, all the participants 
stated that they would feel confident in using the two-phase putting strategy in a normal 
competitive environment.
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7.4 DISCUSSION
The aim o f this study was to examine whether a two-phase psychological putting 
intervention could promote automaticity and, in turn, enhance the performance o f skilled 
golfers, in an ecologically valid environment, who were susceptible to severe performance 
loss under stress. The scores from the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) indicated 
that stress was manipulated as all three participants reported higher intensity levels o f  
somatic and cognitive anxiety and that this anxiety was more debilitative in phases one and 
two o f the competition, in comparison to the two baseline conditions.
Hypothesis one, which stated that golfers would experience a decrement in putting 
performance under stress without the use o f  a psychological intervention, was supported 
(phase B). Golfers high in reinvestment are predisposed to conscious processing, which 
can disrupt automaticity under stress (Masters et al. 1993). This was supported by the 
social validation interviews which indicted that all three participants were consistently over 
analytical (thinking too much about putts), questioning o f their decision making (e.g. 
negative and apprehensive) and preoccupied with making changes to their putting stroke 
during the initial stress phase. The findings o f the present study support the conscious 
processing hypothesis (Masters et al., 1993) and the constrained-action hypothesis (W ulf et 
al., 2002). It was proposed that all three participants adopted an internal, movement-related 
focus (Wulf et al., 2000) during their performance in the initial stress phase. This focus 
increased the demands on working memory through the processing o f  explicit task 
knowledge and thus disrupted the implicit, automatic regulation o f  the skill and ultimately 
impaired performance.
Hypothesis two, which stated golfers using the two-phase psychological intervention would 
be able to maintain their putting score in a stress experimental condition (phase C) was 
supported. In the social validation interviews all three participants reported thinking less in 
both the decision making and execution phase o f each putt, in comparison to the initial 
stress condition. They also reported feeling positive and self-confident in their decision 
making and fluid in their putting stroke. Further, they indicated having little or no 
awareness o f  their putting action during execution.
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The problem, particularly for skilled golfers, high in reinvestment, appears to lie in their 
inability to switch from left (e.g. conscious; analytical) to right (e.g. creative; automatic) 
brain functioning between the decision making and execution phases o f  putts. Further, 
even when skills are being executed via right brain activity it would appear that such 
individuals still often revert back to left brain, conscious processing, particularly when 
questioning their ability in situations open to appraisal. This is indicative o f  high 
reinvesters who tend to be left-brain dominant when attempting to execute motor skills 
under stress (Crews, 2001). Clearly, during the decision making phase o f  golf putting 
conscious attention is required to assess the undulation and grain o f  the green; this requires 
some left-brain functioning. It was proposed that phase one o f the putting intervention 
enabled the participants to visualize the appropriate line, speed and destination prior to each 
putt. Further, it was speculated that an external imagery perspective might discourage the 
processing o f movement-based mechanisms that could be associated with more intrinsic- 
based imagery perspectives (e.g. internal /  kinesthetic). Presumably, external imagery also 
minimized load on working memory and helps the motor system to self-organise more 
natural when skill execution takes place. Clearly, future research needs to investigate the 
effects o f different imagery perspectives on motor control systems.
During the execution phase, skilled golfers carry out putts automatically; this requires right- 
brain functioning. It was proposed that phase two o f the putting intervention promoted 
right-brain activity and thus, enabled participants to consistently execute putts 
automatically. In addition, it was proposed that during the putting execution phase 
participants became desensitized to state anxiety and stress (e.g. self-regulated verbal 
distractions and conscious processing), which supports the contention o f Hardy et al.
(1996). In phase two o f the putting intervention participants were prevented from 
processing explicit task knowledge and self-regulated verbal distractions, owing to the 
demands imposed on working memory by the secondary task. It was suggested that this 
elicited a sustained switch from left to right-brain functioning, which promoted an implicit, 
automatically regulated putting stroke and, in turn, consistent performance during each putt 
under stress. These findings also support the work o f Crews (2001) who found that golfers 
that use techniques to promote right-brain functioning are more adept at dealing with stress 
than those who are more left-brain oriented.
210
All three participants reported investing greater mental effort into their putting strokes in 
the initial stress phase than any other phase o f  this study. Further, all participants reported 
a large decrease in mental effort in the second stress condition in comparison to the initial 
stress condition. These findings support the contention that an internal, explicit task focus 
increases the load on working memory whereas an external, implicit task focus minimises 
loading on working memory (Maxwell et al., 2001; 2002; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). 
In the social validation interviews all participants reported ‘trying too hard’ and ‘feeling the 
need to do more’ in the initial stress condition, which led them to investing large amounts 
o f  mental effort into their putting action. Whereas, in the second stress condition 
participants reported being able to create a ‘smooth’ and ‘automatic’ putting stroke, without 
having to focus on explicit task knowledge (e.g. technique). Thus, suggesting that prior to 
the introduction o f the putting strategy participants felt the need to focus on technique in 
order to recreate a ‘smooth’ and ‘automatic’ putting stroke. It was proposed that the two- 
phase putting intervention consistently reduced the investment o f mental effort into the 
putting task under stress. Further, it was suggested that mental effort was invested into 
generating random letters rather than the technical aspects o f putting performance. Thus, 
suggesting that putting became secondary to generating random letters, which might have 
helped the motor system to naturally self-organise, unconstrained by conscious control.
All three participants spent less time-on-task in the second stress condition in comparison 
to the initial stress condition. These findings suggest that the two-phase putting 
intervention consistently reduced time spent evaluating and executing the putting task 
under stress. In the social validation interviews all participants reported spending ‘too 
much time thinking’ about each putt during the initial stress condition. In contrast, when 
competing in the second stress condition participants reported the two-phase putting 
strategy to help ‘keep things simple’ by making a decision on the line and ‘just putting’. O f 
specific interest to this study was that participant 3 spent less time-on-task than all other 
phases o f  this study. It was proposed that encouraging participants to keep the time they 
spent evaluating and executing each putt under stress consistent with the baseline 
conditions helped prevent over-analysis, whilst also promoting decisive decision making.
O f specific interest to this study were the results o f  the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones,
1992) in comparison to the statements made in the social validation interview. In
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accordance with the modified CSAI-2 all participants reported a decrease in self- 
confidence, which were perceived to be more detrimental to performance prior to the two 
stress phases in comparison to the two baseline measures. The intensity and direction 
scores for self-confidence were marginally higher in the second stress condition in 
comparison to the initials stress condition. Be that as it may, there was still a 
comparatively larger difference in self-confidence intensity and directional scores between 
the second stress phase and the baseline measures. In accordance with the social validation 
interviews all the participants stated feeling more self-confident and /  or positive in their 
putting stroke during the second stress condition in comparison to the initial stress 
condition. This discrepancy in self-confidence between the modified CSAI-2 scores 
reported prior to performance and the retrospective social validation statements that 
reflected on experiences during performance suggest that there were changes in the 
participants’ perceptions. It was proposed that participants’ self-confidence was enhanced 
by the combination o f an automatic putting stroke (promoted by the random letter 
generation task), a consistent putting routine, and a successful performance outcome. 
Clearly, future research needs to assess perceptions and interpretations o f  self-confidence 
and state anxiety in high reinvesters when using the two-phase putting strategy in an 
ecologically valid competitive environment.
A  consideration when conducting a single subject intervention study is the possible change 
in performance which occurs simply as a result o f  being in a study, this is known as the 
Hawthorne effect (Drew, 1976). It is the contention o f  Pates and Maynard (2000) that the 
scrutiny o f  performers in a single subject design might heighten this effect. Drew (1976), 
however, did acknowledge that this effect was reduced as participants became accustomed 
to the study. During this study participants were required to attend twenty sessions, over a 
period o f  ten weeks. Thus, it was suggested that the combination o f the amount o f  sessions 
and duration o f  the study might have controlled for this effect.
There is a potential limitation with the experimental design o f this study that needs to be 
addressed. The ABAC design meant that the treatment phase was the final stage o f  the 
study. Hence, a criticism o f  this study is that participants might have continued to improve 
throughout the study, and then peaked during the last phase. In the repeated baseline 
condition, scores returned back to baseline following a decrease in performance under
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stress, which might have controlled for this limitation. Other single subject design studies 
have provided additional evidence that support the effectiveness o f their intervention 
strategies. Pates and Maynard (2000) used an ABACB design, which enabled them to ‘turn 
o f f  the intervention during the final stage o f their study. This might have allowed them to 
observe, more accurately, the impact o f  the intervention. However, in the present study it 
was not possible to reverse the intervention process by virtue o f  the fact that the 
participants had been exposed to new psychological skills; nor was it deemed ethical. Due 
to participants’ personality characteristics and susceptibility to the negative effects o f stress 
it was felt that they should complete the study with a positive perception o f performance. 
Hence, the final phase o f the study was the treatment condition.
One o f  the aims o f this study was to test a two-phase putting intervention in an ecologically 
valid environment. The psychological intervention was tested on a natural putting surface, 
in accordance with ‘Royal and Ancient’ golf competition etiquette and rules. However, a 
limitation o f  this study is that the experimental task did not accurately reflect the true nature 
of competitive golf. Throughout competition golfers are required to play a range o f  
different strokes and putts on a variety o f fairways and greens. In addition, golfers have 
long periods o f time to reflect on poor performance, between shots. Although the 
participants did have time to reflect between putts, as they played alternatively, this was not 
representative o f playing a round o f golf. Hence, it was suggested that the putting 
intervention was tested in an ecologically valid environment, but that the strategy might not 
be ecologically valid per se. Nevertheless, all participants in this study stated that they 
would feel confident using the intervention out on the course, in a golf competition.
Further, it is not known to what extent the two-phase putting intervention can be adapted to 
longer putts or indeed, other go lf strokes, where conscious processing might occur.
Future research should investigate whether the two-phase putting intervention can be 
successfully taken on to the course and adapted to a range o f  putting scenarios during a go lf  
competition. In addition, further research should examine whether the psychological 
intervention can be adapted to other shots played during a round o f  golf. Finally, research 
should also investigate whether this type o f psychological intervention could be adapted to 
athletes that are susceptible to conscious processing under stress in additional sports such as 
those investigated in study one; basketball, tennis, squash, cricket, and football.
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8 .0 . SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1. INTRODUCTION
The final chapter o f this thesis comprises three sections: first, a summary section that 
provides detail o f the central aims o f the research programme and outlines the key 
findings of the five studies. Second, the discussion section highlights theoretical and 
research issues, the central practical implications derived from the research programme, 
the strengths and limitations of the studies and recommendations for future research in 
the domain o f severe performance loss in competitive sport. The final section draws 
together the conclusions of the thesis.
8.2. SUMMARY
Paucity research has attempted to offer explanations as to why athletes occasionally 
experience a severe loss of performance when competing; definitive explanations elude 
sport psychologists and researchers. Previous research has not explored, from a 
qualitative perspective, the interactive nature of dominant psychological mechanisms 
that underpin severe performance loss, nor have specific intervention strategies been 
identified that counteract this phenomenon in an ecologically valid environment. 
Therefore, the central purpose of this thesis was to examine in detail psychological 
mechanisms that underpin severe performance loss in competitive sport. The main aims 
of this thesis were to identify dominant psychological mechanisms that underpin severe 
performance loss in competitive sport, examine how such mechanisms interact and 
establish coping strategies to counteract the phenomenon.
Masters et al.’s (1993) model of skill failure underpressure and Baumeister’s (1984) 
model of choking under pressure have largely influenced the direction of research into 
performance deterioration under stress. However, the mechanisms that underpin such 
models have been derived from limited research and possess no empirical or qualitative 
grounding in sport. Further, the research underpinning these theories has produced 
equivocal findings (Maxwell et al., 2000). Therefore, an eclectic research programme, 
incorporating qualitative and quantitative methods, was designed to establish a richer 
understanding o f the relationship between dominant mechanisms that underpin severe 
performance loss and strategies to counteract the phenomenon.
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The aim of the first study was to explore psychological mechanisms derived from the 
perceptions and interpretations of athletes that had experienced, first hand, severe 
performance loss in sport. Through such an examination the value o f the available 
theories used in the literature to explain this phenomenon, and the perceptions of 
athletes, could be explored. Study two examined the effect of dispositional mechanisms 
and skilled motor performance upon severe performance loss under stress. Study three 
examined the relationship between dispositional mechanisms and different learning 
methods on severe performance loss under stress. The final two studies explored 
psychological intervention strategies that could counteract severe performance loss 
under stress in those predisposed to this phenomenon.
8.21. Psychological Mechanisms that Underpin Severe Performance Loss in 
Competitive Sport
8.211. Study 1. The rationale for study one was to access a richer understanding 
of severe performance loss in sport using qualitative techniques. Previous research has 
exclusively used quantitative, outcome-based measures to examine this phenomenon 
without a qualitatively derived understanding (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy, Mullen, & 
Jones, 1996; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Masters, 1992; Masters et al, 1993). Participants 
were selected from a pool of'Sporting Experience Surveys' administered equally 
amongst different sporting groups. Semi-structured interviews were conducted on 
participants who ranged from club to national level in soccer (1) golf (1), cricket (3), 
squash (1), tennis (3) and basketball (1). Inductive techniques (Scanlan et al., 1991) 
applied to the transcribed data produced eight general dimensions that were descriptors 
of the overall experiences of the athletes: antecedents, cognitive changes, somatic / 
emotional changes, movement / technical /  sensation characteristics, lack of control / 
understanding, situational factors, personality characteristics and types of competition. 
The dominant, interrelated high-order themes were: ‘pressure’, ‘cognitive and somatic 
changes’, ‘inappropriate foci’ (e.g., self-absorbed), ‘task focus’, and Tack of control of 
outcome’ (e.g., automaticity disruption).
The findings o f this study supported self-focused attention rather than distraction 
theories as an explanation o f severe performance loss in sport. Specifically, 
mechanisms underpinning the athletes’ experiences followed a similar sequence of
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events outlined in Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis. Additional 
interrelated themes were identified that have not previously emerged in the literature. 
These themes were ‘disruption to perception and sensation’, ‘compensatory strategies’ 
and the ‘need to escape’. It was proposed that ‘disruption to perception and sensation’ 
served as a precursor to athletes becoming preoccupied with the task components and 
the process of skill execution, which led to conscious processing and disruption of 
automaticity. Consequently, ‘compensatory strategies’ were adopted in an attempt to 
recreate ‘normal’ movement sensation and successful skill execution. This ironically 
served only to promote greater conscious processing, automaticity disruption and the 
‘need to escape’.
Athletes in this study possessed common characteristics. Two commonly reported 
characteristics central to the problem were ‘directing focus to the process o f the task’ 
and ‘self-absorption’ during performance. Both constructs have been linked to 
dimensions of personality, but possess conflicting elements in the literature 
(Baumeister, 1984; Masters et al., 1993). Hence, the next step was to examine whether 
or not there are personality characteristics that make some performers more susceptible 
to conscious processing of explicit task knowledge than others, particularly while 
experiencing stress.
8.212. Study 2. Study two examined whether or not performers with specific 
personality characteristics (assessed by the Reinvestment Scale) were susceptible to 
severe performance loss under stress. The predictive power of the Reinvestment Scale 
using a well learned (automatic) gross, dynamic motor skill was also assessed. Fourteen 
experienced male university soccer players participated in this study. As measured by 
the Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993), the two experimental groups consisted of 
participants who dispositionally were either high or low in reinvestment. All 
participants were required to perform a wall-volley soccer task (McMorris et al., 1994), 
which involved kicking a ball repeatedly against a wall target zone for 90 s, under 
conditions of high and low stress. The ARS (Cox et al., 1996) was completed prior to 
each condition to assess stress manipulation and the participants’ levels and 
interpretations of anxiety.
The ARS scores indicated that stress was successfully manipulated in this study. 
Performance results indicated that high reinvesters were more prone to conscious
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processing and automaticity disruption than low reinvesters. The findings o f this study 
clearly support the predictive power of the Reinvestment Scale. The next step was to 
examine ways to minimising the accumulation of explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition. This was to establish whether or not by doing so could enhance the 
performance of athletes who were predisposed to conscious processing under stress.
8.22. How Psychological Mechanisms Interact within Severe Performance Loss
8.221. Study 3. Study three investigated the effects o f different learning 
methods and reinvestment on performance under stress. Both reinvestment and learning 
style have been independently identified in the literature as key mechanisms in the 
performance loss; however, the combined effects o f such mechanisms had not been 
assessed. The intent was to assess whether limiting explicit knowledge during skill 
acquisition could prevent performance loss, precipitated by conscious processing in 
individuals predisposed to reinvestment. Implicit learning styles using a dual task 
paradigm have been found to suppress the accumulation of explicit task knowledge at 
the expense of skill development (Hardy et al., 1996; Masters 1992; Maxwell et al., 
2000). Participants either dispositionally high or low in reinvestment (Masters et al.,
1993) learned a basketball task using either a holistic or process method. This study 
chose a holistic method of learning over an implicit method of learning owing to the 
ramifications of using a dual task paradigm. The process learning method was 
developed in accordance with Masters’ (1992) explicit learning protocol. The 
effectiveness o f the two methods was examined under low and high stress conditions. 
The ARS (Cox et al., 1996) was completed prior to each condition to assess stress 
manipulation and the participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety.
Performance scores indicated that the low reinvestment group maintained performance 
under high stress, regardless o f the learning method. The high reinvestment group who 
learned holistically also maintained performance under high stress; however, those who 
learned using a process method demonstrated a decrement in performance under stress.
It was proposed that by minimising explicit knowledge during skill learning conscious 
processing could be avoided in those predisposed to conscious processing under stress.
8.223. Study 4. Study one of this thesis called for an appropriate focus and 
compensatory strategies to be established that facilitate rather than impair performance.
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The findings o f study three indicated that minimising the accumulation of explicit task 
knowledge during skill acquisition was effective in preventing conscious processing and 
maintaining performance under stress. However, given that coaches still consistently 
use orthodox, rule-based coaching styles these findings are inapplicable to skilled 
athletes who already possess a pool of explicit task knowledge. Study four investigated 
the use of different attentional foci and articulatory suppression on skilled golfers, high 
in reinvestment (Masters et al., 1993) to establish whether conscious processing could 
be prevented. Twelve skilled male golfers, possessing a handicap of 15 or less, 
completed a series of five-foot putts under low stress (baseline) then in three different 
foci conditions under stress: internal-process, external-holistic and arbitrary-random 
letter generation. The ARS (Cox et al., 1996), used in studies two and three to assess 
anxiety, had limitations. Hence, the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) was 
completed prior to each condition to assess stress manipulation and the participants’ 
levels and interpretations of anxiety. To explore the conflicting predictions o f the 
processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and the conscious processing 
hypothesis (Masters, 1992) time-on-task and mental effort (Zijlstra, 1993) were 
assessed; semi-structured interviews were also conducted after each condition.
The modified CSAI-2 scores indicated that stress was successfully manipulated in this 
study. Putting scores indicated that when the arbitrary-random letter generation focus 
was adopted participants maintained performance under stress. However, when the 
internal-process focus was adopted participants demonstrated a decrement in 
performance. Further, findings indicated that when adopting the external-holistic focus 
participants were encouraged to execute the task via automaticity. However, 
participants still lapsed into bouts of conscious processing, particularly after missing 
putts, which impaired performance under stress. Participants spent significantly more 
time-on-task in the internal-process and external-holistic conditions compared with the 
baseline measure. Based on the findings of the interviews, it was suggested that this 
additional time was used to focus on explicit task knowledge, which exacerbated the 
deautomatisation process. In contrast, participants spent a similar length o f  time-on- 
task in the arbitrary-random letter generation condition compared with the baseline 
measure. It was speculated that participants in this condition could not access explicit 
task knowledge or process negative cognitions, which can take up additional time and 
resources when performing (Masters, 1992).
219
In summary, adopting an internal-process focus can promote conscious processing, 
which disrupts automaticity and impairs performance under stress. Adopting an 
external-holistic focus can promote automaticity, but bouts o f conscious processing still 
occur, particularly after missing putts, which impairs performance under stress. Finally, 
adopting an arbitrary-random letter generation focus can desensitise high reinvesters to 
stress. Loading on working memory can counteract conscious processing and promote 
automaticity, which enables consistent performance under stress.
8.23. Intervention Strategies to Counteract Severe Performance Loss
8.231. Study 5. The rationale for study five was based on the lack of ecological 
validity o f the preceding study, which consequently prevents the findings being 
extrapolated to golf or indeed, other sports. This study investigated whether a two- 
phase psychological putting intervention could promote automaticity and enhance the 
performance of skilled golfers, high in reinvestment, from experiencing severe 
performance loss in ecologically valid conditions under stress. A single subject 
replication-reversal (ABAC) design was used for this study. Three skilled male golfers, 
possessing a handicap of 10 or less, completed a series o f five-foot putts in low and high 
stress conditions. During the intervention phase of the study golfers learnt a putting 
strategy consisting of two phases: a decision making phase (which involved imaging 
externally the correct direction, speed and destination prior to the execution of each 
putt) and an execution phase (which involved generating random letters internally 
during the execution of each putt). The modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) was 
completed prior to each experimental phase to assess stress manipulation and the 
participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety. Time-on-task and mental effort 
(Zijlstra, 1993) were assessed. To establish a richer understanding o f the intervention 
effectiveness semi-structured interviews were also conducted.
The modified CSAI-2 scores indicated that stress was successfully manipulated in this 
study. Putting scores indicated that performance was greatly improved in the second 
stress phase (post-intervention) compared with the initial stress phase. All golfers 
reported a large decrease in mental effort in the second stress phase compared with the 
initial stress phase. In the semi-structured interviews all participants reported ‘trying 
too hard’ and ‘feeling the need to do more’ in the initial stress phase; it was speculated 
that this led them to invest undue mental effort into their putting action. In the second
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stress phase, however, participants reported being able to create a ‘smooth’ and 
‘automatic’ putting stroke, without having to focus on explicit task knowledge (e.g. 
technique). All participants spent less time-on-task in the second stress phase compared 
with the initial stress phase. These findings suggest that the two-phase putting 
intervention consistently reduced time spent evaluating and executing the putting task 
under stress. In the interviews all participants reported spending ‘too much time 
thinking’ about each putt during the initial stress phase. In contrast, when competing in 
the second stress phase participants reported the intervention strategy to help ‘keep 
things simple’ by making a decision on the line and ‘just putting’. All participants in 
this study stated that they would feel confident using the intervention during 
competition.
It was proposed that the putting strategy counteracted conscious processing and elicited 
desensitisation to stress (Hardy et al., 1996) in skilled golfers high in reinvestment. 
Moreover, this intervention enabled performers to visualize externally the appropriate 
line prior to each putt. It was speculated that this helped to promote right-brain, 
automatic functioning during putting execution which produced consistent performance.
8.3. DISCUSSION
8.31. Theoretical and Measurement Issues
The following section outlines the main theoretical implications that have arisen from 
the programme of research. This is followed by an outline o f the measurement issues 
relating to the Reinvestment Scale and the ARS, the central inventories used in this 
thesis.
8.311. Theoretical Issues. Baumeister’s (1984) model o f choking under pressure 
and Masters et al.’s (1993) model of skill failure underpressure have largely directed 
the current research into performance deterioration under stress. However, there are 
three main issues with the two models: first, the mechanisms associated with such 
models have been derived from paucity research, possessing no empirical or qualitative 
grounding in sport. Second, there are conflicting elements between the two models on 
dispositional factors and explicit knowledge accessibility during the execution o f well 
learned skills. Third, previous research has made assumptions about the information
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processing systems used during such phenomena, based predominantly on quantitative, 
outcome-based measures alone (Baumeister, 1984; Hardy et al, 1996; Lewis & Linder, 
1997; Masters, 1992; Masters et al, 1993).
First, Baumeister (1984) proposed that when a skill becomes automatic the explicit 
knowledge of that skill is inaccessible to the conscious attention to guide performance 
in times of stress thus, performance is impaired. In contrast, Masters et al. (1993; 
Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992) argued that explicit knowledge of an 
automatic skill is readily available to the conscious attention to reinvest in under stress, 
which disrupts automaticity and impairs performance. Second, Baumeister (1984) 
contended that individuals dispositionally low in self-consciousness have a greater 
propensity to experience decrements in performance under pressure, whereas Masters et 
al. (1993) argued that it is those dispositionally high in self-consciousness that are more 
prone to performance decrements under pressure.
The qualitative data, derived from perceptions and interpretation o f experienced athletes 
in this thesis (see studies one, four, and five), has allowed the value o f Baumeister’s 
(1984) and Masters et al.’s (1993) models to be examined. For this reason, the 
programme of research has helped to remedy the conflicting elements between the two 
explanations and overcome some limitations of the research that underpins such 
theories. First, the contention that explicit knowledge is no longer consciously available 
to guide performance in order to prevent decrements in performance under pressure 
(Baumeister, 1984) was not supported by the findings of the thesis. In comparison, 
participants commonly reported rehearsing the component parts o f a specific motor 
schema during competition. Additionally, participants also commonly reported using 
compensatory strategies. Participants began to use additional conscious strategies, in 
the movement characteristics of the task, which normally were executed automatically. 
This, ironically, led to a similar focus that had elicited performance loss in the first 
place and only served as a catalyst further to disrupt the normal skill sequence 
repertoire. Hence, the qualitative data collected throughout this thesis offer support to 
Masters et al.’s (1993; Masters, 1992) model of skill failure under pressure.
Second, Baumeister (1984) reported that individuals dispositionally low in self- 
consciousness were more prone to decrements in performance under pressure. In 
comparison, participants involved in the programme of research consistently reported
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being preoccupied with their feelings and thoughts (self-absorption), and having self- 
presentational concerns during their performance, which implied that they were high in 
self-consciousness. This process was heightened by 'too much time to think' about a 
particular skill, which in turn magnified concerns about being negatively evaluated by 
others. Consistent qualitative findings of the thesis offer further support for Masters et 
al.’s (1993) model o f skill failure underpressure.
Finally, the main findings of this programme offer empirical and qualitative support for 
the psychological mechanisms that underpin Masters et al.’s (1993) model of skill 
failure under pressure. In particular, the qualitative data (in studies one, four and five) 
have gone partway to bridging the gap between the assumption that conscious 
processing systems are used to execute motor tasks during the occurrence of severe 
performance loss based on outcome measures. Further, the secondary task (e.g. random 
letter generation task) used in studies four and five has also helped to bridge the gap 
between such assumptions. For example, using such a secondary task loads heavily on 
the central executive and phonological loop, which suppresses working memory. As a 
consequence this process promotes automatic, right brain activity as conscious 
processing is no longer feasible.
In summary, although consistent support was found for Masters and his colleagues’ 
model this thesis still generated additional common mechanisms associated with severe 
performance loss in competitive sport that have not been reported previously (see 
Section 8.211). This suggests that the sequence of events outlined by Masters et al.’s 
(1993) model is by no means complete in explaining the severe performance loss 
phenomenon. Moreover, there are still limitations with their model, particularly with 
the Reinvestment Scale, that need to be overcome (see Section 8.313).
8.312. Long Term Performance Disorders. Finally, the learning (e.g., holistic) 
and performance (e.g., articulatory suppression task) intervention strategies investigated 
throughout this programme of research might counter long-term forms o f skill 
breakdown such as the ‘yips’. The ‘yips’ is a long-term motor disorder and is thought 
to affect finely controlled motor skills by causing involuntary movement during 
execution (McDaniel et al., 1989). The ‘yips’ has been reported to induce a sudden and 
severe loss in performance similar to that of skill failure under pressure. Recent 
research has identified psychological mechanisms such as self-consciousness, conscious
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processing and automaticity disruption as key psychological factors in the ‘yips’ 
phenomenon (Bawden & Maynard, 2001).
It could be hypothesised that a one-off experience where severe performance loss 
ensued could elicit negative expectation and a fear of failure, two constructs generated 
from study one (see Section 3.31), when faced with a similar situation. Hence, such 
constructs might have lead to the same experience reoccurring, which in turn could 
result in behaviour impairment and essentially, the ‘yips’. Athletes, in study one, who 
made statements such as “It’s always in the back o f your mind, if it can happen once it 
can happen again” and “I still now sometimes feel mechanical and that is five years 
later” typifies this. Thus, from the findings of this thesis it is plausible that in certain 
circumstances severe performance loss could be a precursor to the ‘yips’ disorder. 
Therefore, both the learning and performance intervention strategies identified by this 
programme of research to counteract the negative effects o f stress should be explored by 
practitioners as possible techniques to prevent the onset or indeed reverse the ‘yips’ 
phenomenon. However, it is important to acknowledge that the link made between the 
‘yips’ and severe performance loss is speculative as investigations into the ‘yips’ 
phenomenon were outside the remit of this research programme.
8.313. Reinvestment Scale. Throughout this programme of research the 
Reinvestment Scale was used as a predictor of severe performance loss under stress.
This inventory is based on dispositional characteristics that are clearly related to this 
phenomenon. However, this scale offers a measurement o f an individual’s cognitive 
predisposition, rather than the direct assessment o f specific information processing 
systems used during performance. Therefore, the differing attentional processes 
claimed to underpin the performances of low and high reinvesters were assumed in this 
study. It is the author’s belief that the qualitative data collected throughout this thesis 
successfully strengthened such assumptions. Nevertheless, this does not offer 
conclusive evidence that conscious processing o f  an automatic skill sequence is the 
central tenet in the severe performance loss phenomenon.
Study one of this thesis identified ‘task focus’ and ‘tension’ to be prevalent in the 
occurrence of severe performance loss. By regression to a conscious processing system 
there is a tendency to re-freeze the degrees of freedom in the distal joints, similar to that 
of the early stages of learning (Fuchs, 1962). Thus, to bridge the gap fully between
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dimensions o f personality, conscious processing and outcome-based measures o f severe 
performance loss a greater understanding o f kinematic changes in performance is 
necessary. In addition, electrocardiogram (ECG) and electromyogram (EMG) should 
also be examined so that changes in brain wave and muscle activity can be identified.
Finally, as explained in study one of this thesis the Reinvestment Scale incorporates all 
the items from the Public and Private subscales of the Dispositional Self-consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Hence, high reinvesters are considered to be highly self- 
conscious and thus, more likely to become anxious and stressed in conditions open to 
appraisal (Maxwell et al., 2000). Further, high reinvesters, because of their high self- 
consciousness, might also possess higher trait anxiety than low reinvesters.
Unpublished data referred to by Maxwell et al. (2000) indicated a significant correlation 
(r = 0.55, P < 0.05) between the Reinvestment Scale and the trait section of the State- 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1970). This suggests that high reinvesters 
are likely to be more anxious than low reinvesters, which might account for differences 
in performance between the two groups seen throughout this thesis. Clearly, research 
needs to clarify what it is that such trait inventories actually measure and how they 
interrelate if  the understanding o f the stress-rehearsal-performance breakdown 
occurrence is to evolve.
8.314. State Anxiety Assessment. Two interrelated mechanisms that underpin 
severe performance loss in sport are stress and anxiety. A limitation of previous 
research that has investigated these phenomena is the unsatisfactory way such 
mechanisms have been assessed. In an attempt to remedy this limitation this 
programme of research used self-report anxiety measures. Studies two and three of this 
thesis used the Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS) (Cox et al., 1996), a condensed version of 
the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) (Martens et al., 1990) to assess 
stress manipulation and participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety. The ARS 
comprises 3 items. Each item relates to one of the 3 subscales (somatic anxiety, 
cognitive anxiety & self-confidence) on the original CSAI-2 and possesses sufficient 
reliability (Cox et al., 1996). A direction scale was incorporated into the questionnaire. 
This was adapted from the modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992), but possessed no 
psychometric data. The rationale for using the ARS was based on its simplicity and 
short user-friendly format. The adapted directional scale was used to develop a greater 
understanding of the participants’ perception and interpretation of anxiety.
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Clearly, stress was successfully manipulated in studies two and three o f this thesis. 
However, the changes in ARS intensity and direction scores for the three subscales that 
took place between studies two (see Section 4.31) and three (see Section 5.33) for low 
and high reinvesters under stress were inconsistent. The reasons proposed for this 
anomaly were two fold: first, the intensity scale was not sensitive enough to identify an 
accurate and consistent level of state anxiety due to the limitations associated with 
single item measures (Krane, 1994). Second, the adapted direction scale had no 
psychometric qualities established. For this reason studies four and five used the 
Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory -  2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) to assess 
stress manipulation and participants’ levels and interpretations of anxiety. The 
modified CSAI-2 possesses adequate reliability for the intensity and directional 
components of the three anxiety subscales. Clearly, the modified CSAI-2 indicated 
consistent changes in scores for intensity and direction across the three subscales under 
stress in studies four (see Section 6.31) and five (see Section 7.32) of this thesis. 
However, studies four and five only investigated participants who were high in 
reinvestment.
As discussed earlier in this section high reinvesters are considered to be highly self- 
conscious and thus, more likely to become anxious and stressed in conditions open to 
appraisal (Maxwell et al., 2000). Thus, high reinvesters, because o f their high self- 
consciousness, might also possess higher trait anxiety than low reinvesters. Because of  
the structure of studies four and five o f this thesis it is not known whether the modified 
CSAI-2 is able to produce more accurate and consistent state anxiety data in individuals’ 
low in reinvestment. Future research should investigate state anxiety, precipitated by 
stress in low reinvesters using the modified CSAI-2. In the mean time caution should 
be taken when administering the ARS in future research due to the limitations of using 
single-item measures (Krane, 1994).
8.4. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
This programme of research has raised important implications for practitioners working 
with sports performers. The results o f this thesis indicate the Reinvestment Scale 
(Masters et al., 1993) to be a strong predictor o f severe performance loss, in both gross 
dynamic and fine static motor skills. These findings also indicate that this scale could 
be used as an awareness tool for coaches and practitioners so that appropriate support
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can be provided for performers susceptible to conscious processing in an attempt to 
prevent this phenomenon. However, further research needs to assess the Reinvestment 
Scale in ecologically valid sport setting, across a range of sports. In addition, findings 
from study three o f this thesis indicated that high reinvesters who acquired skills 
through a limited pool of explicit knowledge were able to perform consistently under 
stress. Thus, coaches and practitioners should be cautious when interpreting score from 
the Reinvestment Scale in performers who have acquired skills with minimal explicit 
knowledge.
A primary consideration bome out of the findings of this thesis is to ensure that explicit 
task knowledge accumulation is kept to a minimum during skill acquisition (Masters, 
1992). A further consideration is to ensure that conscious processing of automatic skills 
under stress does not take place in performers who have already developed a pool of 
explicit task knowledge through orthodox learning methods (Masters et al., 1993). The 
findings from study three indicated that by minimising explicit task knowledge during 
skill acquisition, performance impairment precipitated by conscious processing under 
stress could be avoided, particularly in those predisposed to this phenomenon.
Study three has practical implications for coaches and sport psychologists that are two 
fold. First, the findings question the orthodox coaching strategies commonly used in 
sport. Perhaps coaches should minimise the amount of explicit knowledge that is given 
to athletes during skill acquisition. As a consequence, athletes might develop holistic 
skills that are implicitly regulated and unconstrained by conscious control (Wulf, 
McNevin, & Shea, 2001). This process would minimise the opportunity for conscious 
processing, which is of particular importance to those predisposed to this problem. 
However, minimising explicit knowledge during skill acquisition might be less 
beneficial in such sports as rock climbing, than in fast-ball sports like tennis as the role 
of explicit and implicit learning strategies will vary as a function o f task demands.
Thus, explicit instruction might play more o f a central role in the successful 
performance o f strategic sports (e.g., rock climbing) compared with fast ball sports (e.g., 
tennis) where implicit regulation of skills could be required for effective performance 
(Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996). Furthermore, it is not known how these learning 
methods might affect the long-term technical development of such skills. Clearly, 
further research is required in this area to examine the effect o f explicit knowledge
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reduction during skill acquisition on a variety of different sports using longitudinal 
research designs.
A second practical implication for coaches and sport psychologists is that research has 
endorsed the use o f  technical-orientated goals, which require athletes to focus on 
specific components o f a skill during performance (Kingston, Hardy, & Markland 1992; 
Orlick & Partington, 1988). The present findings challenge the effectiveness of using 
technical-oriented goals. Coaches and sport psychologists advising athletes to focus on 
multiple technical-orientated goals might serve as a catalyst for conscious processing 
rather than automaticity. Based on the findings in this thesis the use o f holistic goals 
which focus on more global aspects of performance could be more beneficial to athletes. 
However further, research is needed to examine the impact of holistic goals on a variety 
of sports and skills.
A further consideration for practitioners is the use of articulatory suppression of already 
accumulated explicit task knowledge to counteract the negative effects o f conscious 
processing. In study four of this thesis, using a secondary task to load on working 
memory ensured that individuals who were prone to reinvestment became desensitised 
to stress and thus, could not access explicit task knowledge or be aware o f self-regulated 
verbal distractions. Loading working memory prevented conscious processing and 
promoted automaticity and thus, consistent putting performance in skilled golfers under 
stress. Based on the results of study four, study five o f this thesis developed a two- 
phase putting intervention strategy which incorporated external imagery (decision 
making phase) and a secondary task (execution phase). The findings o f this study 
indicated that external imagery enabled golfers to focus externally on processing critical 
environmental cues prior to putting, whilst the secondary task load prevented conscious 
processing and promoted automaticity during putting execution. Social validation data 
indicated that the putting intervention helped participants to execute a smooth stroke, 
which they felt confident and positive about using in competition. Clearly, the use of 
external imagery and secondary task loading should also be explored by practitioners as 
possible techniques to prevent conscious processing, particularly in those prone to this 
process under stress.
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8.5. STRENGTHS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME
A considered strength of this thesis was the progressive ‘theory into practice’ structure 
of the research programme. The specific aims p f  the programme were to identify 
dominant psychological mechanisms underlying severe performance loss, examine how 
such mechanism interact and then based on these findings establish an ecologically 
valid intervention strategy to counteract the phenomenon. This process, in turn, 
directed the research to the challenge of developing practical and functional strategies 
that could be used in sport. It is the author’s belief that the transition between theory 
and practice was successfully achieved. Further, the author believes that the eclectic 
research methods adopted in the programme have facilitated this transition and thus are 
also considered a strength of this thesis. This approach has not only helped to fulfil the 
aims o f this programme of research, but also has allowed the establishment of an 
improved conceptual and practical understanding o f severe performance loss in 
competitive sport.
Specifically, three types o f research method were used in the programme: study one 
used qualitative inductive techniques, studies two, three, and four adopted quantitative 
group-based designs, which also incorporated semi-structured interview techniques, and 
the final study of the programme used a single-subject replication-reversal (ABAC) 
design. The current research on severe performance loss has predominantly used 
quantitative group-based methods. This research programme has uniquely used 
qualitative and single-subject based methods to investigate this phenomenon.
Moreover, the eclectic approach used in the programme has allowed anomalies in the 
literature that have existed for over a decade to be understood more clearly. 
Understanding the perception and interpretation o f competitive athletes who had 
experienced severe performance loss and examining the relationship between 
reinvestment and learning styles exemplifies this progression. Further, this research 
programme answered recent calls to examine alternative ways to manipulate explicit 
task knowledge during skill acquisition that do not inhibit skill progression (Hardy, 
Mullen, & Jones, 1996; MacMahon & Masters, 2002; Masters, 2000; Maxwell et al., 
2000).
An additional strength to this thesis was the breath and depth of qualitative data 
gathered throughout this research programme, in particular that produced by study one.
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A schematic of the themes generated from the analysis o f study one was formulated to 
help reinforce the complex but interrelated nature o f the phenomena under investigation 
(see Figure 3.6.). Additional themes of this phenomenon were identified that have not 
been reported before. These themes were ‘disruption to perception and sensation’, 
‘compensatory strategies’ and the ‘need to escape’. The impact and interaction of these 
themes are outlined in Section 8.211.
Finally, the programme of research provides a starting point to help coaches and sport 
psychologists identify characteristics of athletes that could make them prone to severe 
performance loss. Furthermore, the programme has provided practitioners with 
practical strategies to help athletes counteract the problem.
8 .6. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME
Perhaps the most limiting factor to this research programme is the use o f the 
Reinvestment Scale (Masters et al., 1993). The limitations and concerns about what 
precisely the inventory measures were addressed in Section 8.313. Clearly, the 
Reinvestment Scale is a predictor of performance behaviour. Nevertheless, it is still not 
clear what it is the Scale is actually measuring, apart from dimensions o f personality. 
Future research needs to identify what it is, exactly, the Scale measures in terms o f  
movement dynamics and information processing systems.
Another limitation of the thesis is the use of the ARS (Cox et al., 1996). The limitations 
and concerns about the Scale's lack of sensitivity were addressed in Section 8.312.
Thus, if  time allows, the author advises other research and practitioners to use the 
modified CSAI-2 (Swain & Jones, 1992) as this inventory is a more sensitive and valid 
measure of state anxiety compared with the ARS (Krane, 1994).
A further limiting factor to the thesis is the narrow focus directed specifically toward 
golf-putting in the latter studies of the research programme. The intervention strategy 
developed for putting in study five could have a practical use for golfers in the future. 
Nevertheless, it is not known whether such an intervention strategy can be adapted to a 
range of putting scenarios, other golf strokes and indeed, other sports such as those 
examined in study one (e.g. basketball, tennis, squash, cricket and football).
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Finally, another limitation o f the thesis is the use of an inductive content analysis as a 
qualitative approach in study one. This is the most prominent technique used in sport 
psychology research (cf. Biddle et al., 2001). The qualitative approach used in this 
research programme was based on the work o f Scanlan et al. (1991; see also Gould, 
Jackson, & Finch, 1993a; Gould, Jackson & Finch, 1993b) who advocated the inductive 
content technique. However, this method is limited by the fact that it has no theoretical 
underpinning in qualitative research methods. For this reason, on reflection the author 
of the thesis would have used a more tradition qualitative approach such as grounded 
theory. The benefits of using such an approach are three fold: First, this approach lends 
itself to research areas that are difficult to examine through quantitative methods. 
Second, grounded theory is beneficial when no comprehensive theoretical models exist, 
but there is still some research available in the area. Finally, grounded theory is 
particularly effective in unearthing of processes that might underpin a particular 
phenomenon (Johnston, Corban, & Clarke, 1999).
In following a grounded theory approach to qualitative research several methodological 
changes would need to take place to the protocol used in the thesis. First, in grounded 
theory data collection the interview format is flexible and open allowing change 
throughout the duration o f the study. This is in contrast to the standardised, semi­
structured interview protocol used in the thesis. Second, the themes generated from 
each interview should be investigated further until saturation (e.g. no more themes are 
generated) is reached. For this reason, the amount of participants can not be predefined. 
In the thesis, saturation might not have been reach as the sample o f ten was 
predetermined prior to the onset o f the study.
8.7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are six main areas identified in this research programme that require further 
investigation. First, although this thesis has gone partway to achieving this (as outlined 
in Section 8.313), there is still a need for researchers interested in severe performance 
loss to examine ways of bridging the gap between an individual’s cognitive 
predisposition (e.g. Reinvestment Scale) and the use of cognitive processing systems 
during performance. Future research should investigate electrocardiogram (ECG) and 
electromyogram (EMG) data so that changes in brain wave and muscle activity can be 
examined. Limited research has focused on changes in brain wave activity (Crews,
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2001) and kinematics (Mullen & Hardy, 2000) of performance loss. Crews (2001) 
observed that golfers who experienced skill breakdown under stress predominantly used 
the conscious analytical side of the brain during performance, which supports the 
conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992). However, Crews’ (2001) laboratory- 
based research used a five-foot straight putt on a flat green that required no decision 
making for the line of each putt. Therefore, future research should investigate the 
relationship between brain wave activity and skill breakdown in ecologically valid 
conditions such as competition. In addition, throughout this thesis it has been proposed 
that during reinvestment individuals regress to a more basic level o f skill processing 
associated with early stages of learning. However, the programme of research did not 
directly examine his assumption. For this reason, future research should investigate the 
relationship between reinvestment and stages of learning.
The findings o f  the kinematic element o f Mullen and Hardy’s (2000) research were 
equivocal. To assess the kinematics o f a golf-putting task under stress, Mullen and 
Hardy (2000) used a two-dimensional analysis. It can be argued that this analysis was 
not a sensitive enough measure to identify what could only be finite changes in 
movement dynamics. Hence, perhaps a three-dimensional analysis would be more 
effective in developing an improved understanding in this area. Clearly, a thorough 
examination o f these constructs is required to establish an unequivocal understanding of 
the relationship between dispositional factors, information processing systems and 
outcome measures. Such examinations should take place in a variety of sports, 
involving static, dynamic, open-and closed-loop skills, in ecologically valid conditions 
such as competition. Thus, perhaps from such investigations the Reinvestment Scale 
could be modified in accordance with changes in information processing systems, 
movement dynamics, and muscular activity, which specifically relate to competitive 
sport.
Second, study one of this thesis identified 'disruption to perception and sensation', 
‘compensatory strategies’ and the ‘need to escape’ as influential factors in the severe 
performance loss phenomenon. It was proposed that 'disruption to perception and 
sensation' served as a precursor to athletes becoming preoccupied with the task 
components and the process of skill execution, which led to conscious processing and 
automaticity disruption. Consequently, ‘compensatory strategies’ were adopted in an 
attempt to recreate ‘normal’ movement sensation and successful skill execution. This
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ironically served only to promote greater conscious processing, automaticity disruption, 
and the ‘need to escape’. Future research needs to examine collectively these three 
constructs if  a greater understanding o f this area of research is to evolve.
Third, study three of this thesis used holistic methods during the acquisition of a free- 
throw. It was speculated that this learning method might have encouraged an outcome- 
based (e.g. extemal-movement effects related focus) focus, which allowed systems to 
self-organise more naturally, unconstrained by conscious control (Al Abood et al., 
2002). This contention is supported by Maxwell and Masters (2002) who found that an 
implicit, external focus, mode of learning and performance is the default option for 
performers, even when an explicit, internal focus is stipulated (Maxwell & Masters, 
2002). Moreover, holistic learners might have allocated additional resources into 
systems that promote automaticity; this might explain their incremental performance 
trends under stress. Future research should investigate the relationship between holistic 
learning, focus o f attention, mental effort and dispositional reinvestment. Specifically, 
such constructs should be examined in a variety of sports, involving static, dynamic, 
open and closed loop skills, in ecologically valid competitive conditions. The effect of 
pre-performance routines (Boutcher, 1990) that promote holistic orientated goals, which 
are thought to direct attention towards more global aspects of skills such as chunking 
and automaticity should also be investigated (Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Kingston 
& Hardy, 1994). Finally, coaches and athletes need to be made aware o f  the 
implications o f developing and using large pools of explicit task knowledge during 
performance. Current coaching methods used in sport should be revised (Wulf et al.,
2 0 0 2 ) then perhaps the need for interventions to counteract conscious possessing might 
be reduced.
A processing efficiency perspective (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) suggests increased effort 
might compensate for anxiety induced distractions by increasing attentional resources 
under stress. This can facilitate performance in cases where additional resources are 
channelled into appropriate processes (e.g. extemal-movement effects related). Hence, • 
if  holistic learners in study three did allocate additional resources into systems that 
promote automaticity, this might explain their incremental performance trends under 
stress. However, it is important to note that neither mental effort nor attentional focus 
was controlled for in this study. Future research should monitor these factors to gain an
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improved understanding of the relationship between attentional foci, mental effort and 
dispositional reinvestment.
Fourth, study five o f this thesis developed and tested a two-phase putting intervention in 
an ecologically valid setting. All participants stated that they would feel confident 
about using the putting intervention during competition. However, it was concluded 
that the strategy was tested in an ecologically valid environment, but was not 
necessarily ecologically valid per se. Future research should investigate whether the 
two-phase putting intervention can be successfully taken on to the course and adapted to 
a range of putting strokes during competition. It would also be beneficial to examine 
the long-term implications of such strategies on technical putting development. In 
addition, further research should examine whether the psychological intervention can be 
adapted to other shots played during a round o f golf. Finally, research should also 
investigate whether this type o f psychological intervention could be adapted to athletes 
that are susceptible to conscious processing under stress in other sports involving gross 
dynamic open-loop skills as well as fine static closed-loop skills.
Fifth, the initial two group-based studies of this thesis produced inconsistent state 
anxiety data. Limitations of the ARS (Cox et al, 1996) were suggested to be the 
primary reason for this as the modified CSAI-2 used in the latter studies remedied the 
problem. Although, self-report measures should remain a feature o f  future research, 
perhaps a combination o f cortical and endocrine measures should also be obtained to 
enhance understanding in this area (Mullen & Hardy, 2000).
Finally, this thesis has identified certain characteristics that have been associated with 
the ‘yips’ phenomenon. Future research should investigate possible links with severe 
performance loss and long-term disorders such as the ‘yips’. As understanding in this 
area evolves in the research practical guidelines can be established that equip coaches 
with the knowledge to minimise opportunities for athletes consciously to process 
explicit task rules during both learning and competitive performance, particularly in 
those prone to severe performance loss.
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8.8. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to examine in detail psychological mechanisms that 
underpin severe performance loss in competitive sport. The main aims were to: 
establish dominant psychological mechanisms that underpin severe performance loss, 
examine how such mechanisms interact, and establish coping strategies to counteract 
the phenomenon. Results indicated that the central tenets of this phenomenon were 
dispositional high reinvestment, conscious processing and automaticity disruption. 
With these tenets in mind, attempts were made to minimise the accumulation o f rule- 
based knowledge during skill acquisition and suppress explicit task knowledge during 
skill execution. Specifically, due to the load placed on working by the secondary task 
(in studies 4 and 5) it can be inferred that this encouraged performers prone to severe 
performance loss to adopt automatic, right-brain processing systems to moderate 
performance, unconstrained by conscious control, which in turn enhanced their 
consistency under stress. It is the author’s belief that, although unanswered questions 
remain, this research programme has furthered the conceptual and practical 
understanding of severe performance loss in competitive sport for researchers, 
practitioners and coaches. This has only been accomplished by making the progression 
from theory into practice, a fundamental requisite of sport psychology if  this discipline 
is to continue to evolve.
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Appendix 2 
Informed Consent for Study 1
Informed Consent Form
This study involves exploring your apparent severe loss o f performance during 
competition. The aim o f the study is to attempt to identify your personal experience, 
prior to, during and after your severe loss of performance. This semi-structured 
interview will last approximately one hour and will include five sections which are as 
follows:
(1) Interviewer’s general details (2) Your general details (3) A detailed description of 
your most severe performance loss during competition (4) other negative 
experiences/discrepancies you have experienced during performance(s) (5) Summary 
questions and final comments.
If you feel comfortable with the interview procedure outlined above and are happy to 
participate, then please sign below. If you have any questions relating to this procedure 
please don’t hesitate to ask.
I have read the description of the interview procedure and consent to participate in the 
study.
Nam e:......................................................... (please print)
Nam e:......................................................... (please sign)
Date:.................................
Many Thanks! 
Ben Chell
4
Appendix 3
A Survey on Individual Sporting Experiences
5
A Survey on Individual Sporting Experiences
Name:..............................................  A ge:.............................................
T el:..................................................  E-mail:.......................................
Main Sport(s):.................................  Years of Involvement:..........
Level competed at (i.e. Novice, recreational, local league, college, county, nationally, 
internationally): ..............................................................................
1) Have you ever experienced times when you consistently perform with excellence in 
practice but poorly in a competitive environment?
Yes / No (please circle accordingly)
2) On a scale o f 1 to 10 how well do you perform in competition 
(1 = Very Poor; 10 = Very Well)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 (please circle accordingly)
3) Have you ever experienced a loss of performance when competing, if  so on a scale o f  
1 to 10 how severe do you perceive this experience to be (1 = not severe -10  = Very 
Severe)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (please circle accordingly)
4) If you have experienced a loss of performance in your sporting career please give a 
brief account of this experience below including the perceived cause(s), and how you 
felt before and during this experience (excluding physical injury)?
5) Are you prepared to be interviewed on your sporting experience(s)?
Yes / No (Please Circle Accordingly)
6
Appendix 4 
Interview Guide for Study 1
Interview Guide
Introduction -  Section (1):
• Explain nature of the interviews, get participants to sign consent form.
• Do you have any objections to my tape-recording this interview?
• All information will be kept strictly confidential -  tapes will be erased when 
the relevant information has been transcribed.
• No names will be used when writing up this study for my thesis to ensure 
complete confidentiality.
• Interview duration -  approximately 1 hour.
• The purpose of this study is to gain an insight in to severe performance loss 
of individuals during competition.
• The interview format comprises 5 sections: a) interviewer’s general details, 
b) interviewee’s general details, c) Interviewee’s description of most severe 
loss during competition, d) other negative experiences/discrepancies during 
performance(s), e) Summary and questions.
Interview format
Section ( 2 ) : -  Interviewee’s general details
The following were asked:
• How long have you played your sport?
• How old are you?
• At what standard are / were you competing?
• Are you currently still competing?
• Please give me some general background information on your involvement in 
your sport.
Section (3k- Interviewee’s description of most severe loss during competition
The following was asked:
• Please describe to me your most severe experience when you felt you could 
not perform to your usual skill level.
Section 14k- Other negative experiences / discrepancies during competition (including 
other snorts)
The following was asked:
• Please describe to me any other occurrence(s) when you experienced a 
severe loss of performance and felt you could no longer compete to your 
usual skill level (including other sports).
Section ( 5 ) : -  Summary questions and final comments
• The interviewer conveyed a brief summary of the interview content.
• The interviewee was given the opportunity to explain any aspects that were 
misinterpreted by the interviewer, and add any further comment if  necessary.
Interviewee 8 - Golf
Nam e:............................    Age:
Years o f Involvement:................................... Level competed at: .
Please describe to me your most severe experience when you felt you could not 
perform to your usual skill level.
Right, it was erm... a couple of years ago it was qualifying for the club championships. 
It wasn’t the pressure so much that I needed to qualify because I’d already qualified. It 
was just like a big medal event. Erm.. .but the reason it became so important to me was 
because o f the fact that I was on a really good score, the course record was on. Through 
the first 9 or 10 holes you don’t think much about it, you just think it’s another round of 
golf until the pressure starts building and building as your score gets better and better. 
You start to think too much about what is going to happen at the end, rather than 
thinking hole by hole. So you are like, all you can think of, it probably happens in a lot 
of sporting events when you are in the lead or something, all you can think of is the fact 
that if  I do this, this and this by the end I will have done it, where as you should always 
think more like, take things one hole at a time. I got through to the 16th. Hole, 
erm...just made a birdie and the 16th and 17th , they run parallel to each other. They are 
quite short holes, and there's a lot of water involved and out of bounds. So there are a 
lot of players dropping balls, and taking a lot o f time on those 2 holes. So at the 16th I 
made a birdie to go 6 under, the course record at the time was 5 under.
So, at this point you were becoming more and more aware of the course record?
Yes. The problem came at the 17th tee, we had to wait a long time for the group in front 
to play. Erm.. .you always find that the more time you have to think the more scenarios 
go through your head. Shall I take this club, that club, shall I knock it down with that, 
shall I just hit an iron. I went from one club back to another. You know, the more you 
think about it the more you just want to get on with it. When you are in that scenario 
you just want to finish and get it over as quickly as possible. It’s not, I would have said, 
an enjoyable situation to be in till it’s actually finished, then you can look back on it and 
enjoy it. Because of the sort of pressure and stress that are involved in it, it has 
happened quite a few times in various events that I have been in, you don’t actually 
enjoy it at the time. You are scared in a way that, but when you look back on it you 
think oh that was a great day, fulfilling day. So erm.. .we were waiting a long time on 
the tee and I don’t know if  your... how much you know about golf, but.. ..I have this 
problem, I’ve always had this problem with what they call shanking, and erm.. .1 
eventually decided to take a 4 iron off the tee, it’s a par 4 with water on the left and out 
of bounds on the right. So you know it’s quite a tight hole and I ended up with the 
worst swing ever I could have ever put on it. I just wanted to try and guide it down the
hole and eim it just went straight right, straight out of bounds. Then the first thing
that comes into your head is I’ve blown it. I’ve blown the course record. You don’t 
think, Oh right, it’s not gone down there, I can still make a six, I can still make a good 
score up the last. All is that came into my head, caz I’d been thinking about it up the 
last previous 3 or 4 holes, I think ya, I’ve got a good chance here and suddenly in a flash 
it was gone, you know what I mean? From having a good chance, and just seeing that 
ball go like that in an instant, everything goes.
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What impact do you think waiting to play between the 16th and 17th had on your 
performance?
I think this is quite, I think out of all the sports I have played golf has to be the most 
frustrating sport. It’s not like a fluid game where you can just get on with it, you don’t 
have to think. The more you have to think the worse it gets because you get so many 
negative thoughts in your mind. If you could just get on with it, like football, I play 
football as well, the pressure doesn’t get to you because you are playing all the time and 
you just get involved in it and you don’t have the time to think. But there's too much 
thinking in golf, you think about all, I mean it’s a four hour round, four / four and a half- 
hour round. How much o f that time do you spend hitting that ball? Very small amount 
of time, I would say three/three and a half-hours o f that time is spent thinking about that 
next shot.
And that’s what you were doing in this particular time period between the 16th and 
17th?
Yes, yes.
Can you elaborate on some of the things you were thinking at this time?
I remember thinking well, I’ve got 2 choices here I either, because with my driver I 
can.. .I’ve got a shot that I know that it’s always going to be going the same way. I can 
fade the ball with my driver to a certain degree, yes. Sometimes it doesn’t work and it 
goes...it just stays straight and doesn’t come back. Other times it does it a little bit too 
much but I know that 80% of the time it will go where I want it to. So I was thinking of 
that shot, just to start it out into the water and fading it back into the fairway, yes. It’s a 
dodge shot because you are aiming it at a hazard, yes, or aiming it down the middle of 
the fairway. A 4 iron is probably easier to hit, less can go wrong, so I was weighing up 
those 2 options.
Can you elaborate on how you finally made your decision on which club to take?
Sure... .the more you are waiting the more your brain gets a little bit more muddled. If I 
had to make the same choice now I would probably take the other choice, but maybe 
that’s because of what happened. If I’d have done the same with a driver and knocked 
that out of bounds I would probably take the other club, but since then I have always 
taken a driver on that hole because of the memories o f what happened. So there is a lot 
of.. .sort of picturing the shot, trying to work out what to do with each club and when I 
took that club there was no sort of definite decision of, Oh that’s the club I want. I was 
always thinking about the other club as well. I was apprehensive and I thought right! I 
stood there first of all waiting for the people in front o f us. Then I thought just knock 
the driver down there, then I thought no, no, no, no, its probably best to take the 4 
iron.. .no, no, no drive, no 4 iron and I probably wasn’t 100% committed to the shot I 
wanted to play.
You mentioned negative thoughts; can you describe to me some of the negative 
thought you were having at this time?
Yes, erm.. ..when you are playing a shot like that, I suppose, if  its just a practice round, 
the fairway seems really wide, but that’s just stressful situations, pressure situations 
everything seems to come in like that (interviewee uses his hands to assimilate the
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narrowing effect of the fairway when under pressure) and all I could see on this 
particular occasion was a very narrow strip of fairway. Erm... and you are thinking of 
what could go wrong rather than what could go right. You can’t .... Its difficult to 
picture the shot you want to play, erm.. .because all you are thinking, there is no sort of 
provision down the fairway everything else comes into play.
Could you elaborate on why, during this occasion the fairway in your mind 
appeared to narrow?
I think you can get too protective o f your scores sometime in those sorts of situations, 
instead o f  thinking, just make 2 pars and you have beaten the course record; whereas a 
birdie and a par would beat the record by 2. You know, you get a bit negative; you get a 
little bit protective. I think when you start to get protective o f your score that’s when 
things can go wrong. Do you know what I mean? I changed my game, I was really sort 
of positive about the way I was going about it during the first 16 holes, caz the 16l a 
short par 4, so I took a driver out and just knocked it on the green, yes. Then, suddenly 
my game plan changed and like, you know? I think when you start playing, you know? 
If you play the first 16 holes positively, then you should carry on through the whole.... 
and because I had to think about it, I had to sort o f change my whole game plan and 
reassess exactly where I was and what score I had. At this point I thought 2 pars does it, 
whereas i f  I had walked straight up to the 17th pumped, because I’d just got a birdie and 
thought, come on let’s go. So I walked off the 16th 6 under. If I had to take the shot 
straight away, it might have been a different scenario. But when I had time to think 
about things and reassess what I’d done, or what I was doing in regards to my score, the 
adrenaline had left me from the last hole and fear had come into the game.
Did the fear and negative thoughts affect you during the first 16 holes?
Erm.. .not really, not really.
Where would your self-confidence have been on a scale of 1-10,10 being very self- 
confident; 1 being not at all self-confident in performing well on the first 16 holes?
I would say about an 8, quite high.
So you were high in self-confidence and low in anxiety during the first 16 holes?
Yes, well, I would say low in anxiety, but it’s building up. At the start, low in anxiety, 
and the more I went through if you’re marking out of 10, say, about 1 through to 5 
through that stage of the round.
Could you elaborate on why you think that was?
It’s sort o f the realisation of what you are doing and the fact that you are steadily 
building a good score and sort of, at any stage it might go wrong. But it wasn’t until I 
walked onto the 17th and had to think about it, it probably rose from about 5 to 8.
This is your anxiety?
Yes.
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So the realization was that you could break the course record...
Yes, caz 16 and 17, 17 especially is a hole where a lot can go wrong, you’ve got a very 
tight area to aim at, whereas on 14 or 15 you know if you hit a bad shot you can get 
away with it. If you hit a bad shot on 17 you are either in the water or out o f bounds.
Could you expand on how this increase in anxiety affected you?
Erm.. .mentally your brain gets scrambled, I think that is probably the term we use, and 
when your brain gets scrambled there are too many thoughts.
Could you elaborate on how the anxiety affected your focus?
I think when I become anxious like that everything becomes a little bit more rushed, you 
don’t take your time you just want to get that shot out of the way, and then walk to the 
next one, you know what I mean? Your pre-shot routine goes a little bit out o f the 
window, or if  it does stay there it becomes more rushed.
Could you expand on your self-confidence whilst you were waiting on the 17th?
I was feeling anxious so self-confidence wasn’t quite as high. Erm.... as I said I wasn’t 
100% committed to the club that I was going to use, so you know, there was a loss of 
self-confidence in the 5 or 10 minute period while we were waiting. When I went off 
the 16th confidence was quite high, and then that 5 minute waiting period, it just...just, I 
mean on your scale 1-10 the self-confidence on the 16th was here and the anxiety was 
there and then it just went like that (interviewee assimilates with his hand that self- 
confidence and anxiety became inverse). All that I could think about was the course 
record... the other guys were chatting away, and I tried to join in but I couldn’t 
concentrate on what they were saying. I was thinking about what was going on in front 
of me.
You said earlier that you took a 4 iron and you’d decided that was the club you 
were going to take although you weren’t sure and your words were... “I just tried 
to guide it down the middle of the hole” can you elaborate on this please?
Well, it’s a shot I don’t know really, you just try, you lift you head quickly because you 
want to see where it is going, you just try and push it down there and its not your natural 
swing, yes! Erm.. .1 think my brain was so scrambled, all I was thinking about was 
knocking it down there and seeing where it had gone. The technique just went 
completely out o f the window.
So after you had hit the 4 iron what happened after that?
Well it went out o f bounds so I had to play another ball off the tee, erm.. .so I decided to 
take the driver this time and I hit it into the water. From that point on it was like a lost 
time you know what I mean? It was just like you couldn’t really remember what the hell 
was going on, it was just like the brain was so scrambled I wanted to get the hole over 
as quickly as possible. So I've hit one out o f bounds and playing three off the tee. I’ve 
hit another one into the water, so now I’m playing my fifth shot to the green with a 
wedge. Once again, technique completely out the window, shanked that one out of 
bounds again (nervous laughter), so I’m now playing 7, came up short of the hole, 
erm.. .chipped on and 2 putted for a 10 (laughs). So I went from 6 under to level parr in
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the space of one hole (laughs). You wanted to hear about severe performance loss 
(laughs).
Could you just describe to me in detail the rest of the shots on that hole?
Erm... I wasn’t concentrating on any of the shots I played on that hole, all I was
thinking about was the first shot I played on the 17  . .  .thinking - why did I do that, 
why didn’t I take this club instead of that one?
So you were still thinking about the previous bad shot?
Yes, oh yes, yes, yes. And like you weren’t concentrating on the shots that you were 
playing at all, you couldn’t get it out of your head o f what you’d done, it was so stupid.
How did that make you feel?
Well! You go from like ecstatic to deflated in the space...and because it’s such a short 
time period, you know what I mean? If its something like football and you lose a goal 
you can get it back, do that in a round of golf and there's no way o f getting it back. You 
know you can’t recover from that, from a 10.. .ha, or even a 6 or a 7.
Could you expand on how you felt during these shots that you were playing; the 
first shot that went out of bounds, the second that went in to the water and the 
third, which you again chipped out of bounds?
Erm.. .yes, I was probably more anxious standing on the tee, than I was actually playing 
the shots. The reason that I got a severe performance loss for the rest of the hole was my 
loss of concentration. The fact that I was thinking o f what I’d done, on the first shot. I 
just wasn’t concentrating on the shots. I just wanted to get them out o f the way and 
finish the hole, get off and get on with finishing the round.
You put in your survey that you felt physically sick, could you elaborate on this for 
me please?
You just feel gutted from what you had just lost in the matter of a minute, err.. .it was 
the fact that you’ve blown the course record, erm. ..you’ve lost your chance o f winning 
that competition, erm.. .you’ve lost the chance o f getting your handicap cut. I would 
have probably been cut to almost scratch, being as I was 6 under. All those factors, 
mainly the course record...
You were aware of these factors whilst playing?
Yes, yes, it’s too much going on, these things are going round in your head and taking 
priority over the shot that you are trying to play. So, obviously the quality o f the 
performance significantly decreases because you are not actually concentrating on what 
you are doing, you are off somewhere else.
How many players were in your group?
2 others.
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Were there any spectators?
No.
So it was just the 3 of you?
Yes.
Were other people aware of your performance that may have been playing or 
waiting to play certain holes?
I don’t think.... I think there were a few people aware of my score e rr.. .but they were 
all playing there own game. No one was coming out and watching, everyone was 
playing their own game. So the only people that were really aware and watching were 
the 2 people I was playing with. One of them was the guy that I was talking about 
earlier, one of my mates that plays o ff+1, erm .. .,and Steve, he plays off about 15/16.
So I mean, actually the funny thing is, and that came into it as well, was the fact that the 
guy I was playing with, held the course record of 67, 5 under, and I was one shot better 
at that point. Erm.. .1 know he was willing me on to do it but you know, at the same 
time he probably didn’t want to lose it, so that was probably going round my head as 
well.
Okay, the people that you were playing with, did they affect you at all?
Yes, I mean especially the better of the players I was with. I don’t think the other guy 
was even aware of what score I was on because he was quite a new player and didn’t 
really realise the significance; whereas the better player did. He knew exactly what was 
going on, exactly what score I was on and w e’d played a lot of golf together, me and 
this other guy, and you know he wouldn’t have wished that on me and I wouldn’t have 
wished that on him. For him, it was quite hard as well, to watch me doing that. Erm..., 
you know; you’d think he’d be glad that I wasn’t now going to beat the course record. I 
think he was genuinely gutted for me as well, so ...
Could you elaborate on how that made you feel?
Yes, I mean at the start of the match, I mean I ’d been playing well up until then and for 
weeks before that, but you never expect to be at that score. If  someone said to me on the 
first tee you are going to be 6 under after 16, you’d go, “No, I don’t think so”. So you 
are out there to score well you’re not sort of targeting a particular score. So my 
expectations were quite high for playing well, but I wasn’t expecting to beat that 
particular score at that particular time. As the round went on and you are 2 or 3 under, 
you start looking toward the other holes, thinking there are some really good birdie 
opportunities out there. There are some holes when you’ve just got to make your parr 
and you know, it just went to plan, and you thought well, if I can make birdie down 12, 
it’s a parr 5 and a birdie down 14, which is also a parr 5 then I will be 5 under. Then 
just make parr at 13 and 15 which are parr 3’s and that all went to plan, and then 
brought the driver out at 16 and knocked it on the green for 6 under, and it like, well, 
everything is going to plan.
Sure. In-between 16 and 17 you had this wait, where did your expectations lie at 
this point?
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All I was looking to do was just to parr it, and was still expected to do it. It’s always the 
hardest, its always hard to cross that finishing line, you know what I mean? That’s the 
hardest part, whether your playing golf or another sport, it’s actually like finishing it off, 
finishing the whole thing off and completing the game. So I was expected to do it but I 
knew that there were dangers out there that could spoil it. But at that time I still 
expected to be 6 under after 18.
Ho did these expectations make you feel physically?
After what I’d done I didn’t feel relaxed, because o f the mental side of it your swing just 
goes completely to pot, it’s like, you are tense. That’s the thing that when you shank the 
ball, once you’ve done it once, it’s very difficult not to do it again. It’s_one o f  those 
faults where you hit one, and I’ve done this before where I’ve played a whole round 
where I’m standing over the ball knowing that I’m going to do it again and there's 
nothing I can do about it.
So it’s like pre-emptive?
Oh yes. The second time when I shanked it out of bounds and I was standing there and I 
knew I was going to do it, or I was pretty sure I was going to do it. Erm.. .and I rushed it 
and off it went. So yes, I think it is the fact that you tense up and grip the club tightly 
and you don’t actually go through with the shot you just try and push at it, guide it.
So it’s almost a completely different stoke from what you would normally do?
Yes, yes.
Erm...did you manage to gain your previous form for the last hole?
I boggied the last just because you know, the expectations had gone, everything had 
gone. It didn’t really matter anymore, it didn’t really matter what I scored on the last 
hole. I didn’t .. .you know, the concentration had gone, there was, you know, what had 
happened to me on the 17th there was nothing more to play for on the 18th. I just played 
it out and made boggie. I mean if  I’d have parred it I would have still been under my 
handicap, as I was playing off 1, but I wasn’t even thinking about that. My expectations 
were so high before hand nothing could make up for it, or even partly make up for what 
I’d just done. So everything was still going round in my head, plus the fact I would 
have to walk in and like people who knew I was on a good score would wonder why, or 
how the hell I’d finished 1 over parr after being, when they saw me, 4 or 5 under. And 
like that’s what I was thinking about!
So you were also aware at this point of what people might have been thinking 
about you?
Yes, yes.
Could you expand on this awareness of others for me please?
I just think in general I’m quite a self-conscious person and always wondering what 
people might be thinking about me. Erm... I mean you think you are strong enough to 
get through something like that, you don’t think you can ever do something like that;
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you can’t work out what has happened. And all you are thinking of is, if  this can 
happen once it can happen again. Erm...
So on a scale of 1-10 where would you say your self-consciousness lay prior to this 
performance loss, 1 being very low and 10 being very high in self-consciousness?
Erm.. .Well, I’m quite a self-conscious person anyway so it would never be sort of 
really low, but sort of a 3 or 4. Mind you, erm.. .you are always self-conscious even if  
you perform well and if  I had managed to get through I would be self-conscious finding 
out what people thought of what I’d done either way; but it’s a good feeling, a good 
self-conscious feeling. Whereas when you’ve blown it, all you want to do is get out the 
clubhouse, get in the car and drive home. You’re pissed off; you don’t really want 
people to know what you have done. I mean it’s difficult because people really 
wouldn’t know what to say in a situation like that. I wouldn’t know what to say.
What about waiting on the 17th?
Erm.. .it was more or less 9 or 10 (referring to levels o f self-consciousness) when I was 
on the 17th.
How important is golf to you?
I’m obsessive about it! I used to play, I used to have a job where I worked in the 
evenings and because I had that free time during the day I would play golf a lot o f the 
time. Say 4 or 5 times a week, but because I played so much, you know if  you play any 
sport too much you lose the enthusiasm. Because I now have to work in the day I don’t 
get time to play as much, at the moment I’m not too worried about it because it’s not as 
obsessive as it used to be. Erm...
Were you obsessed with golf when you experienced this performance loss?
Oh yes, definitely; I was highly motivated to succeed. Whereas, compared to last 
weekend when I shot level parr and I couldn’t work out why I couldn’t get into it, I was 
like playing well, had a good score going but it felt like I didn’t really care what 
happened, I just couldn’t get involved in the game. If I’d have really concentrated I 
would have been 2 or 3 under, but I just, because that obsession had gone, you know, it 
didn’t really matter as much. So I’ve noticed that in the last year there are more 
important things to me now than just scoring.
Could you elaborate on this decrease in obsession for the game and how it has 
affected you performance?
Erm... It varies really because you don’t feel the pressure as much, but in the same 
light, like last weekend, you can’t get into it as well, you can’t get into it. So sometimes 
the pressure helps you sometimes it doesn’t. As long as it’s going all right the pressure 
helps you to concentrate, as soon as things start to go wrong the pressure debilitates 
your performance.
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You mentioned earlier certain changes in the physical aspect of your stroke can
you elaborate on that for me?
It’s difficult to remember because you can't really remember what you have done.
Erm.. .You are trying to block out what you have just done, but it’s difficult. You are 
more like.. .rather than having a relaxed fluid swing, you are pushing at it. It’s like a 
nervy swing its not a full swing, it’s more of a mechanical swing, it’s not fluid.
When you say, “guided” can you explain that in more detail?
Yes, erm.. .You are just trying to push at it and look up as soon as you’ve hit it, to see 
where it has gone.. .hoping, yes, yes, hoping that it has gone in the right direction. So 
your heads up, you’ve got a mechanical swing and it’s the complete opposite to what 
you should be doing.
Okay, did this experience ever affect subsequent performances?
Erm.. .1 think, to a certain degree you learn from what you have done. Erm.. .From the 
previous scenario that you’ve been in and it’s happened on the odd occasion but not to 
the same degree. If it has happened I probably got away with it. Once you’ve got away 
with it you realise what you have done, you realise, my god I’ve just tried to hit the 
same shot that I tried to hit ‘that time’. Fortunately I’ve got away with it, as you 
concentrate you don’t do that again. But you know it could happen again.
Does that worry you at all?
Yes, yes, o f course.
Every time you play?
No, occasionally! It’s not very often that I’m in that situation to be honest.
What kind of situation would you need to be in to elicit this concern about past 
experiences?
It would have to be quite a big competition; it would have to be a good score going or a 
very close match. It could have been a very tight finish to this year’s club 
championships and I made, to a certain degree, the same mistake, I lost my 
concentration on the last hole. I’m 2 shots ahead and I’ve pulled it into the heavy rough. 
At this point I’m feeling the same way as I felt that other time. Even though I have a 2 
shot cushion, it could quite easily happen again, caz. It was in long rough and possibly I 
wouldn’t have found the ball, but fortunately I did. All you could do was punch it out 
onto the fairway, which was about 15 yards...at this point I’ve played 2 and he’s played
1 .1 still know that if  I can knock it onto the green and 2 putt he’s still got to make birdie 
to beat me or to tie. But I ended up making 6 and he ended up making a 4. Erm.. .So 
that made us level, but for some reason it didn’t really.. .1 knew that all I needed to do 
was make a 4 up the last. I thought I had blown it, but I hadn’t you know, I was still in 
there, and it went to play off. Erm.. .But it made me even more determined to win for 
some reason, that time. I played very well over the next 3 holes and because I was 
holder of the dam thing, I did want to lose it, I just wasn’t going to lose it. Erm.. .So 
some times you see pressure manifests itself in different ways. Okay it was a slight 
performance loss on the last hole but my confidence was still there to play well.
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Because it wasn’t like I’d, you know, I’d just hit one bad shot really and it wasn’t that I 
was really pressured when I hit it, I just lost concentration. I knew it was because I 
didn’t concentrate. I didn’t feel under pressure because I was 2 in the lead. Then I 
played the next 3 holes quite well.
Could you elaborate the times when you questioned you ability to perform well?
Erm When I was on the 17th and 6 under I suddenly started to question my
ability. I stood on the tee and knew that I wasn’t going to play a veiy good shot.
Erm.. .And yes, it has happened on other occasions, it’s mainly the shank thing. You 
get that in your head, once you get that in your head.. .you do it once then over and over 
again. And all that you can think of when you are standing there is it’s going to go over 
there, it not going to go straight it’s going to go right.
How did that make you feel!
If it’s another fault then it’s easier to rectify caz, it’s a one off. But this particular fault
that I do get now and again.................. it’s not just me, it’s the same with a lot of people.
Once they’ve hit one they hit another then another and all they can think of is hitting 
that shot.
When does this normally occur?
Erm.. .there are various ways in which it happens and one of them is tensing up and, 
err.... trying to push at the ball rather than follow through the ball. Erm.. .So yes, it 
does happen frequently and I shouldn’t be doing that really, not at my standard. Yes, it 
is quite frequent, when it happens.
Any other situations where you feel you experienced a severe performance loss in 
golf or any other sports?
No, I don’t think so, I mean, especially physical sports I think the adrenaline builds up 
so much that I don’t think you really get the fear. Erm.. .Whereas, all I’ll say with golf is 
that like I said before, you are waiting so long, or there's so much time between each 
shot, probably to much time to think. There are too many scenarios that can go on in 
your head. It’s not like a split decision, an instant decision that you have to make like in 
a game o f football. You don’t have time to think in football, whereas there is too much 
more time to think in golf. I think golf is quite a unique sport in that way. Erm.. .There 
are sports where you have to wait a long time, maybe snooker. But really if  you’re 
sitting down you are not in control of the situation, if  you’re sitting down when the 
other player is building a break, you are not in control of that situation you have to wait 
while he’s building a break. You’re reliant too much on the other person, whereas in 
golf it’s an individual sport. Most of the time you are not playing against another person 
you are playing against the course, or you are playing against a lot of people, but not 
directly one to one like snooker. But you are in control of the situation and you have a 
lot o f time to think about it and, or, it takes the right sort of person to be able to deal 
with that. All these top pro’s, you know, they can blank everything out you know, and 
they will concentrate, you have to concentrate for 4.5 hours, it a long time. Although its 
not a physical sport, as such, it’s not like you have to be amazingly fit to play, but you 
have to be amazingly fit in there (interviewee points to his head), the brain. Because 
you’re only playing for about half an hour, actual shot making, the rest of the time it’s a 
mental game. They reckon the game is sort of 70/80% mental and only 20% skill.
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You mentioned ‘fear’ earlier could you expand on this feeling?
I feared failure on that day on the 17th, and that fear was a fear of failure.
From where did this fear transpire?
Erm.. .1 don’t know, you come so far in the round that there is always that fear of 
failure. I mean you aren’t in total control sometimes o f what you are doing and
erm you know that there are dangers out there, and you know the possible
scenarios that can happen. One of these scenarios is hitting it down the middle; another 
scenario is hitting it out o f bounds. The more you stand there the more you think about 
the possible scenarios that lead to failure, than the possible scenarios that lead to 
success. Erm...In a way you are hoping that shot you play will lead to success, but you 
are fearing the shot that you play leads to failure. So, I don’t know, I think the fear of 
failure does play on your mind and results in a loss in performance.
Okay, do you want to make any other comments or ask any questions?
Just that if I could mention that the guy I was playing with was a factor in this, being 
one a friend, and two a rival. Well, not a rival, but someone I’ve competed against 
before. There were only 2 of us in the club at that standard and there was always rivalry 
between us so it was very disappointing to do that in front of him, and I was aware of 
that when things started to go wrong.
Thank you for your time.
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Reinvestment Scale
Name :   Age : .
The following statements describe characteristic o f certain individuals. Read each 
statement and circle the answer (i.e. true / false; yes /  no) that appropriately 
characterises you. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
on any one statement.
I. I’m always trying to figure myself out. True / False
2 .1 am concerned about my style of doing things. True / False
3 .1 remember things that upset me or make me angry for a
long time afterwards. True / False
4 .1 reflect about myself a lot. True /  False
5 .1 get ‘worked up’ just thinking about things that have upset
me in the past. True / False
6. I’m constantly examining my motives. True /  False
7. I’m concerned about the way I present myself. True / False
8 .1 often find myself thinking over and over about
things that have made me angry. True /  False
9 .1 sometimes have the feeling of somewhere watching myself. True / False
10.1 think of ways of getting back at people who have
made me angry long after the event has happened. True / False
II. I’m self-conscious about the way I look. True /  False
12.1 never forget people who upset me, even
about small things. True /  False
13. I’m alert to changes in my mood. True /  False
14. One of the last things I do before leaving my house
is look in the mirror. True / False
15. When I am reminded o f my past failures, I feel as
if  they are happening all over again. True / False
16. Do you have trouble making up your mind? Yes / No
17.1 usually worry about making a good impression. True / False
18. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I
work through a problem. True / False
19. I’m concern about what others think of me. True / False
2 0 .1 worry less about the future than any one I know. True / False
2 2
Modified Anxiety Rating Scale
Name : ....................................................
Directions: A number of statements which athletes have used to describe their feelings 
before performing. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number on the 
(vertical) scale from 1 to 7 to indicate how you are feeling right now before performing. 
Then circle the appropriate number on the (horizontal) scale from 1 to 7 to indicate 
whether you perceive your feelings to be detrimental or helpful to your performance. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement.
I feel nervous, my body feels tight and/or my stomach tense:
1. Not at all Very detrimental Very helpful
2. A little bit to performance to performance
3. Somewhat
4. Moderately so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Quite a bit
6. Very much so
7. Intensely so
I feel concerned about performing poorly and that others will be disappointed with my 
performance:
1. Not at all Very detrimental Very helpful
2. A little bit to performance to performance
3. • Somewhat
4. Moderately so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Quite a bit
6. Very much so
7. Intensely so
I feel secure, mentally relaxed and confident o f coming through under pressure:
1. Not at all Very detrimental Very helpful
2. A little bit to performance to performance
3. Somewhat
4. Moderately so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Quite a bit
6. Very much so
7. Intensely so
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Appendix 8
The Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2
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The Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2
SEC TIO N  1 S E C T IO N  2
Not at 
all
Some­
what
Moderat 
ely so
Very 
much so
Very
negative
Unimportant Very
positive
I am concerned about this competition 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I have self doubts 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel jittery 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I am concerned that I may not do as 
well in this competition as I could
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
My body feels tense 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I am concerned about losing 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel tense in my stomach 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel secure 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I am concerned about choking under 
pressure
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
My body feels relaxed 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I am confident I can meet the challenge 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I am concerned about performing poorly 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
My heart is racing 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m confident about performing well 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m worried about reaching my goal 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel my stomach sinking 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I feel mentally relaxed 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m concerned that others will be 
disappointed with my performance
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
My hands are clammy 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m confident because I mentally picture 
myself reaching my goal
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m concerned I won’t be able to 
concentrate
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
My body feels tight 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
I’m confident at coming through under 
pressure
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
26
Appendix 9 
The Mental Effort Scale
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Rating scale for mental effort
Please rate the mental effort you have just invested in executing each putting stroke.
150
140
130
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very
effortful
Moderately
effortful
Not at all 
effortful
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Appendix 10
The Movement Imagery Questionnaire -  Revised Version
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Condition Criteria
Participant information - Supplement A.
Prior to each putt please would you consider your ideal putting movement, focus on 
performing the ideal movement. The following information has been obtained from a 
reputable coaching source, please read through the points and focus on them for each 
putt.
During Pre-Putting Routine and Putting Execution:
Performance cues (Back swing phase)
1. Focus on how far the right elbow and wrists rotate backwards, and how far your 
shoulders rock to the right in order for the putter-head to achieve the correct back swing 
distance (opposite for left handers). Focus on keeping these distances consistent for 
each putt.
Performance cues (Contact phase)
2. Focus on your wrists being over the ball at point o f contact.
Performance cues (Follow-through phase)
3. Focus on how far the left elbow and wrists rotate forward, and how far your shoulders 
rock to the left in order for the putter-head to achieve the correct follow-through 
distance (opposite for left handers). Focus on keeping these distances consistent for 
each putt.
Participant information - Supplement B.
Prior to each putt I would like you to consider the ideal path of the ball in relation to the 
desired outcome (e.g. straight and accurate). Imagine a successful putt in terms o f the 
direction and destination o f  the golf ball in isolation o f your putting stroke.
Participant information - Supplement C.
During the entire 30 putts of this condition I would like you to call out random letters 
every 1.5secs. to the click o f a metronome. It is important that you continue to generate 
letters throughout the putting task regardless o f your performance. I would also like 
you to give priority to the randomness of the letters generated.
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Competition Brief
The purpose of this study is to analyse different attentional foci on individual putting 
techniques, in relation to accuracy. You will be in competition with all 12 of the golfers 
involved in this study. The aim of the competition is simply to hole as many putts as 
possible using a specific attentional focus. It is important that you continue to use the 
specified focus, regardless of your performance. During the competition phase you are 
required to complete 20 putts in each o f the 3 foci conditions. Your score from each 
condition will be added together to give an overall competition score. Continue to use 
your pre-putting routine if  you have one (e.g. practice putt(s)), however, it is important 
that you incorporate the specific focus during your routine. You will receive 1 point if  
you hole a putt, however, 1 point will be deducted if you miss a putt. You will be 
required to hole missed putts at the end of each set of ten trials. For each additional 
stroke 1 point will be deducted. Missed putts will be marked and removed if  an 
obstruction is caused. After the competition you will be placed into a league table. The 
league table will be sent to you showing you how you performed in relation to the other 
participants in the study. A video recording will also be made so that an analysis can be 
made of your putting technique by a golf professional. The participant that receives the 
highest score will receive a £50 prize. Prior the 20 trials you will be required to fill out 
a simple questionnaire. Similarly, at the end of each condition you will be required to 
give a mental effort rating score. Finally, after 20 trials you will be briefly interviewed 
on your experiences.
Good Luck!
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Social Validation Interview Guide -  Study 4
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Social Validation Interview Guide
1. How did you feel during the performance - were you able to use the 
strategy provided throughout the putting task?
2. What kind of things did you think about during the putting strategy?
3. Did you experience any distracting thoughts?
4. How did the strategy provided affect your performance?
5. Did you experience any specific problems with the putting strategy?
6. Were you satisfied with the results of your performance?
7. How much effort did you invest in actually doing the putting task - 
in which aspect of the task did you expend most effort?
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Appendix 14
Intervention Brief -  Study 5
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Intervention Brief - Participant Information
Phase 1.
For this phase of the study please would you employ the following information in the 
decision-making phase and execution phase of each putt. You will be asked to complete 
50 putts using the following instructions:
Decision-Making Phase of Each Putt. During this phase I would like you to see 
in your mind's eye the correct direction, speed and destination of each putt prior to 
execution. When you image the correct direction, speed and destination o f each putt it 
is important that you employ an external perspective (seeing your self perform on a 
television screen) rather than an internal perspective (seeing yourself perform through 
your own eyes). To help you with this imagery process you will be shown a two-minute 
video (after every 20 putts) o f a golf professional putting. For each putt you will then 
be asked to imagine that you are watching yourself, as an observer, execute the perfect 
putt on the television screen as you did with the golf professional in the video clip. Do 
not spend too much time evaluating each putt; try and keep the time-frame consistent so 
you get into a routine.
Execution Phase of Each Putt. Immediately after you have imaged the correct 
direction, speed and destination of each putt please start to shout out random letters in 
sync with the sound of the metronome every 1.5 seconds. Please prioritize the 
randomness of the letters that you generate. You may stop generating random letters 
after striking each putt.
Please do not practice these strategies at any other time throughout the duration of the 
experiment.
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Phase 2.
For this phase o f the study please would you employ the following information in the 
decision-making phase and execution phase o f each putt. You will be asked to complete 
a total o f 75 putts using the following instructions; 50 putts today and 25 putts on 
another occasion:
Decision-Making Phase o f Each Putt. Identical to the previous phase I would 
like you to see in your mind's eye the correct direction, speed and destination of each 
putt prior to execution. When you image the correct direction, speed and destination of  
each putt it is important that you employ an external perspective (seeing your self 
perform on a television screen) rather than an internal perspective (seeing yourself 
perform through your own eyes). To help you with this imagery process you will be 
shown a two-minute video (after every 20 putts) of a golf professional putting. For each 
putt you will then be asked to imagine that you are watching yourself, as an observer, 
execute the perfect putt on the television screen as you did with the golf professional in 
the video clip. Do not spend too much time evaluating each putt; try and keep the time­
frame consistent so you get into a routine.
Execution Phase o f Each Putt. Immediately after you have imaged the correct 
direction, speed and destination of each putt please start to shout out random letters, this 
time independent of the metronome every 1.5 seconds. Please continue to prioritize the 
randomness of the letters that you generate. You may stop generating random letters 
after striking each putt.
Please do not practice these strategies at any other time throughout the duration o f the 
experiment.
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Phase 3.
For this phase o f the study please would you employ the following information in the 
decision-making phase and execution phase of each putt. You will be asked to complete 
a total of 75 putts using the following instructions:
Decision-Making Phase of Each Putt. Identical to the previous phase I would 
like you to see in your mind's eye the correct direction, speed and destination of each 
putt prior to execution. When you image the correct direction, speed and destination o f 
each putt it is important that you employ an external perspective (seeing your self 
perform on a television screen) rather than an internal perspective (seeing yourself 
perform through your own eyes). To help you with this imagery process you will be 
shown a two-minute video (after every 20 putts) of a golf professional putting. For each 
putt you will then be asked to imagine that you are watching yourself, as an observer, 
execute the perfect putt on the television screen as you did with the golf professional in 
the video clip. Do not spend too much time evaluating each putt; try and keep the time­
frame consistent so you get into a routine.
Execution Phase of Each Putt. Immediately after you have imaged the correct 
direction, speed and destination of each putt please start generating random letters non­
verbally (in your own head) every 1.5 seconds. Please continue to prioritize the 
randomness o f the letters that you generate. You may stop generating random letters 
after striking each putt. In this phase you are required to hole out each putt. Please 
repeat the above processes when doing this.
Please do not practice these strategies at any other time throughout the duration o f the 
experiment.
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Competition Brief - Phase 1
The purpose of this study is to analyse individual putting techniques, in relation to 
accuracy. You will be in a two-phase competition against two other golfers. The aim of 
the competition is simply to hole as many putts as possible. During this phase (1) of the 
competition you will be required to complete 200 putts. You will receive 1 point if  you 
hole a putt; 1 point will be deducted if you miss a putt. You will be required to hole 
missed putts. For each additional stroke 1 point will be deducted. Missed putts will be 
marked and removed if  an obstruction is caused. After completing the second phase of 
the competition you will be placed into a league table. The league table will be sent to 
you indicating your performance in relation to the other two golfers in the study. The 
golfer with the highest score at the end of the competition will be awarded £50. Finally, 
following Europe's success in the 'Ryder Cup' the BBC is currently producing a 
documentary entitled 'Putting on the Pressure'. As part of the documentary the 
university has been contacted in relation to the sport science support that they are 
providing for the members of the English Golf Union (EGU). The BBC is also 
interested in using footage from the cutting edge golf research that is currently being 
conducted through the university. Hence, footage from this experiment may be 
incorporated into the documentary, which is due to be broadcast in January 2005.
Good Luck!
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Competition Brief - Phase 2
The purpose of this study is to analyse individual putting techniques, in relation to 
accuracy. You will be in a two-phase competition against two other golfers. The aim of 
the competition is simply to hole as many putts as possible. It is important that you use 
the specified focus that you have been taught, regardless o f your performance during 
this competition. During this phase (2) of the competition you will be required to 
complete 200 putts. You will receive 1 point if  you hole a putt; 1 point will be deducted 
i f  you miss a putt. You will be required to hole missed putts. For each additional stroke 
1 point will be deducted. Missed putts will be marked and removed if  an obstruction is 
caused. After competing the second phase of the competition you will be placed into a 
league table. The league table will be sent to you indicating your performance in 
relation to the other two golfers in the study. The golfer with the highest score at the 
end o f the competition will be awarded £50. Finally, following Europe's success in the 
'Ryder Cup' the BBC is currently producing a documentary entitled 'Putting on the 
Pressure'. As part of the documentary the university has been contacted in relation to 
the sport science support that they are providing for the members o f the English Golf 
Union (EGU). The BBC is also interested in using footage from the cutting edge golf 
research that is currently being conducted through the university. Hence, footage from 
this experiment may be incorporated into the documentary, which is due to be broadcast 
in January 2005.
Good Luck!
44
Appendix 16
Social Validation Interview Guide / 
Questionnaire -  Study 5
45
Social Validation Interview Guide / Questionnaire
Please complete the following questionnaire giving reasons for your answers and providing as much 
information about your experience as possible. Please read the question carefully and then circle the 
number on the 1-7 (1= poor; 7=good) Likert scale that corresponds with your response.
1. Were you able to use the two-phase putting strategy consistently throughout the 
task?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
• Decision Making Phase:............................................................................................
• Execution Phase:
2. What kind of things did you think about during the two-phase putting strategy?
• Decision Making Phase:............................................................................................
• Execution Phase:
3. Are you able to recall the putts you holed and missed?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. How did the two-phase putting strategy provided, affect your performance?
• Decision Making Phase:........................................................................................
• Execution Phase:
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5. Did you experience any specific problems with the two-phase putting strategy? 
• Decision Making Phase:...........................................................................................
• Execution Phase:
6. What were your general beliefs about your performance?
7. Did you find the two-phase putting strategy positive or negative?
+
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
• Decision Making Phase:...................................................................
• Execution Phase:
8. Would you feel confident in using this strategy during competition?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. How smooth did your putting stroke feel?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Did your experience differ between phase 1 and 2 of the competition, if so in 
what way? ............................................................................................................................
Thank You!
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Study 2
Low and High Reinvestment: Soccer Performance Analysis
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 30.04 1 30.04 .57 .478 .572 .110
STRESS * 
REINVEST
2006.04 1 2006.04 14.80 .008
Error
(STRESS)
315.2 12 52.54
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST 631.75 1 631.75 .13 .731
Error 29245.50 12 4874.25
Computed using alpha = .05
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Study 2
Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Stress Manipulation Check - Somatic Anxiety Intensity
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Pair LSSOMINT 1.6429 14 .92878 .24823
1 HSSOMINT 2.9286 14 1.14114 .30498
Paired Differences
t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Pair LSSOMINT - 
1 HSSOMINT -1.286 1.68379 .4500 -2.2579 -.3135 -2.9 13 .013
Stress Manipulation Check - Cognitive Anxiety Intensity
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Pair LSCOGINT 1.7857 14 1.18831 .31759
1 HSCOGINT 2.9286 14 1.20667 .32250
Paired Differences
t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Pair LSCOGINT - 
1 HSCOGINT -1.1429 1.87523 .50118 -2.2256 -.0601 -2.28 13 .040
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Somatic Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 11.57 1 11.57 5.17 .063 5.17 .480
STRESS * 
REINVEST
3.57 1 3.57 15.00 .008 15.00 .894
Error
(STRESS)
13.43 12 2.24
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST .57 1 .57 .53 .493 .533 .106
Error 6.43 12 1.06
Computed using alpha = .05
51
Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 6.04 1 6.04 2.38 .174 2.380 .257
STRESS * 
REINVEST
4.32 1 4.32 5.28 .062 3.261 .486
Error
(STRESS)
15.21 12 2.54
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST .89 1 .89 1.60 .253 1.596 .187
Error 3.36 12 .56
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-Confidence ("Intensity")
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 17.29 1 17.29 16.69 .006 16.69 .922
STRESS * 
REINVEST
9.14 1 9.14 16.34 .007 16.34 .917
Error
(STRESS)
6.21 12 1.04
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST 5.14 1 5.14 1.89 .219 1.886 .213
Error 16.36 12 2.73
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Somatic Anxiety (Direction)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 10.32 1 10.32 9.63 .021 9.633 .735
STRESS * 
REINVEST
2.89 1 2.89 9.35 .022 9.346 .722
Error
(STRESS)
6.43 12 1.07
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST 2.89 1 2.89 .70 .435 .698 .120
Error 24.86 12 4.14
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Direction)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS .04 1 .04 .01 .909 .014 .051
STRESS * 
REINVEST
.89 1 .89 1.23 .310 1.230 .156
Error
(STRESS)
15.21 12 2.54
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST 10.32 1 10.32 3.66 .104 3.658 .364
Error 16.93 12 2.82
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low and High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-Confidence (Direction)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
1.00 LOW
REINVESTMENT
7
2.00 HIGH
REINVESTMENT
7
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean1
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 8.04 1 8.04 10.23 .019 10.227 .759
STRESS * 
REINVEST
4.32 1 4.32 18.15 .005 18.150 .940
Error
(STRESS)
4.71 12 .79
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
REINVEST 2.89 1 2.89 1.03 .349 1.030 .140
Error 16.86 12 2.81
Computed using alpha = .05
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Study 3
Pretest Phase: Reinvestment
REINVESTMENT Dependent Variable
1 LOW REINVESTMENT
2 HIGH REINVESTMENT
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
Groups
4.225 1 4.225 .102 .751
Within Groups 1576.750 38 41.493
Total 1580.975 39
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Study 3
Retention Phase: Reinvestment x Learning x Time Analysis
Within-Subjects Factors
TIME Dependent Variable
1 PRETEST
2 LAST 2 0 -LEARNING
3 RENTION
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label N
LEARNING 1.00 PROCESS 20
2.00 HOLISTIC 20
REINVESTMENT 1.00 LOW 20
2.00 HIGH 20
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
TIME 3618.350 2 1809.175 84.097 .000
TIME * LEARNING 24.950 2 12.475 .580 .563
TIME * REINVEST 22.050 2 11.025 .512 .601
TIME * LEARNING * 
REINVEST
19.717 2 9.858 .458 .634
Error (TIME) 1548.933 72 21.513
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 321057.075 1 321057.075 8466.406 .000
LEARNING 81.675 1 81.675 2.154 .151
REINVEST 1.875 1 1.875 .049 .825
LEARNING * REINVEST 35.208 1 35.208 .928 .342
Error 1365.167 36 37.921
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Study 3
Low Reinvestment: Basketball Performance Analysis
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
LOW
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 78.400 1 78.400 2.116 .163 .105 2.116 .281
STRESS * 
LEARNING
57.600 1 57.600 1.554 .228 .079 1.554 .219
Error
(STRESS)
667.000 18 37.056
Computed using alpha = .05 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 119028.100 1 119028.100 2849.077 .000 .994 2849.077 1.000
LEARNING 16.900 1 16.900 .405 .533 .022 .405 .093
Error 752.000 18 41.778
Computed using alpha = .05
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Study 3
Low Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis 
Somatic Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
LOW
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 3.025 1 3.025 12.236 .003 .405 12.236 .911
STRESS * 
LEARNING
2.500E-02 1 2.500E-02 .101 .754 .006 .101 .060
2.500E-02 1.000 2.500E-02 .101 .754 .006 .101 .060
Error (STRESS) 4.450 18 .247
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 198.025 1 198.025 347.751 .000 .951 347.751 1.000
LEARNING 1.225 1 1.225 2.151 .160 .107 2.151 .284
Error 10.250 18 .569
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
LOW
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 3.025 1 3.025 22.224 .000 .553 22.224 .994
STRESS * 
LEARNING
2.500E-02 1 2.500E-02 .184 .673 .010 .184 .069
Error(STRESS) 2.450 18 .136
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 156.025 1 156.025 218.556 .000 .924 218.556 1.000
LEARNING .625 1 .625 .875 .362 .046 .875 .144
Error 12.850 18 .714
Computed using alpha = .05
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Low Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-Confidence Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
LOW
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 2.025 1 2.025 2.710 .117 .131 2.710 .344
STRESS * 
LEARNING
2.500E-02 1 2.500E-02 .033 .857 .002 .033 .053
Error(STRESS) 13.450 18 .747
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 855.625 1 855.625 738.669 .000 .976 738.669 1.000
LEARNING 3.025 1 3.025 2.612 .123 .127 2.612 .334
Error 20.850 18 1.158
Computed using alpha = .05
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Study 3
High Reinvestment: Basketball Performance Analysis
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
HIGH
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
Df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 36.100 1 36.100 .659 .428 .035 .659 .120
STRESS * 
LEARNING
422.500 1 422.500 7.710 .012 .300 7.710 .747
Error(STRESS) 986.400 18 54.800
Computed using alpha = .05 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 108993.600 1 108993.600 1692.155 .000 .989 1692.155 1.000
LEARNING 10.000 1 10.000 .155 .698 .009 .155 .066
Error 1159.400 18 64.411
Computed using alpha = .05
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Study 3
Hieh Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis 
Somatic Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
HIGH
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 65.025 1 65.025 170.869 .000 .905 170.869 1.000
STRESS * 
LEARNING
.625 1 .625 1.642 .216 .084 1.642 .229
Error(STRESS) 6.850 18 .381
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 600.625 1 600.625 928.004 .000 .981 928.004 1.000
LEARNING .225 1 .225 . .348 .563 .019 .348 .086
Error 11.650 18 .647
Computed using alpha = .05
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High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
HIGH
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source
i
Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 65.025 1 65.025 60.803 .000 .772 60.803 1.000
STRESS * 
LEARNING
.225 1 .225 .210 .652 .012 .210 .072
Error(STRESS) 19.250 18 1.069
Computed using alpha = .05 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 555.025 1 555.025 529.997 .000 .967 529.997 1.000
LEARNING .625 1 .625 .597 .450 .032 .597 .113
Error 18.850 18 1.047
Computed using alpha = .05
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High Reinvestment: Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-Confidence (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
STRESS Dependent Variable
1 LOW STRESS
2 HIGH STRESS
Between-Subjects Factors
HIGH
REINVESTMENT
Value Label N
1.00 PROCESS 10
2.00 HOLISTIC 10
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
STRESS 18.225 1 18.225 29.688 .000 .623 29.688 .999
STRESS * 
LEARNING
13.225 1 13.225 21.543 .000 .545 21.543 .992
Error(STRESS) 11.050 18 .614
Computed using alpha = .05
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta
Squared
Noncent.
Parameter
Observed
Power
Intercept 585.225 1 585.225 275.400 .000 .939 275.400 1.000
LEARNING 3.025 1 3.025 1.424 .248 .073 1.424 .204
Error 38.250 18 2.125
Computed using alpha = .05
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Appendix 19 
Statistical Analysis for Study 4
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Study 4
Golf Performance Analysis
Within-Subjects Factors
FOCI Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 15.92 1.240 12
INTERNAL 12.58 1.311 12
EXTERNAL 14.17 2.167 12
RLG 15.08 1.084 12
Tests o f Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
73.396 3 24.465 13.602 .000
Greenhouse-
Geisser
73.396 1.916 38.312 13.602 .000
Huynh-Feldt 73.396 2.310 31.766 13.602 .000
Lower-bound 73.396 1.000 73.396 13.602 .004
Error(FOCI
)
Sphericity
Assumed
59.354 33 1.799
Greenhouse-
Geisser
59.354 21.073 2.817
Huynh-Feldt 59.354 25.415 2.335
Lower-bound 59.354 11.000 5.396
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Somatic Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
SOM Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 17.1667 3.24271 12
INTERNAL 22.8333 3.95045 12
EXTERNAL 22.5833 5.94610 12
RLG 24.3333 6.61037 12
Tests o f Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
SOM Sphericity
Assumed
354.563 3 118.188 7.398 .001
Greenhouse-
Geisser
354.563 2.213 160.252 7.398 .002
Huynh-Feldt 354.563 2.794 126.911 7.398 .001
Lower-bound 354.563 1.000 354.563. 7.398 .020
Error(SOM Sphericity
Assumed
527.188 33 15.975
Greenhouse-
Geisser
527.188 24.338 21.661
Huynh-Feldt 527.188 30.732 17.155
Lower-bound 527.188 11.000 47.926
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
COG Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
• N
BASELINE 16.8333 4.15240 12
INTERNAL 23.3333 2.34844 12
EXTERNAL 23.0833 3.50216 12
RLG 25.5000 4.10100 12
Tests o f Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
COG Sphericity
Assumed
501.062 3 167.021 28.094 .000
Greenhouse-
Geisser
501.062 2.654 188.812 28.094 .000
Huynh-Feldt 501.062 3.000 167.021 28.094 .000
Lower-bound 501.062 1.000 501.062 28.094 .000
Error(COG Sphericity
Assumed
196.187 33 5.945
Greenhouse-
Geisser
196.187 29.191 6.721
Huynh-Feldt 196.187 33.000 5.945
Lower-bound 196.187 11.000 17.835
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-confidence (Intensity)
Within-Subjects Factors
CONF Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 23.50 4.700 12
INTERNA
L
20.42 4.870 12
EXTERNA
L
20.58 5.017 12
RLG 17.17 4.970 12
Tests o f Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
CONF Sphericity
Assumed
241.167 3 80.389 9.297 .000
Greenhouse-
Geisser
241.167 2.187 110.284 9.297 .001
Huynh-Feldt 241.167 2.751 87.679 9.297 .000
Lower-bound 241.167 1.000 241.167 9.297 .011
Error(CON
F)
Sphericity
Assumed
285.333 33 8.646
Greenhouse-
Geisser
285.333 24.055 11.862
Huynh-Feldt 285.333 30.256 9.431
Lower-bound 285.333 11.000 25.939
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Somatic Anxiety (Direction)
Within-Subjects Factors
FOCI Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 3.0833 6.48717 12
INTERNAL -4.2500 9.00631 12
EXTERNAL -5.2500 9.11667 12
RLG -6.5000 10.05892 12
Tests o f Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
668.063 3 222.688 18.409 .000
Greenhouse-
Geisser
668.063 1.871 357.031 18.409 .000
Huynh-Feldt 668.063 2.241 298.165 18.409 .000
Lower-bound 668.063 1.000 668.063 18.409 .001
Error(FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
399.188 33 12.097
Greenhouse-
Geisser
399.188 20.583 19.394
Huynh-Feldt 399.188 24.646 16.197
Lower-bound 399.188 11.000 36.290
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Cognitive Anxiety (Direction) 
Within-Subjects Factors
FOCI Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 2.4167 7.07696 12
INTERNAL -3.7500 6.96909 12
EXTERNAL -4.9167 7.46456 12
RLG -7.7500 10.51514 12
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
661.667 3 220.556 16.473 .000
Greenhouse-
Geisser
661.667 2.347 281.877 16.473 .000
Huynh-Feldt 661.667 3.000 220.556 16.473 .000
Lower-bound 661.667 1.000 661.667 16.473 .002
Error(FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
441.833 33 13.389
Greenhouse-
Geisser
441.833 25.821 17.111
Huynh-Feldt 441.833 33.000 13.389
Lower-bound 441.833 11.000 40.167
a Computed using alpha = .05
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Anxiety Rating Scale Analysis
Self-confidence (Direction)
Within-Subjects Factors
FOCI Dependent
Variable
1 BASELINE
2 INTERNAL
3 EXTERNAL
4 RLG
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Deviation
N
BASELINE 4.6667 8.21676 12
INTERNAL 2.5833 8.39327 12
EXTERNAL 2.5000 10.04083 12
RLG -4.5833 12.39837 12
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
588.417 3 196.139 7.587 .001
Greenhouse-
Geisser
588.417 1.891 311.208 7.587 .004
Huynh-Feldt 588.417 2.271 259.076 7.587 .002
Lower-bound 588.417 1.000 588.417 7.587 .019
Error(FOCI Sphericity
Assumed
853.083 33 25.851
Greenhouse-
Geisser
853.083 20.798 41.017
Huynh-Feldt 853.083 24.983 34.146
Lower-bound 853.083 11.000 77.553
a Computed using alpha = .05
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